









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Chen, S. (2019). Marriage, minorities, and mass movements. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Marriage, Minorities, and
Mass Movements
A dissertation presented by
SHUAI CHEN





ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University op gezag van prof. dr.
G.M. Duijsters, als tijdelijk waarnemer van de functie rector magnificus en uit dien
hoofde vervangend voorzitter van het college voor promoties, in het openbaar te
verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen
commissie in de Aula van de Universiteit op maandag 1 juli 2019 om 16.00 uur door
SHUAI CHEN
geboren te Fujian, China
PROMOTORES: Prof. dr. ir. J.C. van Ours
Prof. dr. A.H.O. van Soest







Almost six years ago, as a former Ph.D. student in statistics I arrived at Tilburg University
with big curiosity about economics. Here I have profoundly understood “endogeneity”
this word for the first time. Here I have toughly struggled with difficult economic theories
and models. Here I have luckily met wonderful teachers and friends. Here I have obtained
support to pay an academic visit to the London School of Economics during which I
have benefited from the world-class intellectual climate and have enjoyed the globally
metropolitan vibe. Here I have proudly presented my first work in economics – my Ph.D.
dissertation “Marriage, Minorities, and Mass Movements”. At this moment, I want to
thank many people for their lesson and criticism, care and love, much and everything.
First and foremost, I am considerably grateful to my supervisors Jan C. van Ours and
Arthur van Soest for their invaluable advice and guidance throughout this dissertation.
Working with Jan has been not only an efficient and pleasant experience, but also a
precious learning opportunity to become a qualified academic. He was always being
inspiring and encouraging when I wrote new research proposals. He provided me with
information on potentially appropriate data and relevant literature he had in mind. When
I was stuck in programing problems of complicated models, he patiently discussed details
with me and helped me to figure out possible solutions. Moreover, Jan led me into
the networks of labor and applied economists by introducing various good conferences
and many of his colleagues to me. I benefited substantially from participating in these
conferences and communicating with these academics. Since Jan left Tilburg University,
Arthur has jointly taken the responsibility for me as my another supervisor. Undoubtedly,
his unique and best lectures in microeconometrics laid the foundation of my research.
Arthur assisted me greatly with my job market paper from evaluation of the potential
of research ideas through comparison between different model specifications to correction
of my grammatical mistakes. His precise, patient, and prompt answers to econometric
questions saved me a huge amount of precious time during the job market season. Both
Jan and Arthur are my role models with their academic devotion as well as charming
personality. I wish I will be a person like them that are not only respected as a prestigious
economist but also liked as a kind person.
i
I want to sincerely thank my mentor outside my specific research field – Laurence van
Lent. His comments and suggestions from perspectives of business and political economy
facilitated to broaden the audience target and to generalize the research attractiveness of
my dissertation. When I was on the job market, he taught me numerous communicating
skills from which I significantly benefited in interviews, campus visits, and negotiations.
I also would like to express my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee:
Eleonora Freddi, Erik Plug, Martin Salm, and David Schindler. They devoted much of
their valuable time to carefully reading my dissertation and generously offering the most
detailed and constructive referee reports I had ever received. In particular, I am thankful
to Eleonora Freddi and David Schindler for their elaborate instructions on the job talk
with their own experience. Without their help, I would be much less confident in many
skills as an academic presenter.
I have benefited considerably from insightful discussions and conversations with col-
leagues at Tilburg and other schools on my research and the job market. They include but
are not limited to Tim Besley, Otilia Boldea, Jan Boone, Patricio Dalton, Robert Dur,
Mery Ferrando, Paul Frijters, Reyer Gerlagh, Leander Heldring, Tobias Klein, Michal
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support for my overseas visits, job applications, and academic meeting reservations.
It has been my pleasure and honor to gain friendships during the period of my Ph.D.
program. Haikun has been my most supportive and reliable friend. I highly enjoyed the
time spent with him and our conversations on various topics. Khulan and Xiaoyu have
been the greatest teaching partners and considerate officemates. As Ph.D. students in
a previous cohort, Yuxin and Chen kindly provided me with many suggestions on every
aspect of the Ph.D. life at Tilburg. I appreciate too the heartfelt encouragement from
Mancy when I was on the job market, the regular company of Ruishen in the sports
center, as well as the fun events organized by Florian and Jaime. Moreover, I will never
forget how Lei, Yadi, Masha, Elisabeth, and I fought hard together for the best group
of the microeconomics and macroeconomics assignments. I also enjoyed those lunches
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This dissertation in applied economics studies how individuals respond in their well-
being, behavior, attitudes and preferences to changes in their personal life and in society.
It consists of three chapters applying economic perspectives and methodologies in the
fields of labor economics and political economy. The second chapter investigates the
effects of partnership dynamics on subjective well-being. The third chapter explores the
symbolic functions of marriage on the stability of formal partnerships. Both chapters
are with a special focus on sexual minorities. The fourth chapter, also the last chapter,
studies how economic insecurity and cultural backlash have shaped the current populist
attitudes and preferences, and have triggered the populist voting behavior in the United
States.
The well-being effects of partnerships, especially of marriages, have been extensively
studied. The positive association between partnership and well-being could originate
from a causal protection effect of partnership, or merely selection, i.e. happier individu-
als are more likely to enter a partnership, or reverse causality such that a shock to one’s
current well-being induces a jump in one’s future probability of partnership entry. It is of
importance to disentangle these three effects. Moreover, partnerships of sexual minorities
are largely unexplored. As society has become more tolerant for sexual minorities, formal
partnership including registered partnership and marriage has been legalized, and public
informal cohabitation has become popular among sexual minorities in many countries
around the world. Thus it is interesting to investigate the influences of same-sex partner-
ships. There are two reasons why the sexual nature of a partnership can have different
effects. First, same-sex couples may be less likely to obtain social connections and sup-
port for their partnership (Badgett, 1995; Clain and Leppel, 2001; Berg and Lien, 2002;
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Carpenter, 2007; Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2007; Patacchini et al., 2015). Second, pressure
from family and society may force sexual minorities to adjust their behavior (Plug et al.,
2014), which in turn affects their well-being.
Chapter 2, coauthored with Jan C. van Ours, analyzes Dutch panel data to investigate
whether partnership has a causal effect on subjective well-being. We take into account
selection effects with an individual fixed effects model given that these selection effects are
due to time-invariant unobservables such as personality. Exploring the effects of current
happiness on future probability of partnership entry, we do not find evidence for reverse
causality. As in previous studies, we confirm that, on average, being in a partnership
improves well-being. Well-being gains of marriage are larger than those of cohabitation.
We systematically compare every pair of entry and exit among different partnership
transitions examining whether the effects within every pair are symmetric. We confirm
symmetry between the well-being effects of partnership formation and disruption. We
also find that marriage improves well-being for both younger and older cohorts, whereas
cohabitation benefits only the younger cohort. Our main contribution to the literature
of partnership and well-being is the special focus on same-sex partnerships. We find that
these effects are homogeneous to sexual orientation. Gender differences exist in the well-
being effects of same-sex partnerships: females are happier cohabiting, whereas marriage
has a stronger well-being effect on males.
Furthermore, the existing economic literature of marriage has mainly focused on its
practical economic incentives and benefits (Becker, 1974; Lundberg and Pollak, 2015; Pol-
lak, 1985; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007; Treas, 1993) and neglected its symbolic functions.
In the current era of the deinstitutionalization of marriage, the practical importance of
marriage has declined while its symbolic significance has still remained high and may
have risen (Cherlin, 2004). The symbolic significance of marriage will not be replaced
by other types of partnerships easily but keep vital in the future. Marriage enforces a
unique public commitment to a long-term and even lifelong relationship, which is usually
expressed in front of relatives, friends, and religious clans (Cherlin, 2004).1 This public
commitment and its resulting enforceable trust (Cherlin, 2000; Portes and Sensenbrenner,
1993) reduce the transaction costs of enforcing agreements between the partners (Pollak,
1985). Furthermore, marriage has evolved to become a marker of individual prestige and
1In the Netherlands, couples going to marry have to declare “in the presence of the witnesses that
they accept each other as husband and wife and that they will faithfully fulfill all duties which the law
connects to their marital status” (Article 67 of Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code) and usually hold a
civil ceremony and a wedding. In contrast, a registered partnership formally starts with a registration
through a registrar.
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personal achievement, rendering itself distinct from other types of relationships (Bulcroft
et al., 2000; Cherlin, 2004).
Chapter 3, also coauthored with Jan C. van Ours, studies the effect of the symbolic
significance of marriage on the stability of formal partnerships. We are interested in
the stability of formal partnerships because of its benefits to the involved households
and society. First, couples experience larger well-being gains from marriage than from
cohabitation as well as higher happiness loss from disruption of marriage than from dis-
solution of cohabitation (Chen and van Ours, 2018; Kohn and Averett, 2014a,b; Stutzer
and Frey, 2006). Second, children benefit more from a stable legal parent union (Pawel-
ski et al., 2006; Prickett et al., 2015; Reczek et al., 2016). Third, stable relationships
with longer duration and legally enforceable commitment (through credible punishment
threats) increase fertility (Fahn et al., 2016; Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2008). Married cou-
ples anticipating a higher probability of divorce give birth to fewer children (Becker et al.,
1977; Fan, 2001; Lillard and Waite, 1993). In aging societies such as most of the devel-
oped countries and China, the constantly low or further declining fertility rate has been
a serious economic and demographic issue.
We exploit Dutch same-sex marriage legalization as a shock to the symbol of marital
institution given that registered partnership and marriage are almost equivalent with
a difference in symbolic meaning. With rich administrative data, we investigate the
transition rate from registered partnership to marriage and divorce hazards from both
types of relationships simultaneously. Our model allows the distinction between the
effect of the symbolic significance of marriage and selection effects. We find that same-
sex marriage legalization increased the divorce hazard by more than 48% for existing
female partnerships and 203% for existing male ones. However, transition to marriage
reduced the divorce hazard by 68% for female partnerships and 98% for male ones, which
the divorce costs can explain only partly. This remarkable symbolic effect of same-sex
marriage identified during the deinstitutionalization of marriage in the highly tolerant
Netherlands for sexual minorities may provide common implications for marriages in
general.
Societies around the world have not only witnessed the deinstitutionalization of mar-
riage, but also been confronted with the deinstitutionalization of established politics and
ideology. For a decade or more, during the Great Recession and alongside the recent
immigrant influx, populism has been on the rise in many Western democracies including
the U.S. (Dorn et al., 2016) and part of Europe (Colantone and Stanig, 2018b; Dustmann
et al., 2017). Populism may harm the established and predictable order of politics and
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the economy that has fostered economic growth and democratic norms (Rodrik, 2018b).
Populism may also exert negative influences on economic performance by imprudently
changing redistribution policy under political pressure (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Di Tella
et al., 2017; Sachs, 1990), through the banking and credit system (Rousseau, 2016), and
through distrust (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Dustmann et al., 2017; Guiso et al., 2004;
Knack and Keefer, 1997). There may exist situations where “economic populism” rather
than “political populism” benefits the vast majority of the nation, such as significant
overhaul and perhaps even erosion of established economic practices and restraints dur-
ing severe economic downturns (Rodrik, 2018a). Understanding what triggers populism
is important if economists and policy makers want to manage its impact.
Chapter 4 examines how economic insecurity and cultural backlash have triggered the
current populism in the United States. Specifically, I exploit two quasi-natural experi-
ments, the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration crisis, to investigate the effects of
unemployment and unauthorized immigration on attitudes related to populism and pop-
ulist voting in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. I discover that recent unemployment
during the Great Recession, rather than existing unemployment from before the reces-
sion, increased the probability of attitudes forming against wealthy elites by more than
14 percentage points. Such attitudes are connected with left-wing populism. I identify
perceived economic unfairness as a mechanism through which recent unemployment drove
left-wing populism. However, cultural backlash rather than economic insecurity escalated
by more than 12 percentage points the probability of anti-immigration attitudes develop-
ing. These attitudes are related to right-wing populism. Furthermore, I obtain evidence
that cohorts economically suffering the aftermath of the Great Recession were 42 per-
centage points more inclined to support left-wing populist Bernie Sanders, while cohorts
residing in regions most intensely impacted by the immigration crisis were 10 percentage
points more likely to vote for right-wing populist Donald Trump. My study disentangles
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on subjective well-being. As in previous studies, we find that, on average, being in a
partnership improves well-being. Well-being gains of marriage are larger than those
of cohabitation. The well-being effects of partnership formation and disruption are
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older cohorts, whereas cohabitation benefits only the younger cohort. Our main
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2.1 Introduction
In the past decades, a large number of studies in economics, sociology, and demography
emerged on the relationship between partnership and well-being or happiness.1 This
literature predominantly asserts a positive association between marriage and well-being
(Carr and Springer, 2010; Diener and Eunkook Suh, 1997; Gove and Shin, 1989; Kalmijn,
2017; Umberson and Karas Montez, 2010; Waite and Gallagher, 2000). Recently, a few
studies examined whether such a positive relationship exists between cohabitation and
well-being finding mixed results (Brown et al., 2005; Hansen et al., 2007; Kamp Dush,
2013; Kohn and Averett, 2014a; Musick and Bumpass, 2012; Soons and Kalmijn, 2009;
Soons et al., 2009; Wright and Brown, 2017).
The positive association between partnership and well-being could originate from a
causal effect of partnership on happiness. However, the positive association could also
be due to selection, i.e. happier individuals are more likely to enter a partnership (John-
son and Wu, 2002; Kim and McKenry, 2002; Sandberg-Thoma and Kamp Dush, 2014;
Stutzer and Frey, 2006; Waldron et al., 1996; Kalmijn, 2017; Wilson and Oswald, 2005).2
For the causal effect there are four nonexclusive explanations. First, partnered individ-
uals may gain from “production complementarities”, i.e. specialization and division of
labor (Becker, 1974, 1981; Stutzer and Frey, 2006). Second, there may be “consumption
and investment complementarities” (Lundberg and Pollak, 2015; Stevenson and Wolfers,
2007). Couples may benefit from economies of scale by pooling resources, jointly con-
suming public goods and investing in children, and sharing leisure activities (Killewald,
2013; Waite and Gallagher, 2000). Third, a partnership may strengthen and expand so-
cial relationships. Partnered individuals do not only receive intimacy, commitment, and
care from their partner, but also obtain material and emotional support from the family,
relatives and friends of their partner (Dush and Amato, 2005; Ross, 1995). Last but not
least, a partnership may introduce social control and mutual supervision salutary to the
couple’s well-being. The norms in a partnership and the daily supervision by the partner
reduce possible risky behavior (Duncan et al., 2006; Fleming et al., 2010; Monden et al.,
2003; Umberson, 1992).
We investigate the well-being effects of partnership dynamics in the Netherlands where
there have been notable demographic changes in the past decades. In terms of partner-
1The literature regards subjective well-being as a substitute for happiness (Diener et al., 2009). We
use the two terms interchangeably.
2There could be adverse selection too if individuals with inferior well-being more likely actively seek
for the protection a partnership offers.
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ship formation, cohabitation has become more popular at the expense of marriage. For
example, by age 30, 34% of women born in the 1950s had been or were still cohabiting
and 78% had been or were still married. Among women born in the 1970s, by age 30
these percentages switched to 69% for cohabitation and 45% for marriage. In the year
1998, there were about 3.4 million married couples, 0.6 million cohabiting households and
2.2 million single households. In 2016 the number of married couples decreased to 3.3
million, while the numbers of cohabiting couples and single households increased to 1.0
and 2.9 million, respectively. Furthermore, fewer cohabiting couples have made a transi-
tion into marriage. For instance, for cohabiting women aged 20-24, there is a clear drop
in the probability to be married within three years after cohabitation started. For those
starting to cohabit in the period 1970-1974, this probability was 58%, while for those in
the period 1980-1984, it reduced to 37%, and for the 1990-1994 cohort, it further fell to
27%. In the meantime, the divorce rates have risen. In 1970 about 0.3% of all marriages
dissolved, in 2014 this was about 1% (Statistics Netherlands).
Our paper exploits panel data on partnerships and subjective well-being collected in
the Netherlands over the period 2008-2013. Our data allow us to make a distinction be-
tween marriage and cohabitation and between different-sex and same-sex relationships.
Couples may invest different levels of tangible and intangible capital (Michael, 2004) in
marriage and cohabitation (Nock, 1995; Stanley et al., 2004). Thus, the subjective well-
being derived from cohabitation and marriage may be different. There are two reasons
why the sexual nature of a partnership can have different effects on well-being. First,
same-sex couples may be less likely to obtain social connections and support for their
partnership. Although same-sex marriages have been legalized since 2001 in the Nether-
lands, this type of partnerships may still not be completely accepted by these couples’
family, relatives, neighbors, or even employers and fellow employees (Badgett, 1995; Clain
and Leppel, 2001; Berg and Lien, 2002; Carpenter, 2007; Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2007; Pat-
acchini et al., 2015). As soon as same-sex partners start cohabiting or get married, their
sexual orientation is likely to be disclosed to the public including their employers and
co-workers (Plug and Berkhout, 2004). Possible discrimination and unfriendly behav-
ior will directly harm their well-being (Mays and Cochran, 2001; Meyer, 2003; Huebner
et al., 2004; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010; McCabe et al., 2010). Second, pressure from
family and society may force sexual minorities to adjust their behavior, which in turn
affects their well-being. For instance, they may refuse to openly enter a partnership, be
less likely to adopt a child, shy away from prejudiced occupations (Plug et al., 2014),
and bear a higher risk of partnership dissolution. According to Statistics Netherlands, in
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2015 over 30% of female same-sex couples married in 2005 ended up with divorce. The
corresponding percentages of male same-sex and different-sex couples are 15% and 18%
respectively.3 Due to the heterogeneity of their partnership formation and stability, the
effect of marital partnership on well-being may differ between same-sex and different-sex
couples. The issues of the well-being and marital partnership of same-sex couples are
largely unexplored in the literature.
Previous studies have investigated differences in well-being effects from marriage and
cohabitation but neglected potential heterogeneity of sexual orientation. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate whether same-sex partnerships have a
different effect on subjective well-being than different-sex partnerships have. Being the
first country that started implementing the same-sex marriage law, the Netherlands bears
the longest duration and relatively mature evolution of same-sex marriages so that its
relevant data are considerably appropriate for our specific research topic. Moreover, the
Netherlands is a country with a highly tolerant attitude to same-sex, bi-sexual and trans-
gender (LGBT) individuals or sexual minorities. For example, in the Eurobarometer
2015, 91% of the Dutch respondents agreed on the statement that “same-sex marriages
should be allowed throughout Europe”, while the average across the 28 EU countries on
this was 61% (European Commission, 2015).
We also study whether partnership effects on subjective well-being are age-cohort spe-
cific. Nowadays, older adults are more likely to be unmarried by remaining cohabiting
or dating without making a formal commitment (Brown and Shinohara, 2013; Brown
et al., 2006; Calasanti and Kiecolt, 2007; Cooney and Dunne, 2001; Sassler, 2010) and
by increasingly divorcing (Brown and Lin, 2012; Kennedy and Ruggles, 2014). Later in
life, cohabitation operates as a long-term alternative to marriage. Therefore, the positive
well-being effect of cohabitation may be comparable to that of marriage for the older
cohort (Brown et al., 2012; King and Scott, 2005; Vespa, 2012; Wright and Brown, 2017).
However, it may also be that older adults prefer to protect the wealth they have accu-
mulated over their lifetime rather than pool resources with their partner (Brown et al.,
3The differences in divorce risks between same-sex partnerships and different-sex partnerships may
be attributed to different factors. Same-sex couples are less likely to have children in their household
and children and the investment in children usually facilitate to stabilize a partnership (Andersson et al.,
2006). Another risk factor of divorce for same-sex couples is big age difference (Noack et al., 2005).
As in the Netherlands, in Norway and Sweden, same-sex marriages of women have the highest divorce
risks (Andersson et al., 2006; Noack et al., 2005). The reasons for gender differences in divorce risks of
same-sex partnerships are not clearly addressed in the literature. It may be because of different levels
of minority stress (Meyer, 2003). Moreover, it could be that the so called “open relationship” or “open
marriage” might prevail more in same-sex couples of men and less so in same-sex couples of women
compared to different-sex couples.
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2012). Cohabitation allows them to retain financial and economic autonomy (Brown
et al., 2018; Chevan, 1996; Hatch, 1995). Moreover, older adults may be less willing to
provide care-giving at later stages of their life. Cohabitation does not explicitly enforce
this kind of responsibility as marriage does (Talbott, 1998). Therefore, the positive well-
being effect of cohabitation could be smaller than that of marriage for older adults. Our
study adds to the literature that debates whether for different age-cohorts the well-being
impact of cohabitation is similar to that of marriage.
Finally, we analyze whether the well-being effects are symmetric for partnership for-
mation and partnership dissolution. Symmetry implies that partnership formation and
partnership dissolution have similar magnitudes but opposite signs. Intuitively, at the
beginning of a partnership a couple is enjoying the intimacy and mutual trust (Michael,
2004) and thus partnership formation has a positive effect on well-being (Lucas et al.,
2003; Lucas and Clark, 2006). However, as time goes by a partnership may be con-
fronted with difficulties and face a breakup. Therefore, partnership dissolution may have
a negative effect on the well-being of the individuals involved. Only a handful of stud-
ies examined the well-being gain of a partnership formation and the well-being loss of a
partnership dissolution simultaneously. Usually, strong effects of partnership dissolution
are found (Kalmijn, 2017; Simon, 2002; Strohschein et al., 2005; Williams and Umberson,
2004). However, these studies do not rigorously test whether partnership formation and
dissolution have symmetric effects on well-being. Hence, our paper is one of the pio-
neers to systematically compare every pair of entry and exit among different partnership
transitions examining whether the effects within every pair are symmetric.
All in all, our contribution to the literature on partnership and well-being is threefold.
First, we establish the causal effect of marriage and cohabitation on subjective well-
being. Second, our paper systematically tests the symmetry of partnership formation
and dissolution. The third and also our key contribution to the literature is on well-being
effects of same-sex partnerships. We confirm the results from previous studies that the
well-being gains of marriage are larger than those of cohabitation. We find that these
effects are homogeneous to sexual orientation. We also find gender differences in the well-
being effects of same-sex partnerships. Females are happier cohabiting while marriage




Traditionally there are two competing models explaining the mechanisms through which
partnership formation and partnership dissolution affect well-being: the long-term re-
source accumulation model and the short-term crisis adaptation model.
The long-term resource model argues that the well-being gains of partnership forma-
tion accumulate over time rather than manifest immediately. With the proceeding of a
partnership, a couple keeps investing more resources in terms of shared tangible property
(income, real estate, combined families and mutual friends) and intangible capital (in-
timacy, trust, commitment and family responsibilities) (Kamp Dush and Amato, 2005;
Rhoades et al., 2011; Rusbult, 1980). This implies that the partnership ties become
stronger over time and the positive well-being effect increases with partnership duration
(Kalmijn, 2017; Waite and Gallagher, 2000). Likewise, the well-being losses of part-
nership disruption will materialize gradually. Besides, the loss of the gradually accrued
investment in the previous partnership makes it difficult to recover for the divorcees’
well-being (Stanley et al., 2006). Simpson (1987) shows that after breaking up a longer
partnership, people feel higher level of distress over a longer period of time than individu-
als who break up after a short partnership. The resource model has some variants such as
investment model (Rusbult, 1980), role theory (Pearlin, 1999) and chronic strain theory
(Amato, 2000), all of which share the similar idea of gradual well-being promotion and
deterioration in the long run during partnership formation and dissolution, respectively.
The short-term crisis adaption model asserts that the stress around a partnership
disruption is only temporary and the divorcees are able to recover or adjust quickly. Thus
the initial negative well-being effect will fade with the passage of time (Acock and Demo,
1994; Booth and Amato, 1991; Pearlin, 2009; Stroebe et al., 2007). Moreover, Wheaton
(1990) claims that a partnership disruption, as a stressful event, actually alleviates the
stress of sustaining an unsuitable partnership with low quality, so the breakup distress
is only short-term. Similarly, the positive well-being effect of a partnership formation
is also only temporary. Partnered individuals increase merely short-term well-being and
then adapt back to the original level of well-being of pre-partnership that is determined
by stable internal characteristics like personality (Anusic et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2003;
Lucas and Clark, 2006; Musick and Bumpass, 2012; Soons et al., 2009). Other variants
of the crisis model include adaptation theory (Diener et al., 2006; Lucas et al., 2003),
stressful-event-as-stress-relief-model (Wheaton, 1990), and setpoint theory (Anusic et al.,
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2014).
The theory of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe, 2007) and the ideational
perspective (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988) argue that in countries where citizens’ phys-
iological and safety needs have been met, society shifts to valuing self-actualization and
individual autonomy. If partnerships support this kind of self-actualization and individ-
ual autonomy, partners in the union will enjoy the well-being gains; otherwise, partners
will not have these well-being gains or may even have well-being declines. Similarly,
Finkel et al. (2014) recently put forward that in today’s modern society, young people
hold increasingly high expectations and standards of marriage, such as personal growth
in the marital union. The newly marrieds will feel disappointed if marriage does not
catch up with their high expectations and standards of marriage, hence their well-being
may not change substantially or may even decline after getting married.
2.2.2 Gender Differences
A few studies have explored gender differences in these well-being effects. Men and women
seem to be affected in a similar pattern by marital statuses and transitions (Kalmijn,
2017; Strohschein et al., 2005; Williams, 2003). However, gender differences in the levels
of these effects are found especially for marital dissolution in Simon (2002), Umberson
(1992), and Williams and Dunne-Bryant (2006). Simon (2002) and Williams and Dunne-
Bryant (2006) find that divorce entails a stronger depression for women than for men, and
a more significant reduction in psychological well-being for women with young children
than for their male counterparts. On the contrary, Kalmijn (2017) and Williams and
Umberson (2004) allege that marital dissolution undermines life satisfaction and self-
reported health for men more than for women. Blekesaune (2008) claims that divorce
elevates more distress for mothers than for fathers. These differences may be attributed
to different social roles of men and women in a partnership (Umberson, 1992) or simply
different forms of responses to marital transitions between men and women (Simon, 2002).
Gender differences exist between marriage and cohabitation as well, although the re-
sults are quite mixed. Wright and Brown (2017) conclude that partnered men in both
marriage and cohabitation enjoy similar well-being gains compared to dating and single
men, while there are no considerable well-being differences among marital statuses for
women. However, Brown et al. (2005) find that among middle-aged and older adults,
married women have identical depression scores as cohabiting women and men do, while
their scores are all higher than those of married men. Among youngsters, Mernitz and
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Kamp Dush (2016) assert that direct marriage benefits emotional health for both men
and women while cohabitation only benefits women, and that these gender differences
are detected for first unions only. Among parents, Kamp Dush (2013) finds that after
union disruption, depressive symptoms of previously married mothers, but not cohabiting
mothers, return to pre-divorce levels, while depressive symptoms of previously married
fathers increase more than those of cohabiting fathers. Avellar and Smock (2005) con-
clude that the dissolution of cohabitation entails moderate declination for men’s economic
situation while hurts women’s economic standing much more intensely.
Cohabitation may have smaller positive effects on well-being than marriage has. The
former is usually regarded as a trial marriage, so cohabitants may invest lower levels
of tangible and intangible capital (Michael, 2004) in cohabitation than marrieds do in
marriage (Nock, 1995; Soons et al., 2009; Stanley et al., 2004). Cohabitation, as merely a
trial marriage, may exert weaker causal protective effects than marriage does in terms of
production and consumption complementarities, social connections, and social controls
(as discussed above). Moreover, cohabitation bears higher disruption rates and lower
expectations on a stable future relationship than marriage does since it is a trial marriage.
Therefore, dissolution from cohabitation may less intensely impact the well-being and
emotion than that from marriage does (Blekesaune, 2008; Kamp Dush, 2013). Recovery
from cohabitation disruption may be also faster than recovery from divorce.
2.2.3 Sexual Minorities
The literature on the well-being effects of different types of partnerships for sexual mi-
norities is limited, a distinction according to gender is even more rare. According to the
minority stress theory (Meyer, 2003), sexual minorities in a relationship experience stress
when interacting with other people, so they respond with coping strategies including
concealing their relationship (Rostosky et al., 2007). As it is harder to hide marriage
than cohabitation in practice, the minority stress may shrink the well-being gap between
marriage and cohabitation. Nonetheless, it is also possible that only sexual minorities
with lower levels of such minority stress select themselves into marriage. Such a selection
will enlarge the well-being gap between marriage and cohabitation.
Empirically, Fingerhut and Maisel (2010) claim that having a domestic partnership
(closer to marriage than to cohabitation legally) alleviates negative impacts of stress on
life satisfaction for sexual minorities. Riggle et al. (2010) find that sexual minorities in
legally recognized relationships report less psychological distress and higher well-being
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than those in committed relationships, and that a similar gap exists between those in
committed relationships and singles. Wight et al. (2013) find that sexual minorities in
marriage and domestic partnership have identical levels of psychological distress, which
are lower than those of sexual minority singles and higher than those of different-sex mar-
ried couples. Gorman et al. (2015) discover that only among different-sex couples women
report significantly different physical health from men, while among sexual minorities the
physical health gender differences do not exist.
2.3 Methodology Review
The methodology to establish a relationship between partnership and well-being has
evolved over time as researchers have made efforts to conquer more challenging questions:
going from association to causality and accounting for reverse causality. Three types of
studies can be distinguished with increasing degree of complexity of the analysis. The
first type of studies uses cross-sectional data focusing on correlation between partnership
and well-being. Gove and Shin (1989), White (1992), Mastekaasa (1995), and Diener and
Eunkook Suh (1997) conduct such an analysis for the US, Canada, Norway and multiple
countries together, respectively. They confirm the positive association between subjective
well-being and marriage across countries and cultures. Kurdek (1991) and Mastekaasa
(1995) show that cohabitation is also positively correlated with subjective well-being in
some countries. None of the studies in this category addresses the issue of causality, i.e.,
they do not distinguish selectivity from causality or consider possible reverse causality.
The second type of studies tries to remove the selection effect such that happier
people are more likely to enter a partnership. The selection effect is due to individual-
specific unobserved heterogeneity. One example of such an unobserved characteristic is
personality: extroverted people may be happier and also more likely to find a partner.
Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004), Stutzer and Frey (2006), Musick and Bumpass
(2012), and Averett et al. (2013) are representatives of the static fixed effects studies
where individual time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is taken into consideration.
Most studies find that partnership including marriage and cohabitation increases the well-
being of individuals that enter a partnership. However, this conclusion is not universal.
For instance, Averett et al. (2013) show that marriage leads to a higher Body-Mass Index,
to overweight and obesity as well as less exercise. Meanwhile, these studies find evidence
of a positive selection effect. Chapman and Guven (2016) employ data from the US,
the UK and Germany and introduce the quality of marriage as additional explanatory
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variable. They discover that the positive effect of marriage on happiness is driven by
happy marriages. For couples who are not happily married, marriage has a negative
effect on happiness.
The third type of studies focuses on addressing potential reverse causality, i.e., a
shock to the well-being of an individual leads to a jump of the likelihood of entering a
partnership for that individual. Lillard and Panis (1996) employ a simultaneous-equation
framework using proportional hazards for health and marital separations. The correla-
tion of the errors of the two equations captures the selection effect. They attempt to
deal with reverse causality by introducing instrumental variables in the health equation.
Van den Berg and Gupta (2015) take a similar measure and claim that men generally
enjoy a protection effect of marriage while women benefit from marriage only after the
childbearing age. Ali and Ajilore (2011) apply propensity score matching to obtain a
counterfactual outcome and correct for selection on observables. Their results show that
marriage indeed reduces risky health behaviors and thus improves well-being. Kohn and
Averett (2014a,b) both assume sequential reverse causality from current well-being to
the partnership choice in the next period. Their first study uses a dynamic fixed effects
model with internal instruments advocated by Blundell and Bond (1998) to account for
reverse causality. Their second study exploits a random coefficient mixed logit model
to estimate the unobserved heterogeneity associated with both health and relationship
choice so that they are able to disentangle the reverse causality due to this unobserved
heterogeneity. Both studies find that marriage and cohabitation benefit health similarly.
2.4 Data and Statistical Model
2.4.1 Data
Our research is based on data from the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social
sciences) panel administered by CentERdata (see for details: www.lissdata.nl). The panel
is a random sample of households drawn from the Dutch population consisting of more
than 6500 households, over 10000 individuals and 93 monthly waves from November 2007
till July 2015.
With information of partnered household heads and their wedded or cohabiting part-
ner, we identify the sexual orientation of each individual by comparing one’s gender with
that of his or her partner (see the Appendix 2.A for details). In this way, individuals
who were always single during the period of observation are not included in part of our
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analysis, i.e. where sexual orientation is included in the analysis.4 First, we investigate
the effect of any partnership on subjective well-being. Then, we study whether marriage
has a different effect on subjective well-being than cohabitation has. As the society be-
comes more and more tolerant and people more and more open minded on the forms
of partnerships, cohabitation has been considerably popular and a soaring tendency in
the partnership market especially in the Netherlands (Latten and Mulder, 2014). Due to
the rapid expansion of cohabitation and its distinction from other marital statuses, it is
reasonable to isolate it as a different category.
There are 27,779 observations in our sample where 425 concern individuals who en-
tered a same-sex relationship.5 The sample size of sexual minorities is comparatively
small, but it matches the estimated share of sexual minorities in the population (Sand-
fort et al., 2006; Bakker et al., 2009). And, in comparison with other studies our sample
of sexual minorities is quite large.
Our indicator of well-being is based on the question “On the whole, how happy would
you say you are?” The answer is provided on an ordinal scale from zero to ten (from totally
unhappy to totally happy). Panel a of Figure 2.1 illustrates the well-being distribution by
partnership status. On the happiness scale from zero to ten hardly anyone reported below
five. In the relatively lower score groups of five, six and seven, non-partnered individuals
dominate partnered ones in percentage, while in the higher score groups of eight, nine and
ten this is the contrary. Apparently, couples are happier than non-partnered individuals.
Panel b of Figure 2.1 further distinguishes marriage from cohabitation in the partnership
forms. Cohabitants account for higher proportions in the happiness score groups of five,
six and seven but lower proportions in the groups of eight, nine and ten than marrieds. So,
generally speaking, partners are happier if they are married as compared to cohabiting.
Nonetheless, the differences between various types of individuals in Figure 2.1 are all
unconditional and can only be suggestive of a causal effect of partnership on evaluative
happiness.
Table 2.1 gives an overview of average well-being distinguished by marital status and
sexual orientation. The last column in the table confirms the findings in Figure 2.1.
4If the reason for remaining single is accidental, this does not bias our results. However, if the singles
did not enter a partnership because they would not benefit in terms of well-being, we will overestimate
the well-being effects of partnership formation. Nevertheless, it is also possible that these singles have
lower well-being levels than people who experienced at least one partnership during the sample period
and could have benefited more than average from partnership formation. Then, the well-being effects of
partnership will be underestimated in our study.
5The definitions and descriptives of the relevant variables in the main models are provided in Tables
2.A.2.1 and 2.A.2.2 in Appendix 2.A.2.
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Figure 2.1: Well-being and Partnership
a. Partnership
b. Marriage and Cohabitation
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Table 2.1: Subjective Well-being by Marital Status and Sexual Orientation; Averages
(Number of Observations)
Different-sex Same-sex Unknown Average
a. Partnership
No partner 6.98 (801) 7.65 (34) 7.14 (5,224) 7.12 (6,059)
Partner 7.73 (19,104) 7.76 (391) 7.55 (2,225) 7.71 (21,720)
b. Marriage and Cohabitation
Marriage 7.76 (16,043) 7.83 (220) 7.81 (369) 7.76 (16,632)
Cohabitation 7.58 (3,061) 7.68 (171) 7.50 (1,856) 7.56 (5,088)
The category “unknown” exists because these individuals have always been single, or their partners did
not participate in the survey if they have been ever partnered, therefore their sexual orientation cannot
be identified; see Appendix 2.A for details.
On the scale from zero to ten, non-partnered individuals on average score 7.12 while
partnered individuals have an average score of 7.71. On average, married couples obtain
7.76 while cohabitants have 7.56. Comparing the first two columns of Table 2.1, it is
obvious that irrespective of the marital status, on average sexual minority individuals are
happier although the difference is only substantial in the period when they are single.
The number of observations of singles is rather small. Therefore, we make no distinction
among never married, separated, divorced and widowed.6
The partnership transitions are displayed in Table 2.2. As shown in the table, there
is a persistent stability in partnership status. Over a period of five years, among the
6,702 individuals in our sample only 614 partnership transitions happened. Transitions
from cohabitation account for the largest fraction, more than twice the transitions from
each of the other two marital statuses. Most of cohabitants broke up rather than entered
a marriage. Over twice the number of single individuals switched to cohabitation than
to marriage. Given the numbers of observations of these marital statuses in the sample,
marriage is considerably more stable compared to cohabitation.
2.4.2 Statistical Model
Subjective well-being is measured on an ordinal scale from zero to ten. To account for
time-invariant unobserved personal characteristics, we use a linear fixed effects model
6As shown in Table 2.1 our sample includes 34 observations of the single period for sexual minorities.
Among them, nine observations are for the divorced phase and 25 observations are for the never married
period. Of the 801 observations of the single period for sexual majority, 21 observations are for the phase
of separation from a cohabitation, 330 observations are for the period of divorce from marriage, 49 for
widow phase and 401 for the period of never-married. There are also 5,224 observations of singles for
whom we are not able to establish sexual orientation. The latter group of singles is only used in the first
part of our analysis.
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Table 2.2: Partnership Transitions
Married Cohabiting Single Total
Married – 72 61 133
Cohabiting 159 – 180 339
Single 44 98 – 142
Total 203 170 241 614
Based on 27,779 observations of 6,702 individuals over five years.
even though in such a model the dependent variable is supposed to be cardinal. As
indicated by Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and Stutzer and Frey (2006) when
analyzing happiness and life satisfaction, the linear fixed effects model performs as well





itβx + αi + εit (1)
where i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) refer to individuals, t (t = 1, 2, ..., T ) stand for years and p is
either the partnership dummy, or a dummy vector of different marital statuses including
married and cohabiting with single as the reference. Furthermore, h denotes well-being
measured on a scale from zero to ten and x represents the vector of covariates that may be
correlated to both partnership and well-being such as drinking and smoking behavior
(Clark and Etilé, 2006), Body Mass Index (Clark and Etilé, 2011) and physical problems
(Graham et al., 2011; Kohn and Averett, 2014b), as well as demographic and socioeco-
nomic variables like the number of children living at home, whether the respondent is
a home owner, log of personal net monthly income in Euros, whether the respondent
holds a college diploma, and age-cohort dummies. Finally, αi represent individual-
specific time-invariant effects. The error terms εit are assumed to have zero mean and










iT ). Time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity that may affect both partnership and well-being, such as personality, is
removed by subtracting individual sample means.
We start our analysis with a pooled cross-section analysis, ignoring individual fixed
effects. Conditional on observed characteristics we estimate the association between
partnership and well-being. The association combines the effect of selectivity and the
causal effect from partnership to well-being. Then, by introducing individual fixed effects
we remove the effect of selectivity thus establishing a causal effect. In a separate section
below, we also investigate the presence of reverse causality by relating current well-being
7This is also the case in our analysis. By way of sensitivity analysis, we estimated a fixed effects
ordered logit model finding very similar results.
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to future partnership.
2.5 Parameter Estimates Subjective Well-being
2.5.1 Baseline Estimates
The relevant parameter estimates of our fixed effects model are displayed in Table 2.3. The
two columns show the partnership effect on happiness for males and females separately. To
indicate the importance of considering individual fixed effects, we present OLS parameter
estimates in panel a.8 There, the partnership elevates the subjective well-being by 0.60
for men and 0.45 for women, about half a point on an 11-point scale. With the fixed
effects setting in panel b, partnership also has a positive effect on happiness where the
difference between males and females is small. Comparing estimates of panels a and b,
it is obvious that the OLS estimates are partly driven by the positive selection such that
happier individuals are more likely to have a partner. Nevertheless, after removing this
selection effect with the fixed effects model, there is still a significant increase in well-
being related to partnership of about 0.25. So, the effect of partnership on subjective
well-being and the selection effect explain around 50% of the positive association between
partnership and well-being, respectively. Although well-being is measured on a scale from
0 to 10, hardly anyone reports a well-being less than 6 and few individuals report a 10.
In relative terms an increase of 0.25 over a range of 6 to 9 is quite substantial.
In panel c of Table 2.3 we explore whether partnership effects are different for same-
sex and different-sex couples. For males, the effect of having a same-sex partner is about
the same as that of having a different-sex partner. For females, the well-being effect of
having a same-sex partner is much higher than that of having a different-sex partner,
but also for females, like in the case of males, we cannot reject that partnership exerts
identical influences on happiness for same-sex and different-sex couples.
Panel d shows that marriage makes couples happier than cohabitation does.9 We
compare the effects of marriage and cohabitation to that of being single. Later on, we
systematically analyze the dynamics or transitions among different partnership statuses.
The positive effect of marriage on well-being is stronger for women than for men. The
well-being effect of cohabitation is the same for both genders.
8We also run the OLS models on the subset of people who changed partnership status during the
survey period as a robustness check since these individuals identify the fixed effects estimates. The
results are similar to those in panel a of Table 2.3.
9We consider panel d in Table 2.3 as our baseline estimates. Appendix 2.B presents the parameter
estimates of the full baseline model.
19
Table 2.3: Parameter Estimates Effects of Partnership on Subjective Well-being;
OLS and Individual Fixed Effects
Males Females
OLS
a. Partner 0.60 (0.06)** 0.45 (0.05)**
Individual Fixed Effects
b. Partner 0.26 (0.07)** 0.27 (0.07)**
c. Different-sex partner (βdsp) 0.27 (0.08)** 0.27 (0.08)**
Same-sex partner (βssp) 0.25 (0.31) 0.71 (0.42)
†
p-value (βdsp=βssp) 0.940 0.303
d. Marriage (βm) 0.33 (0.08)** 0.39 (0.08)**
Cohabitation (βc) 0.21 (0.07)** 0.21 (0.07)**
p-value (βm=βc) 0.086
† 0.004**
e. Different-sex marriage (βdsm) 0.32 (0.09)** 0.44 (0.09)**
Different-sex cohabitation (βdsc) 0.25 (0.08)** 0.17 (0.08)*
p-value (βdsm=βdsc) 0.351 0.000**
Same-sex marriage (βssm) 0.69 (0.41)
† 0.15 (0.51)




Panels a, b and d 27,779 observations of 3,088 males and 3,617 females;
panels c and e 20,330 observations of 2,275 males and 2,526 females;
standard errors in parentheses; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
In panel e we distinguish different-sex and same-sex marriage and cohabitation. For
different-sex partnerships the effects of marriage and cohabitation are similar to those
presented in panel d. For same-sex male partnerships, the well-being effects of marriage
are substantially bigger than those of cohabitation. For same-sex female partnerships,
this is the opposite, i.e. the well-being effects of cohabitation are substantially larger
than those of marriage.
All in all, we conclude that partnership has a positive effect on subjective well-being
and that this positive effect is statistically identical for same-sex and different-sex couples.
Given the significant effect of marital partnership during the short survey period of five
years, our results support the idea that the well-being benefits manifest in the short term
as in the crisis model (Booth and Amato, 1991; Pearlin, 2009) and adaptation theory
(Diener et al., 2006; Lucas et al., 2003).
2.5.2 Reverse Causality
In the analysis of the effects of partnership dynamics on well-being, there is a possibility
of selectivity or reverse causality, or both. With the linear fixed effects model, we remove
selectivity due to individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity related to both partnership
and happiness. However, the linear fixed effects model does not account for possible
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a. Happinesst−1 -0.002 (0.005) -0.000 (0.003)
b. Happinesst−2 -0.003 (0.006) 0.002 (0.004)
c. Happinesst−3 0.004 (0.007) -0.010 (0.004)*
d. Happinesst−4 0.004 (0.009) -0.007 (0.006)
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05; covariates and constant are
included in every model but not shown for parsimony.
reverse causality, i.e., the phenomenon that an individual whose happiness increases is
more likely to find a partner. A person who becomes happier and more satisfied with
his or her life may appear more confident and be more willing to socialize, so he or she
is more attractive and approachable in the partnership market. Similarly, for a person
who enters depression it is difficult to find a partner (Sandberg-Thoma and Kamp Dush,
2014).
To investigate whether or not reverse causality is an issue, we study whether single
people are more likely to be partnered later on, as their happiness changes over time
because of some shock. We estimate a fixed effects model in which the dependent variable
is whether or not an individual is partnered and the independent variables are happiness
in an earlier period and the same covariates as before. If reverse causality existed, we
would expect that a higher level of happiness makes partnership formation later on more
likely. We use different lags for happiness to allow for effects that materialize quickly or
more slowly. Table 2.4 displays the relevant parameter estimates of lagged happiness.
Row a shows that a positive shock to happiness of an individual who was single does not
improve his or her probability to enter a partnership one year later. Rows b to d present
that also after two, three or four years there is no effect. None of the results are sizable
or significant except the coefficient in row c for women. Although it is significant at 5%
significance level, the magnitude of 1% is still negligible. From this we conclude that
reverse causality from happiness to future partnership dynamics is not an issue.
2.5.3 Symmetry
Partnership formation and partnership disruption may have different effects on subjective
well-being both in sign and magnitude. Therefore, it is interesting to distinguish between
entering a partnership and quitting it and test whether their effects are symmetric. We
introduce a “single to partnered” dummy variable with value one in case of partnership
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Table 2.5: Parameter Estimates Effects of Partnership on Subjective Well-being;
Asymmetry of Partnership Formation and Dissolution
Males Females
a. Single to partnered (βsp) 0.18 (0.09)
† 0.17 (0.10)
Partnered to single (βps) -0.30 (0.09)** -0.29 (0.08)**
p-value (βps=−βsp) 0.339 0.351
b. Single to married (βsm) 0.17 (0.16) 0.28 (0.20)
Married to single (βms) 0.25 (0.15) -0.00 (0.13)
p-value (βsm=βms) 0.722 0.249
Single to cohabiting (βsc) 0.06 (0.11) 0.05 (0.12)
Cohabiting to single (βcs) -0.18 (0.10)
† -0.14 (0.09)
p-value (βcs=−βcs) 0.418 0.561
Cohabiting to married (βcm) 0.06 (0.10) 0.08 (0.09)
Married to cohabiting (βmc) -0.31 (0.15)* -0.02 (0.11)
p-value (βcm=−βmc) 0.152 0.660
p-value (βsm−βms=βsc+βcs=βcm+βmc=0) 0.429 0.599
Column 1 contains 12,955 observations of 3,088 men; column 2 14,824 observations of 3,617 women.
Standard errors in parentheses; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
formation and value zero otherwise. Likewise, the “partnered to single” dummy values
one in case of partnership dissolution and values zero otherwise.
Panel a of Table 2.5 presents seemingly asymmetric effects during partnership forma-
tion and during partnership dissolution. The first term of single to partnered refers to the
effect when a partnership forms and the second stands for the effect when a partnership
dissolves. In both columns, partnership formation and disruption have opposite effects
on the subjective well-being for both men and women. For example, males who make a
transition from singleness to partnership experience on average an increase in well-being
of 0.18. If they break up and become single, they face a decrease in well-being of 0.30. In
order to formally check whether the effects are identical in magnitude during partnership
formation and disruption, we conduct the pair symmetry test with the null hypothesis
such that the absolute values of the coefficients of the two transition variables are equal.
The p-value of the test indicates that we cannot reject that the effects are symmetric.
Partnership is heterogeneous in the sense that it includes informal cohabitation and
formal marriage. The subjective well-being derived from cohabitation and marriage is
likely to be different. That is why we further investigate the symmetries of transitions
among marriage, cohabitation and singleness. Panel b displays the effects on subjective
well-being of several types of partnership dynamics. For example, entering marriage does
not seem to raise subjective well-being for cohabiting couples while going from marriage to
cohabitation significantly reduces men’s happiness while it does not affect women’s hap-
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piness.10 Marriage provides a tighter, more socially recognized and enforceable contract
than cohabitation. Apparently, for males this is more of an issue than for females. Never-
theless, for these more elaborate dynamics among singleness, cohabitation and marriage,
though the symmetries still hold, most of the estimates are insignificant. This may be due
to the small number of observations in each transition (see Table 2.2). The estimation
of the partnership dynamics also provides evidence to the short-term crisis model or ad-
justment theory. During partnership formation, subjective well-being improves quickly;
during partnership dissolution, subjective well-being is harmed immediately as well.
2.5.4 Age Cohort Differences
For younger and older individuals, marital partnership may have different meanings. For
instance, among youngsters, cohabitation is usually seen as a trial marriage, while older
individuals may think of cohabitation as a long-term substitute for marriage (Brown
et al., 2012; King and Scott, 2005; Vespa, 2012; Wright and Brown, 2017).
To investigate potential heterogeneity in the effects of partnership on well-being, we
explore whether there are differences by age. Kohn and Averett (2014b) distinguish
individuals under 45 and over 45 and indeed find different relationship effects for the two
sub-samples. Following their idea, we divide the sample into two age cohorts: people
born before 1962 (46-year old in the first wave 2008 of the survey) and after 1962. The
relevant parameter estimates are displayed in Table 2.6. Panel a shows that partnership
increases happiness for men born before 1962 but not for women in the same age cohort.
Both men and women in the older cohort obtain larger well-being gains from marriage
than from cohabitation. Panel b displays that partnership exerts a positive influence
in the younger cohort and so do marriage and cohabitation. For the younger cohort,
the happiness benefits from marriage are bigger than those from cohabitation but the
difference is not statistically significant.
These findings raise an interesting question: why does cohabitation benefit only the
younger age cohort but not the older one? We speculate that older adults may prefer
to protect the wealth they have accumulated over their lifetime rather than pool the
resources with their partner (Brown et al., 2012), and cohabitation allows them to retain
financial and economic autonomy that would not be possible in marriage (Brown et al.,
2018; Chevan, 1996; Hatch, 1995). Furthermore, older adults, especially older women,
may be less wiling to provide care-giving at a later stage of their life, and cohabitation
10Interpreting these parameter estimates should be cautious since due to data limitations we ignore
partnership transitions within a year.
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Table 2.6: Parameter Estimates Effects of Partnership on Subjective Well-being
by Age Cohort
Males Females
a. Born before 1962
1. Partner 0.28 (0.12)* 0.17 (0.15)
2. Marriage (βm) 0.36 (0.12)** 0.31 (0.16)*
Cohabitation (βc) 0.13 (0.14) -0.10 (0.17)
p-value (βm=βc) 0.044* 0.000**
b. Born in 1962 or thereafter
3. Partner 0.25 (0.09)** 0.30 (0.08)**
4. Marriage 0.30 (0.11)** 0.37 (0.10)**
Cohabitation 0.23 (0.09)** 0.28 (0.08)**
p-value (βm=βc) 0.515 0.313
Panel a 15,395 observations with 1,704 men and 1,773 women;
panel b 12,384 observations with 1,385 men and 1,845 women.
Standard errors in parentheses; † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
does not explicitly enforce this kind of responsibility as marriage does (Talbott, 1998).
Another possible explanation is that for people born before 1962, cohabitation was still
not widely accepted when they entered the partnership market. The social attitude
to cohabitation may have also influenced their individual attitude. Even though later
they chose to cohabit, they still did not regard cohabitation as similar to marriage. On
the contrary, when individuals in the younger age cohort entered a partnership, society
already bore quite a tolerant attitude to cohabitation. In the mean time cohabitation is
more popular than marriage in the partnership market.
2.6 Conclusions
Many studies find positive well-being effects of a partnership for which there are various
explanations. It may be that partnered individuals gain from production complementar-
ities, division of labor or consumption and investment complementarities. It may also
be that couples benefit from economies of scale by pooling resources, jointly consuming
public goods and investing in children, and sharing leisure activities. A partnership may
strengthen and expand social relationships. Finally, a partnership may introduce social
control and mutual supervision.
We analyze Dutch panel data to investigate whether there is a causal effect of part-
nership on subjective well-being finding that this is indeed the case. We do not find
evidence for reverse causality which occurs if a positive shock to one’s well-being induces
partnership formation. As in a few previous studies, we find that well-being gains of
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marriage are larger than those of cohabitation which may be related to different invest-
ment levels of tangible and intangible capital. We also find that the well-being effects of
partnership formation and disruption are symmetric. Since our panel covers a five-year
period, this finding supports the crisis model and adaptation theory that the well-being
effects of marital partnership transitions manifest in the short term rather than that they
need a long time to accumulate. Furthermore, we find that marriage improves well-being
for both younger and older cohorts while cohabitation only benefits younger cohort. This
may be due to the weaker desire of pooling economic resources and lower willingness of
care-giving for older cohabitants. Or, it might be because of different social acceptance of
cohabitation when older individuals initially entered the partnership market a long time
ago. Even though they later on chose to cohabit, older individuals still do not regard
cohabitation as similar to marriage.
Whereas we contribute to the literature by studying partnership dynamics, investi-
gating reverse causality and establishing cohort-specific differences in well-being effects,
our main contribution is on well-being effects of same-sex partnerships. We find that
these effects are similar to those of different-sex partnerships. This may seem surprising
because of possible discrimination against sexual minorities once their sexual orientation
is disclosed. Perhaps thanks to the effective implementation of education and policy on
marriage equality and respect for sexual minorities, this prejudice against sexual minori-
ties does not prevail in the Netherlands. Although overall same-sex and different-sex
partnerships have similar effects on well-being we do find gender differences in the well-
being effects of same-sex partnerships. Females are happier cohabiting while marriage
has a stronger well-being effect on males. We can only speculate about the reasons for
this difference as the literature on the well-being effects of different types of partnerships
for sexual minorities is limited. It might be that especially for male same-sex partner-
ships marriage provides a tighter, more socially recognized and enforceable contract than
cohabitation. Apparently, for female same-sex partnerships this is less of an issue.
We are confronted with a few difficulties in the current study. First, the analysis is
restricted to a short panel, so we are unable to examine whether the well-being effects
of partnership dynamics will persist in the long term. Basically, the crisis model argues
that these effects are temporary while the resource model claims that these effects need
a long time to materialize. To investigate which of the models is more realistic, a longer
panel is more helpful. Second, to analyze the heterogeneity of sexual orientation in the
well-being effects of partnership dynamics in more detail, a larger dataset is needed. The
number of partnership transitions and the size of same-sex sample are still relatively small
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in our data. Due to these limitations, our parameter estimates for same-sex partnerships
are imprecise. Third, though we include a number of time-varying covariates and apply
the fixed effects model to account for time-invariant unobservables, we cannot completely
resolve the concern of the possible time-varying confounding unobservables. If the panel
data contained information on the nature and magnitude of exogenous shocks to partner-
ship market, we would be able to exploit such a shock to draw a more compelling causal
conclusion.
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Appendix 2.A: Details on Our Data
2.A.1: Sexual Orientation
It is hard to measure an individual’s sexual orientation in surveys. There are basically
three ways to do this and each method has its limitations. The first method is simply
asking for sexual preferences: “Regarding your sexual preference, are you attracted to
men or to women?” Answers could be in five categories: one only to men; two especially
to men, but to some extent also to women; three as much to men as to women; four
especially to women, but to some extent also to men; five only to women. This measure
was employed by Plug and Berkhout (2004), and Buser, Geijtenbeek, and Plug (2015).
The second measure of sexual orientation is through sexual activity. Badgett (1995)
and Black et al. (2003) used answers to the question “How many males and females
did you have sex with?” The third measure of sexual orientation is based on the gender
of respondents’ partner. This measure was used by Klawitter and Flatt (1998) and
Allegretto and Arthur (2001).
The three measures of sexual orientation have their own advantages and shortcomings:
sexual preference and past sexual activity ask directly about sexual orientation so they
can identify sexual orientation with just cross sectional data even for respondents who
are single at the time of the survey. However, they may result in plenty of non-responses
because of privacy. Besides, past sexual activity will probably wrongly classify, for exam-
ple, individuals who participated in different-sex activities a few times but then figured
out they prefer same-sex relationships. Data of the gender of respondents’ partner are
more widely accessible than sexual preference and past sexual activity. Moreover, sexual
orientation based on partner’s gender is more observable to the respondents’ family and
employers. Thus, if the researchers want to investigate outside influence related to sexual
orientation, this measure is more appropriate. Nevertheless, for respondents who were
partnered in none of the waves of the panel, this measure can not detect their sexual
orientation. This may lead to sample selection (Plug and Berkhout, 2004). The three
measures capture different respects of sexual orientation hence are not necessary to be
completely consistent. Which measure to use empirically depends on the specific prob-
lem to be investigated. We study the effect of partnership on subjective well-being where
in part of our analysis we distinguish between different-sex and same-sex relationships.
Since such an effect is directly related to the respondents’ partner during the partnership,
the measure of sexual orientation based on partner’s gender is most suitable.
From the background variables in the LISS-panel, we know the position within the
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household of each of the respondents, i.e., whether they are household head, wedded
partner, cohabiting partner, parent (in law), child living at home, house mate, and family
member or boarder. We also know marital status which includes never married, married,
separated, divorced, and widowed. Information on the domestic situation includes single
without child(ren), single with child(ren), (un)married cohabitation without child(ren),
(un)married cohabitation with child(ren), and other. With these variables we are able to
identify the sexual orientation of every household head and their partner.
First, we combine the originally 93 monthly waves to construct an initial panel. Sec-
ond, in the initial panel we keep only the partnered household heads and their (un)wedded
partner using the categories of (un)married cohabitation with(out) child(ren) in “domes-
tic situation”. Third, we identify the sexual orientation of every partnered individual
by comparing one’s gender with that of one’s (un)wedded partner and record the corre-
sponding person numbers in the same-sex group and different-sex group respectively.11
2.A.2: Definitions and Descriptives of Variables
The subjective well-being indicator is collected annually, while other variables including
the partnership dynamics are available on a monthly basis. In our analysis all variables
are specified on an annual basis. This means some loss of information, for example,
multiple changes in partnership status within a year are ignored. Table 2.A.2.1 provides
an overview of the definition of the variables we use in our analysis. Table 2.A.2.2 presents
the descriptives of these variables.
11There are two exceptions, bisexuals and trans-genders, which consist of 30 individuals together.
Following previous studies (Plug et al., 2014; Buser et al., 2015) we categorize them into same-sex group
since they all belong to sexual minorities. In the interpretation and discussion we will use the expressions
of same-sex and sexual minorities interchangeably.
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Table 2.A.2.1: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Subjective well-being “On the whole how happy would you say you are?” (score 0-10)
Partnered Dummy variable if partnered
Married Dummy variable if married
Cohabiting Dummy variable if cohabiting
Single Dummy variable if never married, separated, divorced or widowed
Same-sex Dummy variable if classified into same-sex group
Children number Number of living-at-home children
Home owner Dummy variable if home owner
Net income Personal net monthly income in Euros
Missing info net income Dummy variable if net income is missing
College Dummy variable if with college diploma
Drinking Dummy variable if drink alcohol during the last seven days
Drinking days Number of days in the past seven days drink alcohol
Smoking Dummy variable if smoke now
BMI Body Mass Index
Physical problem Number of physical problems diagnosed by physicians
Missing info physical problem Dummy variable if physical problem is missing
Age20–70p Age cohort dummies, reference cohort is teenagers
Table 2.A.2.2: Descriptives
Men Women
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Subjective well-being 7.6 0 10 7.6 0 10
Number of children 0.8 0 7 0.9 0 7
Net income/104 0.2 0 16.3 0.1 0 28.6
Drinking days 2.8 0 7 1.9 0 7
BMI 25.7 13.9 64.4 25.4 12.4 81.4
Physical problem 0.8 0 10 0.8 0 18
Percentages
Partnered 80.7 0 100 76.0 0 100
Married 62.8 0 100 57.4 0 100
Cohabiting 18.0 0 100 18.6 0 100
Single 19.3 0 100 24.0 0 100
Home owner 75.7 0 100 72.8 0 100
Missing info net income 5.0 0 100 5.3 0 100
College 34.0 0 100 26.8 0 100
Drinking 73.4 0 100 56.1 0 100
Smoking 21.3 0 100 18.4 0 100
Missing info physical problem 5.2 0 100 5.0 0 100
Different-sex 74.1 0 100 69.5 0 100
Same-sex 1.4 0 100 1.7 0 100
Unknown orientation 24.5 0 100 28.8 0 100
Age to 19 4.3 0 100 5.2 0 100
Age 20 to 29 8.3 0 100 10.6 0 100
Age 30 to 39 12.8 0 100 15.2 0 100
Age 40 to 49 17.9 0 100 18.9 0 100
Age 50 to 59 20.5 0 100 21.1 0 100
Age 60 to 69 23.0 0 100 18.8 0 100
Age 70 plus 13.2 0 100 10.2 0 100
Based on 12,955 observations of 3,088 men and 14,824 observations of 3,617 women.
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Appendix 2.B: Parameter Estimates Baseline Model
Table 2.B.1 presents a full set of parameter estimates related to Table 2.3 panel d. The
first two rows indicate the effects of marriage and cohabitation, identical to the ones
presented in Table 2.3 panel d. Teenagers (the reference of the age group dummies)
appear to have the highest level of happiness. The happiness of men aged 20 to 29 is
somewhat lower while from age 30 onward well-being drops even further. However, for
females the age gradient is hardly present. The number of children has a negative effect
on happiness although only for females this effect is significantly different from zero. Net
income has a positive effect on happiness for males but not for females. Physical problems
have a negative happiness effect for males and smoking has a positive effect for males.
Most of the other variables have no significant effect on happiness.
Table 2.B.1: Parameter Estimates Effects of Partnership on
Subjective Well-being; Full Baseline Model
Males Females
Marriage 0.33 (0.08)** 0.39 (0.08)**
Cohabitation 0.21 (0.07)** 0.21 (0.07)**
Children number -0.04 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03)**
Home owner -0.08 (0.07) -0.02 (0.06)
Log(net income) 0.04 (0.01)** -0.00 (0.01)
Missing info net income 0.30 (0.12)* -0.19 (0.09)*
College 0.09 (0.08) 0.10 (0.08)
BMI 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00)
Physical problem -0.03 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)
Missing info physical problem -0.02 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04)
Smoking 0.09 (0.04)† 0.04 (0.05)
Drinking -0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Drinking days -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Age 20 to 29 -0.13 (0.08)† -0.11 (0.07)†
Age 30 to 39 -0.34 (0.12)** -0.14 (0.10)
Age 40 to 49 -0.45 (0.13)** -0.15 (0.11)
Age 50 to 59 -0.56 (0.14)** -0.13 (0.12)
Age 60 to 69 -0.44 (0.15)** -0.09 (0.13)
Age 70 plus -0.39 (0.16)* 0.05 (0.15)
Constant 7.37 (0.21)** 7.62 (0.16)**
12,955 observations of 3,088 men; 14,824 observations of 3,617 women.
Standard errors in parentheses; † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
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Chapter 3




The practical economic importance of marriage has declined while its symbolic sig-
nificance has still remained high and may have risen. We study the effect of the
symbolic significance of marriage on the stability of formal partnerships. We exploit
Dutch same-sex marriage legalization as a shock to the symbol of marital institu-
tion given that registered partnership and marriage are almost equivalent with a
difference in symbolic meaning. With rich administrative data, we investigate the
transition rate from registered partnership to marriage and divorce hazards from
both types of relationships simultaneously. Our model allows the distinction be-
tween the effects of interest and selection effects. We find that same-sex marriage
legalization increased the divorce hazard by more than 48% for existing female
partnerships and 203% for existing male ones. However, transition to marriage
reduced the divorce hazard by 68% for female partnerships and 98% for male ones,
in which the divorce costs may explain only part. This remarkable symbolic effect
of same-sex marriage identified during the deinstitutionalization of marriage in the
highly tolerant Netherlands for sexual minorities may provide common implications
for marriages in general.
Keywords: Same-sex marriage, Registered partnership, Divorce, Duration analysis
JEL-codes: D78, J12, J15, J16, K36
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3.1 Introduction
In the current era of the deinstitutionalization of marriage, the practical importance of
marriage has declined while its symbolic significance has still remained high and may have
risen (Cherlin, 2004). Formal relationships such as marriage have become less popular
while informal relationships such as cohabitation have been on the rise. Some countries
have introduced a registered partnership which is legally similar to marriage as another
type of formal relationship. Moreover, the previous marital privilege of different-sex cou-
ples has been extended to be available for same-sex partners in many countries around
the world. Most of the practical functions of marriage, such as specialization or division
of labor and economies of scale by pooling resources (Becker, 1974; Pollak, 1985; Treas,
1993) as well as consumption and investment complementarity (Lundberg and Pollak,
2015; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007), and their induced gains can be achieved through
registered partnership or cohabitation. However, the symbolic significance of marriage
will not be replaced easily but remain vital in the future. Marriage enforces a unique pub-
lic commitment to a long-term and even lifelong relationship, which is usually expressed
in front of relatives, friends, and religious clans (Cherlin, 2004).1 This public commitment
and its resulting enforceable trust (Cherlin, 2000; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993) reduce
the transaction costs of enforcing agreements between the partners (Pollak, 1985). Fur-
thermore, marriage has evolved to become a marker of individual prestige and personal
achievement, rendering itself distinct from other types of relationships (Bulcroft et al.,
2000; Cherlin, 2004).
We study how the symbolic significance of marriage, i.e. the unique public com-
mitment and the symbol of individual prestige and achievement of marriage, affects the
stability of formal partnerships. We are interested in the stability of formal partnerships
because of its benefits to the involved households and society. First, couples experience
larger well-being gains from marriage than from cohabitation as well as higher happiness
loss from disruption of marriage than from dissolution of cohabitation (Chen and van
Ours, 2018; Kohn and Averett, 2014a,b; Stutzer and Frey, 2006). Second, children benefit
more from a stable legal parent union (Pawelski et al., 2006; Prickett et al., 2015; Reczek
et al., 2016). Third, stable relationships with longer duration and legally enforceable
commitment (through credible punishment threats) increase fertility (Fahn et al., 2016;
1In the Netherlands, couples going to marry have to declare “in the presence of the witnesses that
they accept each other as husband and wife and that they will faithfully fulfill all duties which the law
connects to their marital status” (Article 67 of Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code) and usually hold a
civil ceremony and a wedding. In contrast, a registered partnership formally starts with a registration
through a registrar.
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Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2008). Married couples anticipating a higher probability of divorce
give birth to fewer children (Becker et al., 1977; Fan, 2001; Lillard and Waite, 1993). In
aging societies such as most of the developed countries and China, the constantly low or
the further decline in fertility rate has been a serious economic and demographic issue.
Specifically, we exploit same-sex marriage legalization in the Netherlands as a shock
to marital institution to investigate the effect of this legislation and the effect of getting
married on the stability of same-sex formal partnerships already existing before the le-
galization. In 1998, registered partnerships were introduced in the Netherlands. This
type of partnerships has been also open to same-sex couples since its initiation. Later,
same-sex marriages were legalized in 2001. We focus on same-sex formal partnerships,
namely registered partnerships and marriages, since (1) sexual minorities are the objects
of this legal recognition, and (2) registered partnership and marriage are almost equiv-
alent with a difference in symbolic meaning (Lee Badgett et al., 2008; Waaldijk, 2001),
which enables identification of the effect of the symbol of marriage.2 In general, same-sex
marriage legalization in one’s jurisdiction of residence significantly decreases the costs of
marriage entry and hence increases the (net) value of marriage (Farmer and Horowitz,
2015). Rational individuals choose to enter or maintain a marriage conditional on agree-
ment with their partner if the gains of marriage outweigh its costs, or the (net) value of
marriage is positive. Thus, this legislation may impact the stability of same-sex formal
partnerships in three ways. First, if one but not both partners passes the threshold in
his or her utility function of marriage, one partner prefers to enter a marriage while the
other partner prefers to stay in the current registered partnership. This disagreement
may induce conflicts and even disruption of the registered partnership. Second, if both
partners pass the marriage threshold in their utility function, they agree to transfer their
current registered partnership to marriage. Third, after the transition to marriage, the
symbolic significance of marriage stabilizes the existing partnership. We account for all
these three channels in our study.
Using rich administrative data from Statistics Netherlands, we employ a bivariate
mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model with competing risks. This allows us to inves-
tigate transitions from registered partnership to marriage simultaneously with transitions
from registered partnership to divorce. In the same model we also study whether a part-
nership became more stable after transforming to marriage. Our method endows us with
2There is another minor difference between registered partnership and marriage in the procedure of
bilaterally consensual divorce only which we will discuss in Section 3.2. As a sensitivity analysis, we also
estimate the effect of canceling the higher costs of divorce from marriage on the stability of different-sex
marriages in Section 3.5.2.
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the capacity to make a distinction between two types of selectivity and “treatment”. Se-
lectivity may occur if inherently more stable relationships are more likely to transform
into a marriage i.e. positive selection, or less likely to do so i.e. adverse selection. Alterna-
tively, marriage may have a treatment effect if the transition from registered partnership
to marriage renders the existing relationship more stable due to the symbolic significance
of marriage. We take into account these two types of selection effects and different kinds
of partnerships in stability by allowing both observables and unobservables to affect the
transition into marriage and the transition into divorce simultaneously. In our model two
pairs of unobserved heterogeneity capture unobservables in the transition to marriage
and in the divorce hazard, respectively. We rely on the correlations of these two pairs
of unobserved heterogeneity to identify the selection effects. Accounting for selectivity
we can establish a causal treatment effect of getting married on the stability of same-sex
relationships.3
We find that indeed after transforming into marriage, relationships became more sta-
ble than previous registered partnerships. The symbol of marriage has a clear stabilizing
treatment effect on same-sex partnerships even after accounting for the effect of divorce
costs. We also find that same-sex marriage legislation increased divorce from existing
registered partnerships from before the legalization while at the same time initiating
the transition to marriage. Moreover, we discover adverse selection of stable same-sex
registered partnerships less inclined to transform into marriage for males but not for
females. Comparing the stability of same-sex marriages and same-sex registered partner-
ships formed post-legalization, we find that marriages were more stable. Our results are
robust against a wide range of sensitivity analyses.
We study the Netherlands because its highly tolerant attitude to same-sex marriages
facilitates our identification of the effect of the symbolic significance of marriage.4 For
example, in the Eurobarometer 2015, 91% (the highest proportion among all the EU 28
countries) of the Dutch respondents agreed on the statement that “same sex marriages
should be allowed throughout Europe”, while the average across the 28 countries of
the European Union was only 61% (European Commission, 2015). In such an open-
3In section 3.5, we discuss issues of identification of a causal effect such as the no-anticipation as-
sumption in more detail.
4In the Netherlands, homosexual acts were decriminalized in 1811 following the integration of the
country into the French empire (in France decriminalization occurred in 1791; see Waaldijk (2001)). The
cross-country variation in decriminalization is huge. In England and Wales, sex between two men was
illegal until 1967 when it was decriminalized for men over 21 years of age. The decriminalization referred
to “in private” meaning for example that men could not have sex in a hotel. A similar decriminalization
was introduced in 1980 in Scotland and in 1982 in Northern Island.
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minded society and free atmosphere, same-sex couples can enter and terminate a formal
partnership with much less discrimination and external pressure compared to in other
countries. This kind of environment helps us to obtain a cleaner estimate of the effects
of interest and might also make it possible to provide some implications for different-sex
partnerships with our analysis.5
The economic literature of marriage (and partnership) has mainly focused on the
economic incentives and benefits of marriage. Among them, only a handful of studies
are in relation to same-sex partnerships. Zavodny (2008) explores whether the earning
premium of married men also applies to cohabiting gay men finding that this is not the
case. A similar conclusion is drawn by Booth and Frank (2008). Jepsen and Jepsen
(2002) compare matching of same-sex male couples, same-sex female couples, different-
sex cohabiting couples, and different-sex married couples. Positive assortative mating
is found for all traits across all types of couples while this effect is stronger for non-
labor-market traits than for labor-market traits, and stronger for different-sex cohabiting
couples than for same-sex (cohabiting) couples. Oreffice (2011) estimates the effect of
intra-household-bargaining on gay and lesbian couples’ labor supply discovering a similar
pattern of bargaining for same-sex (cohabiting) couples as for heterosexual cohabiting
couples. Younger or richer partners in same-sex households have more bargaining power
and supply less labor. This pattern is also established by Klawitter (2008). Lee Badgett
et al. (2008) present an analysis based on Californian data collected among self-identified
same-sex couples. A distinction is made between being single, having a partner but
not cohabiting, cohabiting but without a registered (domestic) partnership, and having
a registered partnership.6 Registered partnership in California was not equivalent to
marriage as it was not portable across state lines and was not recognized by the federal
government. Nevertheless, the Californian Supreme Court argued that marriage differs
from a registered partnership not in its legal rights and responsibilities but only in its
symbolic meaning and common understanding. Lee Badgett et al. (2008) find some,
albeit limited, evidence of economic determinants of partnership status. For example,
income is positively correlated with the probability of having a registered partnership
among men but not among women.
5The high tolerance and open mind for same-sex relationships in the Netherlands may generate
a concern on external validity of our analysis. In less tolerant countries, difference may appear due to
discrimination against sexual minorities. However, the effect of the symbol of marriage itself is unchanged.
Since in this paper we are interested in the effect of the symbolic significance of marriage instead of the
composite effect involving discrimination, we prefer a highly tolerant society like the Netherlands as our
research context.
6The survey was held before in 2008 the same-sex marriage was legalized in California.
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However, as the deinstitutionalization of marriage, the previously important economic
functions of marriage including production, consumption and investment complementar-
ity (Becker, 1974; Lundberg and Pollak, 2015; Pollak, 1985; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007;
Treas, 1993) have been largely impaired and replaced by other types of relationships
(Cherlin, 2004). Our study adds to this economic literature of marriage by investigating
the symbolic functions of marriage which have been considerably neglected. The effect of
the symbolic significance of marriage is not trivial. Based on our analysis, transition to
marriage significantly reduced the divorce hazard by 98% for male same-sex partnerships
and 68% for female ones while canceling the costs of divorce that amount to about 750
euro (Teurlings Advocaten, 2019) increased the divorce hazard by 48% of different-sex
marriages.
Previous studies on the stability of same-sex partnerships compare this stability with
that of different-sex partnerships and explore the reasons for their difference (Carpenter
and Gates, 2008; Kurdek, 2004; Lau, 2012; Manning et al., 2016). The lower stability
of same-sex partnerships may be related to the lower degree of household specializa-
tion exhibited among same-sex couples, especially female same-sex couples, compared
to different-sex couples (Aldén et al., 2015). However, this specialization gap narrows
across cohorts (Giddings et al., 2014). Because different-sex and same-sex couples from
recent cohorts have become similar in terms of economic incentives such as specializa-
tion (Giddings et al., 2014), our result on the effect of divorce costs on the stability of
different-sex marriages may shed some light upon same-sex partnerships too. Becker
(1981) notes that “homosexual unions are much less stable than heterosexual marriages”
and that economic forces are responsible for this. Becker relates this to the higher search
costs for homosexuals due to the “opprobrium attached to homosexuality” because of
which, there is less information available making it harder to form stable relationships.
Furthermore, since same-sex unions are less formalized, they dissolve at lower costs than
different-sex marriages. Black et al. (2007) argue that gay men and lesbian women face
different constraints from heterosexual individuals. Same-sex couples have fewer children
than comparable different-sex couples (Andersson et al., 2006).7 The costs of children
for same-sex couples are higher because couples who wish to adopt a child also face
non-monetary costs in terms of time and effort to overcome implicit and explicit discrim-
inatory obstacles. The above explanations are related to discrimination against sexual
minorities and pressure they are confronted with. In the highly tolerant society of the
7In our data, discussed in Section 3.3, this is also the case though this difference in the Netherlands is
considerably smaller than that in the US. On average in the Netherlands, there are almost no children in
a gay-man household, half a child in a lesbian household, and 1.5 children in a heterosexual household.
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Netherlands, our inference on the effect of the symbolic significance of marriage based
on a policy change in same-sex marital institution may provide common implications for
marriages in general.
3.2 Institutional Background
Over the past decades, the Netherlands experienced big changes in the partnership mar-
ket. Marriage has lost its dominant role while other types of relationships, including
informal cohabitation and formal registered partnership, have become popular. In this
section we are going to briefly present the evolution of registered partnership and same-sex
marriage in the Netherlands and discuss their similarities and differences.8
3.2.1 Registered Partnerships
Registered partnerships were introduced on 1 January 1998 in the Netherlands. They
have been open to both same-sex and different-sex couples since its initiation. Registered
partners had many of the same rights and duties as married couples in for example tax,
property and inheritance. A registered partnership was “almost a clone of marriage”
(Waaldijk, 2001). Scherf (1999) provides information from a survey of recently concluded
registered partnerships. Same-sex couples were asked whether they would have concluded
a marriage if this had been a possibility with over 80% confirming that this would have
been preferred. About 60% indicated that they would transfer the registered partnership
to a marriage should that become possible in the future. According to Scherf (1999) a
registered partnership had the same consequences as a marriage except for those with
respect to children. In a marriage, the birth of a child automatically implies that both
spouses are parents. In a registered partnership only the biological mother would be a
parent in the eyes of the law whereas the partner would not be considered as a parent.
Nevertheless, both partners could apply to the court for joint custody of a child. On 1
April 1998 the parenting law ended the privilege of married couples to adopt children.
Since then, both individuals and couples in either a formal or an informal relationship
regardless of their sexual orientation have been allowed to adopt a child. Thus in combi-
nation with this adoption law, the difference between marriage and registered partnership
in terms of children disappeared.
From 1 April 2001 to 1 March 2009, married couples in the Netherlands were permitted
8For legal details we rely heavily on Waaldijk (2001).
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to switch their marriage to registered partnership. This could be followed by a convenient
and less costly divorce process without the need to go to court.9 Since it was not always
recognized abroad as a divorce and lacked the legal arrangements for children born in
the marriage, this so called flash divorce procedure was abolished on 1 March 2009. In
part of our analysis, we exploit the flash divorce to estimate the effect of divorce costs
reduction – around 750 euro in total including court fees and legal fees (Government of the
Netherlands, 2019; Teurlings Advocaten, 2019) – on the stability of different-sex formal
partnerships. By comparing this effect with that of the symbolic significance of marriage,
we throw light on the important role the latter plays in stabilizing formal partnerships.
3.2.2 Same-Sex Marriages
Waaldijk (2001) provides a detailed description of the characteristics of the same-sex
marriage law in the Netherlands. After being approved in the Dutch parliament by the
House of Representatives on 12 September 2000 and the Senate on 19 December 2000, on
1 April 2001 same-sex marriage was legalized. Since then “a marriage can be contracted
by two persons of different sex or of the same sex” (Article 30 of Book 1 of the Dutch
Civil Code). For the first time in human history, same-sex couples were officially and
legally offered marriage equality.
Figure 3.1 shows the annual number of new registered partnerships and marriages
from 1998 to 2015. Panel a displays the developments of same-sex formal relationships.
Registered partnerships were popular only in the first year of their existence. After that,
the number of new registered partnerships declined rapidly and then remained sort of
constant from 2001 onward at the level of about 500 per year. After a spike in the
first years of the same-sex marriage legalization, there were about 1400 new same-sex
marriages per year.
Panel b of Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolution of new different-sex registered partner-
ships and marriages. The different-sex couples present a completely different pattern. In
1998, approximately 90,000 marriages were formed. Up to 2001, registered partnerships
were not very popular. With the initiation of the flash divorce, the number of new reg-
9From a research point of view, it is inconvenient that two different changes in marriage institutions,
i.e. this flash divorce and same-sex marriage legalization, were introduced on the same day. Nevertheless,
we are not concerned that this threatens the identification of our main effects of interest, i.e. the effect of
same-sex marriage legalization and the effect of the symbolic significance of marriage. The flash divorce
focused on the administrative process of transforming a marriage to a registered partnership which was
easier to dissolve. However, we study the first registered partnerships of individuals, which were not
targeted by the flash divorce. Moreover, if registered partners chose to marry because of the option of
flash divorce, this kind of selectivity would be captured by our MPH model.
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Figure 3.1: New Marriages and Registered Partnerships; 1998-2015
a. Same-Sex b. Different-Sex
Source: Statistics Netherlands
istered partnerships started to rise persisting at a level of around 10,000 per year from
2003 onward. Although initially many registered partnerships occurred because of the
transition from marriage, later on new registered partnerships not immediately following
a marriage became more important. After March 1st, 2009 due to the abolition of the
flash divorce, new entries into registered partnerships were not preceded by a marriage.
Why would couples transfer their registered partnership to marriage? As discussed
previously, there is not much difference between registered partnership and marriage in
legal rights and responsibilities as well as economic incentives. A small difference between
them is how the relationship legally starts and ends. People that want to marry have
to declare “in the presence of the witnesses that they accept each other as husband
and wife and that they will faithfully fulfill all duties which the law connects to their
marital status” (Article 67 of Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code). Registered partners
formally start by registering through a registrar. A divorce of marriage can be obtained
only in court. However, a registered partnership can be dissolved through a contract if
both partners consent and there are no minor children involved. If either of these two
conditions is not met, the divorce of a registered partnership should be dealt with in
court too. Our result based on the flash divorce procedure shows that canceling divorce
costs related to court and legal fees had a significant effect but could not explain the
whole effect of transition to marriage on the stability of formal partnerships. What still
remains is the symbolic significance attached to marriage, i.e. the public commitment
and the symbol of individual prestige and personal achievement. When both marriage
and registered partnership are options (after 2001 in panel a and all the years in panel
b of Figure 3.1), choosing to enter a marriage rather than a registered partnership may
signal a strong public commitment and personal achievement. Figure 3.1 displays that
indeed much more new couples irrespective of sexual orientation preferred marriage to
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registered partnership in every year.
3.3 Data
In our analysis, we use rich administrative data from Statistics Netherlands. The high
quality individual level data include personal characteristics such as the country where
the person was born, gender, immigrant status, birth year and month. There is also
detailed information of every marital status of all individuals in the population, such as
the beginning and ending dates, the birth year and month of the partner, the country
where the partner was born, and the gender of the partner.
In order to make the administrative data available for our analysis we had to address a
number of issues. First, we identified the sexual orientation of every person by comparing
their gender with the gender of their partner in every formal partnership, i.e. registered
partnership or marriage. Second, since the focus of our analysis is on the duration of
formal partnerships, we established the start date of every formal relationship and when
applicable the end date. We also constructed some partnership characteristics such as
the age difference between the two partners and whether the couple shares the same
origin, i.e. was born in the same country. Third, we gathered all, around 70,000, same-
sex partnerships records. In part of our analysis, we also investigate the stability of
different-sex partnerships. We randomly sampled approximately the same number of
different-sex partnerships for comparison due to the highly demanding computational
capacity of our model estimation. Finally, since registered partnerships were legalized
in 1998, we use data about partnership formation from January 1st, 1998 onward. We
follow only the first partnership of individuals starting until December 31st, 2005 to
eliminate that the duration of one’s later partnership was influenced by one’s experiences
of previous partnerships. We trace every partnership for a maximum of ten years until
either their termination or the censoring time (death, widowhood, or end of data period).
The reasons for such a data tailoring are that (1) partnerships with entry later than
December 31st, 2005 are too far away from the year of same-sex marriage law passage,
(2) these partnerships only contribute to estimates of short spells, and that (3) censoring
every partnership at 10 years makes a comparison easier. The definitions and descriptives
of the relevant variables in the baseline model are provided in Table 3.A.
To illustrate the nature of our data, we present survival functions of same-sex reg-
istered partnerships and marriages in Figure 3.2. Panel a shows same-sex female rela-
tionships and panel b displays same-sex male relationships. In both panels the left-hand
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Figure 3.2: Survival Probabilities of Same-Sex Registered Partnerships
a. Two Women; before (Left) and after (Right) the Same-Sex Marriage Law
b. Two Men; before (Left) and after (Right) the Same-Sex Marriage Law
side graphs present survival functions of registered partnerships that started before the
legalization of same-sex marriages. The right-hand side graphs do the same for registered
partnerships that started after the legalization of same-sex marriages. Each graph indi-
cates the transition to marriage and the cumulative transition to marriage and divorce.
There is a clear difference between the left-hand side and right-hand side graphs. Regis-
tered partnerships that started before the same-sex marriage legalization are less likely to
survive. After 10 years, 20 percent of the registered partnerships transferred to marriages
and 10 (males) to 15 percent (females) ended in divorces. Registered partnerships that
started after the same-sex marriage law are as likely to divorce but less likely to transform
to marriage. This is no doubt related to the choice couples had to immediately go for a
marriage rather than start with a registered partnership.
It is also interesting to compare the stability of same-sex and different-sex marriages
that started after same-sex marriage legalization. As shown in Figure 3.3, during the
first years of their existence, different-sex marriages had the lowest divorce risk, but later
they were less stable than same-sex male marriages. Same-sex female marriages had the
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lowest survival probability.
Figure 3.3: Survival Probabilities of Marriages that Started after Same-Sex Marriage
Legalization
3.4 Statistical Model
We investigate the effects of same-sex marriage legalization on the stability of same-sex
registered partnerships. Registered partnerships can be terminated either through disso-
lution or transformation to marriage. We are also interested in whether subsequent mar-
riages are less or more stable than the preceding registered partnerships. To study both
effects, we use a bivariate mixed proportional hazard approach modeling the transition
processes to divorce and marriage simultaneously. Marriage entry may exert a treatment
effect on the stability of same-sex registered partnerships. Therefore, we account for the
possibility that after a transformation to marriage, the divorce risk changes. We start
our analysis with registered partnerships that were established before the introduction of
the same-sex marriage law.
We model the transition rate from a registered partnership to marriage as follows.
The marriage rate at duration t conditional on a vector of observed characteristics x and
unobserved characteristics νm is specified as
θm(t|x, νm) = exp(x′βm + ΣkµmkIk(t) + νm). (2)
The subscript m denotes transformation to marriage. The vector x includes the absolute
age difference between the partners in a couple, whether the couple shares the country of
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origin, and whether the couple is native or first or second generation immigrant. Further-
more, this vector also includes birth year cohorts, age cohorts of partnership entry, and
partnership entry year dummies. The term ΣkµmkIk(t) represents piece-wise constant du-
ration dependence, i.e. duration dependence that is locally constant in connected spells
or intervals. k = 1, 2, ..., K is the subscript for duration interval and Ik(t) are indica-
tors which are equal to one in corresponding consecutive intervals. The true distribution
of duration dependence can be arbitrarily closely approximated with a large number of
duration intervals. We employ four duration intervals (K = 4; 0-1, 1-3, 3-7, and longer
than seven years) and normalize µ1 = 0 for identification. Note that since a transition to
marriage cannot take place before the legalization of same-sex marriage, the duration of
transition to marriage is counted from the date of legalization.
The conditional density function of a completed registered partnership duration tran-
sitioning to a marriage can be written as:




in which tm represents the duration of the registered partnership until it transformed to
marriage. Likewise, the divorce hazard of a registered partnership at time t is as follows:
θd(t|x, IL, Im, νd) = exp(x′βd + δLIL + δmIm + ΣkµdkIk(t) + νd). (4)
Similarly, the subscript d denotes divorce. The vector x contains the same observed
characteristics and the pattern of duration dependence is the same as before. New ele-
ments in the specification of the divorce rate are the two indicator variables. The first is
IL = I(t > tL), which denotes whether or not the duration of the registered partnership
was beyond the legalization of same-sex marriage on April 1st, 2001. Although this is a
fixed calendar date, registered partnerships started at different points in calendar time.
Thus different couples would pass the date of legalization at different durations of their
registered partnership. Therefore, we are able to distinguish this effect from duration
dependence. The parameter δL captures the effect of same-sex marriage legalization on
the divorce hazard. A positive δL would indicate that the legalization raised the divorce
rate possibly due to disagreement between the partners on the next phase of the rela-
tionship, i.e. marriage (Farmer and Horowitz, 2015). A negative δL would represent a
stabilizing effect of same-sex marriage legalization. The second indicator variable in the
divorce hazard is Im = I(t > tm) which denotes whether a registered partnership was
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transferred into a marriage. The parameter δm identifies the change in the divorce risk
after getting married. A negative δm would imply that marriage induced relationships to
become more stable while a positive δm would imply that marriage would be less stable
than the preceding registered partnership.
The conditional density function of a completed registered partnership duration end-
ing with a divorce can be written as:
f(td|x, IL, Im, νd) = θd(td|x, IL, Im, νd) exp(−
∫ td
0
θd(s|x, IL, Im, νd)ds) (5)
where td denotes the duration of the registered partnership until it dissolved. In our
analysis it is important to account for potential selectivity in the transition from registered
partnership into marriage. Registered partnerships that transformed to marriage may be
different for unobserved reasons from those that did not. It could be that more stable
registered partnerships switched to marriage while less stable ones dissolved. If this were
the case and we failed to take such a selectivity into account, we might wrongly interpret
a significant negative estimate of δm as a treatment effect, i.e. a stabilizing effect of
marriage on formal partnerships.
To disentangle the selection effect from the treatment effect of marriage, we model
the transitions from registered partnerships to divorce and to marriage simultaneously
and allow the two corresponding unobserved heterogeneity components νs and νm to be
correlated. These two components represent common unobserved time-invariant con-
founding factors. A major advantage of utilizing this kind of approach is that, as shown
by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003), identification of the treatment effect does not rely
on a conditional independence assumption and it is not necessary to have a valid instru-
mental variable to establish a causal effect. Instead, identification comes from the timing
of events, namely the order in which divorces and transitions to marriage occurred. To
establish whether one event has a causal effect on the hazard of the other event, the key
identification assumption is no-anticipation. This assumption imposes a recursive struc-
ture on the underlying process. No-anticipation does not imply that forward-looking
individuals cannot have an expectation on possible future events. As long as they do not
act on this expectation by changing outcomes, the no-anticipation assumption is not vio-
lated (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003). In the context of our study, the no-anticipation
assumption allows for the possibility that a couple in a registered partnership planned
to marry in the future. This assumption still holds if the couple did not change the
duration of their current registered partnership in response to their expectation or plan
44
of marriage. First, it does not make sense that couples brought forward or postponed
their previously planned marriage merely because they scheduled this marriage before.
Second, if a registered partnership dissolved since one partner proposed marriage while
the other did not want it and hence decided to divorce, this is taken into account in
our model investigating the effect of same-sex marriage legalization.10 Identification also
relies on the mixed proportional structure of the hazard rates. We use a very flexible
specification of the hazard rates as we do not impose functional form assumptions on
age dependence or on the distributions of unobserved heterogeneity in the hazards of
marriage and divorce.
The joint conditional density function of completed durations of registered partner-
ships that end with either divorce or marriage can be specified as





f(td|x, IL, Im, νd)f(tm|x, νm)dG(νd, νm) (6)
in which G(νd, νm) is the joint discrete distribution of the two unobserved heterogeneity
components each of which is supposed to take two values. Because we also estimate
constants, we normalize νd1 = νm1 = 0. The associated probabilities are
p1 = Prob(νd = νd1, νm = νm1)
p2 = Prob(νd = νd2, νm = νm1)
p3 = Prob(νd = νd1, νm = νm2) (7)
p4 = Prob(νd = νd2, νm = νm2)




αj is a set of parameters for programming convenience to guarantee non-negative proba-
bilities, for j = 1, ..., 4 with α4 normalized to zero. In this MPH-structure the assumption
is that the unobserved components are random effects, i.e. they are orthogonal to the
explanatory variables. Since both the divorce hazard and the transition-to-marriage rate
are assumed to have two types, in combination there may be four types. Modelling the
selection effects, these two sets of unobserved heterogeneity are able to capture some
important elements of a partnership such as preferences of couples and quality of a part-
nership. A combination of easy divorce and easy marriage indicates an impulsive couple
that is usually in a low quality partnership, while a combination of low divorce and dif-
10As a sensitivity analysis to further alleviate concerns on anticipation effects, we employ a subsample
in which we discard registered partnerships that were established between one quarter before and one
quarter after same-sex marriage legislation. The parameter estimates are very similar.
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ficult marriage refers to a cautious type. Both of these represent adverse selection. The
remaining two combinations imply types with positive selection — partnerships with low
divorce risk more likely transform to a marriage and unstable partnerships also have a
low marriage rate. Equation (6) is used as basis for our log-likelihood function that is
maximized over all parameters. We perform separate estimations for male and female
same-sex couples.
3.5 Parameter Estimates
3.5.1 Duration of Same-Sex Registered Partnerships
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the main parameter estimates based on same-sex regis-
tered partnerships that were formed before the introduction of same-sex marriage law.11
Panel a reports the results of competing risks models, while panel b displays the outcomes
of single risk models that ignore the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
components of the two transition rates.
Our main interest is twofold. First, we explore the effect of same-sex marriage le-
galization on the divorce hazard. Second, we want to know whether or not marriage
stabilized its preceding registered partnership. Although the magnitude of the effects
differ for female and male partnerships, our main findings are very similar. The same-sex
marriage law increased divorce rates by 48% (exp{0.39}− 1) for female partnerships and
203% for male ones. Moreover, registered partnerships that were replaced by marriages
were more stable than before. Getting married reduced the divorce hazard by 68% for
female partnerships and 98% for male ones. Both effects are significantly different from
zero.
We also find positive duration dependence in the divorce hazard. After their first year,
registered partnerships were more likely to dissolve. In later years, the divorce rate did not
change much. The transition rate from registered partnership to marriage showed a strong
negative duration dependence. In the first year after same-sex marriage legalization, the
marriage rate was high. In later years the transition rate was substantially smaller.
The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity according to the estimates in panel a
is presented at the bottom of the table. As shown, we can identify three combinations
of divorce hazards and marriage rates. There is no group which conditional on observed
characteristics and duration dependence has a low divorce hazard and a high marriage
11All parameter estimates are presented in Appendix 3.B.
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rate.12 The main difference between females and males is that the largest group for males
is the one that has low transition rates to both divorce and marriage whereas for females
there is also a substantial group with a combination of low transition rate to marriage
and high divorce hazard.
Table 3.1: Parameter Estimates Transition Rates of Same-Sex Registered Partnerships
to Marriage and Divorce (either Directly or through Marriage as an Intermediate State)
Two Women Two Men
(1) Divorce (2) Marriage (3) Divorce (4) Marriage
a. Competing risks
Same-sex marriage law 0.39 (0.18)** 1.11 (0.22)***
Married -1.13 (0.30)*** -3.72 (0.42)***
Duration dependence
1-3 years 1.13 (0.23)*** -0.65 (0.21)*** 0.89 (0.22)*** -1.07 (0.21)***
3-7 years 1.10 (0.28)*** -0.80 (0.25)*** 1.21 (0.33)*** -0.62 (0.25)**
7+ years 1.02 (0.32)*** -3.14 (0.58)*** 0.87 (0.38)** -3.24 (0.49)***
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν -∞ (—) -5.68 (0.18)*** -3.12 (0.40)*** -6.04 (0.14)***
α1 -0.88 (0.22)*** -1.76 (0.05)***
α3 0.13 (0.43) -3.40 (0.62)***
-Loglikelihood 4080.7 4370.0
b. Single risks
Same-sex marriage law 0.31 (0.18)* 0.67 (0.21)***
Married -0.53 (0.16)*** -1.36 (0.27)***
Duration dependence
1-3 years 1.13 (0.23)*** -0.63 (0.20)*** 0.97 (0.24)*** -1.00 (0.21)***
3-7 years 1.09 (0.28)*** -0.77 (0.25)*** 1.18 (0.33)*** -0.57 (0.27)**
7+ years plus 1.04 (0.32)*** -3.13 (0.58)*** 0.85 (0.37)** -3.21 (0.50)***
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν -∞ (—) -5.67 (0.18)*** -3.89 (0.40)*** -6.09 (0.14)***
α 0.00 (0.36) -1.68 (0.06)*** -3.04 (0.31)*** -1.94 (0.05)***
-Loglikelihood 2398.0 1683.0 2251.0 2123.5
Note: Based on 3,147 women and 4,404 men. Other covariates are included in every model but not
shown for parsimony. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The
distributions of unobserved heterogeneity in panel a is as follows
Transition rate to
Women Men Divorce Marriage
p1 0.16 0.14 High High
p2 – – Low High
p3 0.45 0.03 High Low
p4 0.39 0.83 Low Low
Panel b of Table 3.1 shows the relevant parameter estimates if we do not take into
account the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity components of the two
12The associated probability of the group which conditional on observed characteristics and duration
dependence has a low divorce hazard and a high marriage rate converges to zero. A low divorce rate
signals a stable relationship. For these relationships there is no urgent need to transfer into a marriage.
Hence for this group the marriage rate is low across the board. For relationships with a high divorce
rate, there are two types: one impulsive type very likely to transform to a marriage, the other type not
very likely to make this transition.
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transition rates. The results for female same-sex couples are similar to those in panel a.
The absolute sum of the log-likelihoods of the divorce estimates in panel b is 4081.0, which
is almost identical to the minus log-likelihood of the joint estimate in panel a that has a
value of 4080.7. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation
between the unobserved heterogeneity components. For male same-sex partnerships the
difference between the competing risks and single risks estimates is significant. Since
the absolute sum of the log-likelihoods in panel b is 4374.5 and in panel a it is 4370.0,
the value of the Likelihood Ratio test equal to 12.8, which with one degree of freedom
is significantly different from zero. Apparently, selectivity is an issue for male same-sex
registered partnerships. There is adverse selection, i.e. partnerships that were less likely
to dissolve were also less likely to transform into a marriage, and partnerships that would
have been more likely disrupted were more likely to enter a marriage.
How can we interpret our main findings? For those that made the transition to
marriage, the relationship became more stable. Note that according to our estimates this
is not due to the selection effect such that more stable registered partnerships transfered
to marriage. It is even the other way around. Less stable male same-sex partnerships
were more likely to enter a marriage. Providing that marriage and registered partnership
are equivalent in legal and economic functions, we attribute this stabilizing treatment
effect of marriage to its symbolic significance and higher divorce costs. In Section 3.5.2
we find that divorce costs accounted for only part of the stabilizing effect and its influence
dropped dramatically and quickly.
We think that the effect of same-sex marriage legalization on the stability of same-sex
partnerships may be caused by disagreement between couple on future marital arrange-
ment. Perhaps, after the law one partner wanted to marry while the other preferred to
keep the current status. The disagreement between them may have induced a dissolution
of the registered partnership. As suggested by Farmer and Horowitz (2015), escalation to
a more advanced relationship requires agreement. When through legalization, marriage
becomes an option for same-sex couples, the costs of marriage entry drop. Thus, there
are two possibilities for low quality same-sex registered partnerships. First, one but not
both partners passes a threshold in his or her utility function. So, one partner prefers to
enter a marriage while the other partner prefers to stay in a registered partnership. This
induces conflict increasing the divorce rate, which is captured by our parameter estimate
of same-sex marriage legalization. The second possibility is that both partners in a low
quality registered partnership pass their marriage threshold in their utility function and
hence agree to marry. However, the essence of their marriage, its inherent low quality,
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determines the divorce in the future. This is reflected in the adverse selection captured
by the correlated unobserved heterogeneity in our model.
Table 3.2 confirms that same-sex marriages were more stable than same-sex registered
partnerships. It presents parameter estimates of the same model using a sample of the
first marriages and registered partnerships that started after same-sex marriage legaliza-
tion. These first partnerships are tracked until the abolition of flash divorce. We simply
compare the stability of these first marriages and registered partnerships. A registered
partnership was censored at the time when it transformed to marriage. As shown in
the table, the divorce risk of marriages was significantly lower than that of registered
partnerships (reference group). After the legalization of same-sex marriages, more stable
couples decided to marry while less stable couples went for registered partnership.
Table 3.2: Parameter Estimates Divorce Rates from Same-Sex Relationships (both Reg-
istered Partnerships and Marriages) Starting after the Same-Sex Marriage Law
(1) Two women (2) Two men
Marriage -0.55 (0.13)*** -1.00 (0.16)***
Duration dependence
1-3 years 1.33 (0.20)*** 0.85 (0.20)***
3-7 years 1.56 (0.27)*** 1.27 (0.26)***
7+ years 1.49 (0.57)*** 0.89 (0.66)
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν -2.16 (0.95)** -3.42 (0.60)***
α -2.01 (1.57) -1.67 (0.84)**
Observations 9,061 11,069
Note: All covariates and constant in previous models are included in every model but not shown for
parsimony. Both columns use first marriage or registered partnership of every individual that started
after the law and are right censored at the flash divorce ban; standard errors in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
3.5.2 Costs of Divorce and Duration of Marriages
In this subsection, we explore the effect of canceling the higher divorce costs on the stabil-
ity of different-sex marriages. In the highly tolerant Dutch society for sexual minorities,
different-sex and same-sex couples are even more similar. The result may imply that
divorce costs do not account for the whole stabilizing effect of marriage identified in the
previous subsection.
From April 1st, 2001 to March 1st, 2009, both different-sex and same-sex married
couples could terminate their marriage through a convenient and less costly process, the
so called flash divorce. These couples first changed their marital status to registered
partnership. Then they chose whether to end the registered partnership or not without
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going to court. It may save up to around 750 euro by divorcing with this special procedure.
We exploit the flash divorce to analyze how divorce costs affected the divorce hazards
of different-sex marriages. The effect of flash divorce cannot be identified for same-sex
marriages since this type of marriages did not exist before 1 April 2001. The model
specification is slightly adjusted based on equation (4). The divorce rate of marriages is
defined as:
θd(t|x, IFD, IBFD, νd) = exp(x′βd + δFDI(t > tFD) + δBFDI(t > tBFD) + ΣkµkIk(t) + νd)
(8)
in which the indicator variables IFD and IBFD denote the time of the introduction and
the abolition of flash divorce. Furthermore, δFD captures the effect of flash divorce
introduction and δBFD is the effect of abolishing the flash divorce. The density function
of completed durations of marriages, i.e. the durations until a divorce took place can be
written as:
fd(t|x, IFD, IBFD, νd) = θd(tm|x, IFD, IBFD, νd) exp(−
∫ td
0
θd(s|x, IFD, IBFD, νd)ds). (9)
We remove the unobserved heterogeneity by integration
fd(t|x, IFD, IBFD) =
∫
νd
fd(td|x, IFD, IBFD, νd)dH(νd) (10)
where H(νd) is the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity which we assume to be
discrete with two points of support following a logistic distribution.
Column (1) of Table 3.3 displays the parameter estimates of different-sex marriages
that began from 1998 onward.13 The introduction of flash divorce significantly raised
the divorce hazard of different-sex married couples by 48% (exp{0.39} − 1). Quite a few
different-sex couples who got married between January 1st, 1998 and April 1st, 2001,
took advantage of this convenient divorce procedure to end their marriage right after this
procedure was available.14
The flash divorce procedure was abolished on March 1st, 2009. In the first column of
Table 3.3 the flash divorce ban had an insignificant effect on the divorce rate of different-
sex couples, which was due to the gradual decline in divorce between the flash divorce
13We estimated a version with unobserved heterogeneity but both ν and α were very imprecisely
estimated. Also, the LR test did not reject the version reported. The complete estimation results of
Table 3.3 are reported in Appendix 3.B.
14In a sensitivity analysis we notice that from the second year onward the flash divorce had no signif-
icant effect on the divorce hazard.
50
Table 3.3: Parameter Estimates Effects of Flash Divorce on Divorce Rates from Marriages
Different-sex Marriages Same-sex Marriages
From 1998 onward After SSM-law Two women Two men
Flash divorce 0.39 (0.16)**
Flash divorce ban -0.01 (0.08) -0.09 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09)
Duration dependence
1-3 years 0.81 (0.10)*** 0.67 (0.11)*** 0.76 (0.09)*** 0.14 (0.09)
3-7 years 1.03 (0.11)*** 0.95 (0.12)*** 0.86 (0.11)*** 0.32 (0.12)***
7+ years 0.99 (0.12)*** 1.03 (0.16)*** 0.64 (0.16)*** 0.32 (0.18)*
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν −∞ (—) -2.19 (1.36) -2.04 (0.65)***
α 2.06 (3.88) 0.19 (1.22) -2.07 (1.23)*
Observations 15,574 12,444 15,152 16,210
Note: All covariates and constant in previous models are included in every model but not shown for
parsimony. Column (1) shows the estimates for different-sex marriages starting from 1998 onward;
columns (2) to (4) contain marriages that were set up after the introduction of same-sex marriage and
flash divorce. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
introduction and its abolition. The second column reports the parameter estimates for
different-sex marriages that started after the introduction of the flash divorce law. Also
for them, the effect of flash divorce abolition was not significantly different from zero.
Just for comparison, we present the estimates for same-sex marriages too in the third
and fourth columns. For these marriages, the flash divorce ban had no significant effect
on the divorce rate either.
One of the issues that remain is the importance of children. Children may be a vital
factor influencing a couple’s decision of whether or not to divorce. However, children will
not be a big issue in our study since our sample consists of the first registered partnerships
only. The vast majority of the same-sex couples (81.1% for females and 98.8% for males)
did not have a child living at home.15 Still, we used information about the number of
children living at home in another dataset (household administrative data) and added
this to our baseline model. The main parameter estimates shown in Appendix 3.C are
hardly affected.
3.6 Conclusions
Over the past decades, marriage has been deinstitutionalized in the sense that its legal
and economic functions have been impaired or replaced by other types of relationships.
Moreover, registered partnership and marriage have been available in many countries to
15In the descriptives table of Appendix 3.A, the average number of children is 0.31 in the household
of lesbian women and 0.01 in that of gay men.
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same-sex couples who had been excluded from this kind of legal institution. In these
countries, differences between registered partnership and marriage are small or basically
non-existent except for the divorce costs and symbolic significance attached to marriage,
including enforceable public commitment and marker of personal achievement.
Same-sex marriage legalization is a recent phenomenon that provides an opportunity
to study how the symbol of marriage affects the stability of formal partnerships. Thanks
to its symbolic significance, marriage may stabilize its preceding registered partnership
by enforcing its unique public commitment and marking the personal prestige of the mar-
ried couple. Opening up the possibility for same-sex couples to transfer their registered
partnership to marriage does not necessarily imply that this is the only possible response.
It may be also that the reduced costs of marriage entry due to same-sex marriage legal-
ization have different impacts in the utility function of two partners of the couple: one
partner passes its threshold of marriage while the other does not or at least not imme-
diately. Such disagreement could indicate that the introduction of same-sex marriages
stimulated divorce from registered partnerships.
We study how the Dutch same-sex marriage legalization in 2001 affected the stability
of same-sex registered partnerships which were introduced in the Netherlands in 1998. We
find that same-sex marriage legalization indeed caused quite a few registered partnerships
to divorce. Nevertheless, many other registered partnerships transferred into marriages.
We also investigate whether marriages that were transformed from registered partnerships
were more stable than they originally were. In theory, marriages could be more stable
because of selectivity, i.e. the inherently more stable registered partnerships transformed
into marriages while the unstable ones were not. Using a bivariate hazard rate model
with marriage and divorce as competing risks and allowing marriage to directly affect
the divorce rate, we find that for females selectivity is not an issue while for males there
is adverse selection. Apparently, same-sex male partnerships that were less likely to
dissolve were also less likely to transform into a marriage. For both females and males,
we find strong and significant effects of marriage on the stability of their relationship.
Once turned into a marriage, relationships were much more stable than they were before
as registered partnerships. Studying the effect of the flash divorce arrangement on the
duration of different-sex marriages, we conclude that the divorce costs cannot explain the
whole effect of transition to marriage on the stability of formal partnerships. This is all
the more surprising since the main remaining difference between registered partnerships
and marriages seems to be merely symbolic. The symbolic significance of marriage has
powerful stabilizing effects too on interpersonal relationships.
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Appendix 3.A: Definitions and Descriptives of Vari-
ables
Table 3.A.1: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Same-sex marriage law Dummy variable of the same-sex marriage legalization
Heterosexual Dummy variable if classified as straight partnership
Gay man Dummy variable if classified as gay men partnership
Lesbian Dummy variable if classified as lesbian partnership
Age difference Absolute age difference between a couple
Same origin Dummy variable if both partners of a couple were born in the same country
Native Dummy variable if both parents born in the Netherlands
First generation immigrant Dummy variable if born abroad with at least one parent born abroad too
Second generation immigrant Dummy variable if born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born
abroad too
Year dummies of partnership entry Dummy variables of the year when the partnership started
Duration Proceeding duration of partnership in years
Birth year cohorts Dummies of birth year cohorts, the larger the younger cohort
Age cohorts of partnership entry Dummy variables for age cohorts of partnership entry
Children number Number of children living at home
Children missing Dummy variable if number of children is missing
Table 3.A.2: Descriptives
Lesbian Women Gay Men
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Age difference 5.32 0 38 7.19 0 56
Children number 0.31 0 6 0.01 0 3
Percentages
Same origin 89.96 0 100 77.27 0 100
Natives 88.18 0 100 80.72 0 100
First generation 4.16 0 100 12.58 0 100
Second generation 7.66 0 100 6.70 0 100
Partnership years≤ 1 2.19 0 100 3.13 0 100
1 <Partnership years≤ 3 6.93 0 100 6.63 0 100
3 <Partnership years≤ 7 10.23 0 100 10.15 0 100
Partnership years> 7 80.65 0 100 80.09 0 100
1902 < Birth year ≤ 1912 0.22 0 100 0.09 0 100
1912 < Birth year ≤ 1922 0.48 0 100 0.50 0 100
1922 < Birth year ≤ 1932 2.67 0 100 3.97 0 100
1932 < Birth year ≤ 1942 5.91 0 100 10.08 0 100
1942 < Birth year ≤ 1952 16.75 0 100 21.93 0 100
1952 < Birth year ≤ 1962 35.53 0 100 32.61 0 100
1962 < Birth year ≤ 1972 34.13 0 100 26.68 0 100
1972 < Birth year ≤ 1982 4.32 0 100 4.13 0 100
Age partnership entry ≤ 20 0.19 0 100 0.17 0 100
20 < Age partnership entry ≤ 30 13.22 0 100 11.81 0 100
30 < Age partnership entry ≤ 40 43.66 0 100 34.97 0 100
40 < Age partnership entry ≤ 50 26.06 0 100 27.18 0 100
50 < Age partnership entry ≤ 60 10.90 0 100 16.33 0 100
Age partnership entry > 60 5.97 0 100 9.54 0 100
Children missing 8.45 0 100 14.74 0 100
Based on 3,147 lesbian women and 4,404 gay men
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Appendix 3.B: Full Parameter Estimates
Table 3.B.1 presents a full set of parameter estimates corresponding to Table 3.1 panel a.
Table 3.B.2 displays a full set of parameter estimates corresponding to Table 3.2. Table
3.B.3 shows a full set of parameter estimates corresponding to Table 3.3.
Table 3.B.1: Parameter Estimates Transition Rates of Same-Sex Registered Partnerships;
Competing Risks
Two Women Two Men
(1) Divorce (2) Marriage (3) Divorce (4) Marriage
Same-sex marriage law 0.39 (0.18)** 1.11 (0.22)***
Married -1.13 (0.30)*** -3.72 (0.42)***
Entry in 1999 0.06 (0.13) -0.37 (0.16)** 0.29 (0.13)** -0.19 (0.14)
Entry in 2000 -0.02 (0.14) -0.90 (0.22)*** 0.01 (0.16) -1.05 (0.22)***
Entry in 2001 pre-law 0.19 (0.38) -0.33 (0.37) 0.63 (0.32)** -0.84 (0.44)*
Duration dependence
1-3 years 1.13 (0.23)*** -0.65 (0.21)*** 0.89 (0.22)*** -1.07 (0.21)***
3-7 years 1.10 (0.28)*** -0.80 (0.25)*** 1.21 (0.33)*** -0.62 (0.25)**
7+ years 1.02 (0.32)*** -3.14 (0.58)*** 0.87 (0.38)** -3.24 (0.49)***
1942 < Birth year ≤ 1952 0.80 (0.78) 0.39 (0.48) 0.64 (0.58) -0.04 (0.25)
1952 < Birth year ≤ 1962 1.46 (0.83)* -0.11 (0.57) 0.99 (0.64) -0.20 (0.34)
1962 < Birth year ≤ 1972 1.79 (0.84)** 0.67 (0.60) 1.21 (0.66)* 0.01 (0.40)
Birth year > 1972 2.36 (0.89)*** 2.53 (0.68)*** 1.21 (0.70)* -0.01 (0.52)
20 < Age partnership entry ≤ 30 -0.67 (0.73) -0.86 (1.06) -0.47 (0.65) -1.06 (0.74)
30 < Age partnership entry ≤ 40 -1.00 (0.74) 0.40 (1.08) -1.31 (0.67)* -1.33 (0.77)*
40 < Age partnership entry ≤ 50 -1.46 (0.76)* 0.28 (1.11) -1.89 (0.71)*** -1.31 (0.80)*
50 < Age partnership entry ≤ 60 -1.88 (0.85)** 0.13 (1.15) -2.42 (0.79)*** -1.45 (0.84)*
Age partnership entry > 60 -3.16 (1.49)** -3.40 (1.33)** -2.86 (1.08)*** -1.66 (0.88)*
Age difference 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Same origin -0.49 (0.18)*** -0.58 (0.24)** -0.34 (0.16)** -0.13 (0.17)
First generation -0.59 (0.30)** -1.31 (0.34)*** -0.23 (0.20) -0.21 (0.22)
Second generation 0.27 (0.18) -0.25 (0.23) 0.22 (0.21) -0.17 (0.26)
Constant -4.50 (1.15)*** 1.74 (1.30) -3.01 (0.96)*** 3.87 (0.88)***
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν -∞ (—) -5.68 (0.18)*** -3.12 (0.40)*** -6.04 (0.14)***
α1 -0.88 (0.22)*** -1.76 (0.05)***
α3 0.13 (0.43) -3.40 (0.62)***
-Loglikelihood 4080.7 4370.0
Note: Based on 3,147 women and 4,404 men. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01. The distributions of unobserved heterogeneity in panel a is as follows
Transition rate to
Women Men Divorce Marriage
p1 0.16 0.14 High High
p2 – – Low High
p3 0.45 0.03 High Low
p4 0.39 0.83 Low Low
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Table 3.B.2: Parameter Estimates Divorce Rates from Same-Sex Relationships (both
Registered Partnerships and Marriages) Starting after Legalization of Same-Sex Mar-
riages
(1) Two women (2) Two men
Marriage -0.55 (0.13)*** -1.00 (0.16)***
Entry in 2002 -0.01 (0.17) -0.11 (0.22)
Entry in 2003 -0.07 (0.18) 0.22 (0.22)
Entry in 2004 -0.19 (0.20) 0.24 (0.24)
Entry in 2005 -0.11 (0.22) -0.09 (0.27)
Entry in 2006 0.07 (0.23) 0.06 (0.30)
Entry in 2007 -0.52 (0.33) -0.63 (0.44)
Entry in 2008-9 -0.11 (0.56) -0.32 (0.65)
Duration dependence
1-3 years 1.33 (0.20)*** 0.85 (0.20)***
3-7 years 1.56 (0.27)*** 1.27 (0.26)***
7+ years 1.49 (0.57)*** 0.89 (0.66)
1942 < Birth year ≤ 1952 -0.86 (1.07) -0.43 (1.23)
1952 < Birth year ≤ 1962 0.16 (1.16) -0.20 (1.38)
1962 < Birth year ≤ 1972 0.73 (1.20) 0.26 (1.42)
Birth year > 1972 0.90 (1.23) 0.42 (1.47)
20 < Age partnership entry ≤ 30 -1.12 (0.61)* -2.71 (0.62)***
30 < Age partnership entry ≤ 40 -2.06 (0.72)*** -3.12 (0.67)***
40 < Age partnership entry ≤ 50 -2.14 (0.77)*** -3.78 (0.74)***
50 < Age partnership entry ≤ 60 -1.68 (0.90)* -4.58 (0.99)***
Age partnership entry > 60 -4.34 (1.68)*** -4.81 (1.57)***
Age difference 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)***
Same origin -0.11 (0.19) -0.88 (0.18)***
First generation 0.02 (0.24) -0.61 (0.21)***
Second generation 0.35 (0.19)* -0.37 (0.31)
Constant -2.22 (1.65) 0.38 (1.61)
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν -2.16 (0.95)** -3.42 (0.60)***
α -2.01 (1.57) -1.67 (0.84)**
Observations 9,061 11,069
Note: Both columns use first marriage or registered partnership of every individual that started after
the law and are right censored at the flash divorce ban; standard errors in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.B.3: Parameter Estimates Effects of Flash Divorce on Divorce Rates from Mar-
riages
Different-sex Marriages Same-sex Marriages
From 1998 onward After SSM-law Two women Two men
Flash divorce 0.39 (0.16)**
Flash divorce ban -0.01 (0.08) -0.09 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09)
Entry in 1999 0.09 (0.10)
Entry in 2000 -0.00 (0.10)
Entry in 2001 pre-FD 0.26 (0.19)
Entry in 2001 post-FD -0.09 (0.11)
Entry in 2002 0.05 (0.11) 0.16 (0.11) 0.02 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10)
Entry in 2003 -0.15 (0.12) -0.04 (0.11) -0.08 (0.11) 0.31 (0.11)***
Entry in 2004 -0.15 (0.13) -0.05 (0.12) -0.09 (0.12) 0.23 (0.12)*
Entry in 2005 -0.05 (0.13) 0.09 (0.12) -0.03 (0.12) 0.08 (0.13)
Entry in 2006 -0.13 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) -0.04 (0.12) 0.15 (0.13)
Entry in 2007 -0.41 (0.16)*** -0.26 (0.15)* -0.29 (0.14)** 0.06 (0.14)
Entry in 2008 -0.15 (0.16) 0.04 (0.15) -0.20 (0.15) 0.11 (0.15)
Entry in 2009 pre-ban 0.37 (0.29) 0.54 (0.29)* -0.13 (0.37) 0.16 (0.38)
Entry in 2009 post-ban 0.08 (0.17) 0.27 (0.16) -0.33 (0.16)** -0.01 (0.18)
Entry in 2010 -0.17 (0.18) 0.05 (0.18) -0.30 (0.17)* 0.01 (0.18)
Entry in 2011 -0.14 (0.20) 0.03 (0.19) -0.38 (0.18)** 0.11 (0.20)
Entry in 2012 0.03 (0.22) 0.22 (0.21) -0.38 (0.19)** 0.17 (0.22)
Entry in 2013 0.02 (0.26) 0.24 (0.25) -0.59 (0.23)*** 0.09 (0.25)
Entry in 2014 -0.51 (0.41) -0.24 (0.39) -0.36 (0.26) -0.08 (0.31)
Entry in 2015 -0.18 (0.73) -0.13 (0.73) -1.44 (0.73)** 0.51 (0.38)
Duration dependence
1-3 years 0.81 (0.10)*** 0.67 (0.11)*** 0.76 (0.09)*** 0.14 (0.09)
3-7 years 1.03 (0.11)*** 0.95 (0.12)*** 0.86 (0.11)*** 0.32 (0.12)***
7+ years 0.99 (0.12)*** 1.03 (0.16)*** 0.64 (0.16)*** 0.32 (0.18)*
1932 < Birth year ≤ 1942 -0.90 (0.24)*** -0.90 (0.35)*** -1.11 (0.44)** -1.19 (0.23)***
1942 < Birth year ≤ 1952 -0.75 (0.28)*** -0.63 (0.36)* -1.80 (0.49)*** -1.32 (0.25)***
1952 < Birth year ≤ 1962 -0.77 (0.32)** -0.62 (0.42) -1.69 (0.51)*** -1.40 (0.29)***
1962 < Birth year ≤ 1972 -0.77 (0.34)** -0.53 (0.44) -1.63 (0.52)*** -1.34 (0.32)***
Birth year > 1972 -0.83 (0.36)** -0.69 (0.46) -1.41 (0.53)*** -1.42 (0.36)***
20 < Age partnership entry ≤ 30 0.04 (0.14) 0.13 (0.18) -1.29 (0.36)*** -1.45 (0.31)***
30 < Age partnership entry ≤ 40 0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.19) -1.75 (0.38)*** -1.94 (0.33)***
40 < Age partnership entry ≤ 50 0.10 (0.19) 0.18 (0.24) -2.08 (0.40)*** -2.40 (0.35)***
50 < Age partnership entry ≤ 60 -0.05 (0.25) 0.02 (0.31) -2.02 (0.41)*** -2.07 (0.38)***
Age partnership entry > 60 0.48 (0.33) 0.70 (0.41)* -1.99 (0.49)*** -1.41 (0.42)***
Age difference 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.00)***
Same origin -0.29 (0.06)*** -0.24 (0.07)*** -0.12 (0.09) -0.31 (0.07)***
First generation 0.01 (0.06) -0.07 (0.07) -0.21 (0.12)* -0.46 (0.10)***
Second generation 0.25 (0.08)*** 0.23 (0.09)** 0.22 (0.09)** 0.01 (0.11)
Constant -4.23 (0.40)*** -4.00 (0.72)*** -0.48 (0.92) 0.57 (0.86)
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν −∞ (—) -2.19 (1.36) -2.04 (0.65)***
α 2.06 (3.88) 0.19 (1.22) -2.07 (1.23)*
Observations 15,574 12,444 15,152 16,210
Note: Column (1) shows the estimates for different-sex marriages starting from 1998 onward; columns
(2) to (4) contain marriages that were set up after the introduction of same-sex marriage and flash
divorce. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
56
Appendix 3.C: More Parameter Estimates
Table 3.C.1 presents the main parameter estimates including number of children living at
home for the baseline model in panel a of Table 3.1. The results are virtually identical.
Table 3.C.1: Transition Rates of Same-Sex Registered Partnerships to Marriage and
Divorce (either Directly or through Marriage as an Intermediate State); Children Number
Included
Two Women Two Men
(1) Divorce (2) Marriage (3) Divorce (4) Marriage
Competing risks
Same-sex marriage law 0.35 (0.18)** 1.14 (0.21)***
Married -0.86 (0.35)** -3.78 (0.40)***
Duration dependence
1-3 years 1.11 (0.23)*** -0.66 (0.21)*** 0.90 (0.22)*** -1.07 (0.21)***
3-7 years 1.00 (0.28)*** -0.82 (0.25)*** 1.23 (0.33)*** -0.69 (0.25)***
7+ years 0.86 (0.32)*** -3.19 (0.58)*** 0.89 (0.38)** -3.34 (0.49)***
Children number -0.15 (0.07)** -0.04 (0.09) 0.65 (0.17)*** 0.02 (0.37)
Children missing -0.79 (0.30)*** -4.37 (0.64)*** -3.92 (0.64)*** -4.84 (0.25)***
Unobserved heterogeneity
ν -∞ (—) -5.60 (0.18)*** -3.07 (0.39)*** -5.87 (0.14)***
α1 -0.45 (0.58) -1.61 (0.05)***
α3 0.76 (0.88) -3.46 (0.67)***
-Loglikelihood 4051.2 4264.4
Note: Based on 3,147 women and 4,404 men. Other covariates are included in every model but not
shown for parsimony. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The
distributions of unobserved heterogeneity in panel a is as follows
Transition rate to
Women Men Divorce Marriage
p1 0.17 0.16 High High
p2 – – Low High
p3 0.57 0.03 High Low
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Abstract
This paper examines how economic insecurity and cultural anxiety have triggered
the current populism in the United States. Specifically, I exploit two quasi-natural
experiments, the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration crisis, to investigate
the effects of unemployment and unauthorized immigration on attitudes related to
populism and populist voting in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. I discover
that recent unemployment during the Great Recession, rather than existing un-
employment from before the recession, increased the probability of attitudes form-
ing against wealthy elites by more than 14 percentage points. Such attitudes are
connected with left-wing populism. I identify perceived economic unfairness as a
mechanism through which recent unemployment drove left-wing populism. How-
ever, cultural anxiety rather than economic insecurity escalated by more than 12
percentage points the probability of anti-immigration attitudes developing. These
attitudes are related to right-wing populism. Furthermore, I obtain evidence that
cohorts economically suffering the aftermath of the Great Recession were 42 per-
centage points more inclined to support left-wing populist Bernie Sanders, while
cohorts residing in regions most intensely impacted by the immigration crisis were
10 percentage points more likely to vote for right-wing populist Donald Trump.
My study disentangles economic insecurity from cultural anxiety and links each of
them to a different type of populism.
Keywords: Populism, Unemployment, Immigration, Great Recession, Voting
JEL-codes: A13, D31, J01, J64, P16
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4.1 Introduction
For a decade or more, during the Great Recession and alongside the recent immigrant
influx, populism has been on the rise in many Western democracies including the U.S.
(Dorn et al., 2016) and part of Europe (Colantone and Stanig, 2018b; Dustmann et al.,
2017). The current populism has caused the collapse of the established party system and
seen the rise of prominence of radical and populist politicians, e.g. Donald Trump and
Bernie Sanders in the U.S., the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, Syriza and Golden Dawn
in Greece, the National Rally (formerly known as the National Front) in France, and
the Five Star Movement in Italy. What has driven the recent populist tide — economic
insecurity or cultural anxiety? Is there a difference between the populism triggered by
economic factors and that triggered by cultural factors? This study aims to answer these
two questions by investigating how unemployment and unauthorized immigration caused
the surge in populism and by examining the different dimensions of populism.
Populism is defined as an “ideology” that divides society into two antagonistic camps:
virtuous people versus corrupt elites and the establishment, or virtuous people versus
threatening outsiders (Canovan, 1999; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Laclau, 1977; Mudde,
2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Wiles, 1969). Populism usually appears with two
compatible forms — left-wing populism and right-wing populism (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014;
Kaltwasser, 2018; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013; Rodrik, 2018a,b). In the former, “the
people” refers to the “common man” with lower income or the “poor” who cannot access
power. They are perceived to be exploited by, and thus opposed to, the wealthy and
powerful “elites” who control the economy and define its rules. In the latter, “the people”
denotes the “nation” against outsiders, i.e. foreigners or immigrants, who are regarded
as threats to the popular will (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Kaltwasser, 2018; Mudde and
Kaltwasser, 2013; Rodrik, 2018a).
Understanding what triggers populism is important if economists and policy makers
want to manage its impact. Populism may harm the established and predictable order
of politics and the economy that has fostered economic growth and democratic norms
(Rodrik, 2018b). Populism may also exert negative influences on economic performance
by imprudently changing redistribution policy under political pressure (Alesina and Ro-
drik, 1994; Di Tella et al., 2017; Sachs, 1990), through the banking and credit system
(Rousseau, 2016), and through distrust (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Dustmann et al., 2017;
Guiso et al., 2004; Knack and Keefer, 1997). There may exist situations where “economic
populism” rather than “political populism” benefits the vast majority of the nation, such
61
as significant overhaul and perhaps even erosion of established economic practices and
restraints during severe economic downturns (Rodrik, 2018a).
Initially, with the Great Recession1 and the 2014 immigration crisis in the U.S. as
quasi-natural experiments, I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) framework to iden-
tify the effects of unemployment and unauthorized immigration on populist attitudes.
During the Great Recession, large numbers of individuals who had not previously been
unemployed were laid off. They form the treatment group in my first design. The corre-
sponding control group comprises people who were never unemployed during the period
covered by my data. Thus, the Great Recession affected the individuals in the treatment
group more substantially than those in the control group. Individuals in the treatment
group and control group share the covariate balance — a reasonable overlap on a large
range of pre-treatment characteristics (Atanasov and Black, 2016).2 Moreover, to render
units in the two groups more similar, I apply nearest neighbors propensity score match-
ing based on pre-treatment characteristics. With retrospective employment information,
I also discard people who were once unemployed during the ten years preceding 2008, so
that the two groups become even more comparable. The 2014 immigration crisis prin-
cipally affected the West South Central region of the U.S. in the sense that the great
majority of unauthorized Central American immigrants entered the U.S. through this
region. Hence, the treatment group in this second design consists of residents in the West
South Central region while the control group reflects those in the rest of the U.S. As in
the first design, I use propensity score matching to enhance the covariate balance between
the two groups. In both designs, respondents in the treatment group and control group
present parallel time trends, measured pre-treatment.
I provide evidence that recent unemployment during the Great Recession increased
the probability of attitudes forming against wealthy elites by more than 14 percentage
points. Such attitudes are related to left-wing populism. I find evidence that a mecha-
nism fanning the left-wing populist attitudes was perceived economic unfairness. I do not
detect that unemployment from before the recession exerted a significant influence on at-
titudes related to populism.3 Ruling out economic channels of actual and perceived labor
1The Great Recession has been used as a shock to the labor market in multiple studies (see Algan
et al. (2017), Ananyev and Guriev (2016), and Dehdari (2018)).
2Appendix 4.A.2 compares covariates between the treated and the controlled, measured pre-treatment,
to verify the covariate balance and common support.
3In Appendix 4.D.2 I present a simple game theoretical model of heterogeneous socio-economic classes
in a society based on Ghatak and Verdier (2017)’s set-up. In such a game, mutual fighting between
low and high socio-economic classes will never be a pure equilibrium unless the economy is in adverse
conditions. This model fits the empirical results I document on the Great Recession.
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market competitions and perceived social security crowding out, I argue that cultural
anxiety or xenophobia in the West South Central region during the 2014 immigration
crisis raised the probability of a negative attitude to immigration by more than 12 per-
centage points. This anti-immigration attitude is connected with right-wing populism.
Effects of unauthorized immigration on attitudes of left-wing populism are not found.4
Furthermore, I account for the interactive effects of economic and cultural concerns
by examining unemployment rate, immigrant proportion, and their interactions at the
regional level in every quasi-natural experiment. I find no evidence that immigration
exposure was a significant multiplier of the effects of regional unemployment on attitudes
related to populism. Nor do I detect that individual or regional unemployment provoked
extra significant hostility to immigrants during the immigration crisis, even in the entry
region of these unauthorized immigrants. As a result, I disentangle economic insecurity
from cultural anxiety.
In a second step, I establish the effect of recent unemployment during the Great
Recession and the effect of the 2014 immigration crisis on populist voting in the 2016
U.S. Presidential Election. Bernie Sanders was representative of left-wing populists and
Donald Trump representative of right-wing populists. With a pseudo panel, I show that
cohorts that had a high average of recent unemployment post-Great Recession were 42
percentage points more inclined to support Sanders while cohorts that resided in the West
South Central region during the immigration crisis were 10 percentage points more likely
to vote for Trump. However, cohorts suffering unemployment before the Great Recession
were only more likely to vote for left-centrist Clinton.
The current study contributes to several strands of literature. Principally, it adds to
the academic debate on the drivers of populism taking place between the economic inse-
curity perspective and the cultural backlash thesis. Only a handful of studies investigate
both economic and cultural determinants simultaneously. Even fewer of them examine
their interactions. Inglehart and Norris (2016) establish the association between voting
for populist parties across European countries and economic and cultural characteristics.
They find evidence supporting cultural backlash rather than economic insecurity. Dust-
mann et al. (2017) interact macroeconomic indicators with regional cultural traits. They
discover that more authoritarian and traditional cultural characteristics amplify the ad-
verse effects of economic recessions on trust in political institutions, while trust is less
4In Appendix 4.D.3 I present another simple game model of heterogeneous cultures and identities in
a society. In this game, dominant natives as the majority will always take the action of fighting against
recent immigrants regardless of economic conditions. This model is also consistent with my empirical
evidence on the immigration crisis.
63
sensitive to economic conditions in more liberal and modern areas.
I contribute to this literature on populism in three respects. First, with individual
panel data, I provide the first quasi-natural experimental evidence at the individual level
for the drivers of different types of populism. Second, with separate shocks to economic
insecurity and cultural backlash respectively, I disentangle the economic driver from the
cultural driver and link each of them to a different type of populism. Third, compared to
most studies in this literature that focus on politics only (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Algan
et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2018a; Di Tella and Rotemberg,
2018; Foster and Frieden, 2017; Guiso et al., 2017; Hatton, 2016; Jensen et al., 2017), I
utilize a richer set of measures to capture different dimensions of populism. A decrease in
confidence in people who are running major companies and an increase in preferences for
income redistribution by imposing higher taxes on the rich (rather than by economically
assisting the poor) indicate attitudes that are against wealthy elites, and in the literature
these attitudes are related to left-wing populism. The anti-immigration attitude is con-
nected with right-wing populism in the literature. Additionally, I explore populist voting
behavior in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
Second, this paper is relevant to a growing literature on the effects of economic hard-
ship on social capital, especially on trust and confidence. Ananyev and Guriev (2016)
exploit the 2009 economic recession in Russia to analyze the effect of income on gener-
alized social trust and find this effect statistically and economically significant. Algan
et al. (2017), Dustmann et al. (2017), and Foster and Frieden (2017) conclude that ad-
verse economic shocks and the resulting rise in unemployment exerted negative influences
on Europeans’ trust in national and EU governments. However, these studies do not dis-
tinguish between unemployment that existed before the economic downturn and new
unemployment caused by the adverse economic shocks. My results show that recent
unemployment during the Great Recession, rather than unemployment that existed be-
fore the Great Recession, triggered the decrease in trust or confidence in the wealthy.
This original finding implies that those that were not laid off until the economic reces-
sion blamed rich elites for their unemployment. Those suffering pre-existing economic
hardship may merely attribute their joblessness to their own circumstances. I verify this
implication when exploring the perception of economic unfairness as a mechanism.
Third, my results are closely related to studies on preferences for redistribution.
Kuziemko et al. (2015) conducted randomized survey experiments, discovering that mis-
trust in government explains the low support for redistribution in the U.S. However,
Americans strongly preferred only one redistribution policy — the estate tax target-
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ing the top 0.1% of U.S. families. This may be interpreted as a wish to prevent the
self-perpetuation of extreme wealth. Because of the prevailing attitudes against wealthy
elites “respondents might still support (it) if, say, the government merely burns the money
it collects (from the rich)”. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Benabou and Ok (2001)
argue that people with higher-than-expected income growth are more inclined to oppose
redistribution, even when they earn below-average income and benefit from redistribu-
tion. Alesina et al. (2018) find strong political polarization in preferences for redistri-
bution and detect that only left-wing respondents react to pessimistic intergenerational
mobility perception by increasing their preferences for redistribution. Intuitively, the
higher the perceived importance of effort rather than luck in determining one’s income,
the higher the belief in the fairness of the economy, and thus the lower the preferences
for redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Piketty, 1995). I adopt this mechanism
of perceived economic unfairness in my study. What is new in my contribution to this
literature is that I combine two variables in the data to distinguish two forms of prefer-
ences for redistribution, i.e. the request for imposing higher taxes on the rich and the
demand for economically assisting the poor.
Moreover, this study is part of the large literature on the impact of immigration.
The attitude to immigration is studied in two traditions — political economy and socio-
psychology (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). The former focuses on competition over
resources between immigrants and natives and explains immigration attitudes from the
perspective of natives’ individual self-interest. The latter perceives immigration attitudes
as symbolic of group identity. In socio-psychology, contact theory states that exposure
to and interaction with immigrants will produce a more tolerant and friendly attitude to
immigration. Threat theory, however, alleges that natives see the arrival of immigrants
as a threat to the national identity, economy, and culture. The greater the number of
immigrants, the bigger the threat. I examine both channels of individual self-interest
and collective identity concern, and only find evidence for the latter (see also Card et al.
(2012), Sniderman et al. (2004), and Tabellini (2018)). The unauthorized immigrants
from Central America did not negatively impact natives in the labor market. Nor did
natives regard these immigrants as a threat to their jobs and social security. The negative
attitude to immigration arose mainly from cultural and identity concerns.
Last but not least, my paper sheds light on certain problems that have awaited analysis
in the expanding literature on political polarization or extreme voting. Previous studies
on radical right voting have failed to identify the specificity of their results and to exclude
the possibility of voting for the radical left. They are unable to distinguish between a
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general pattern of extreme voting and a tendency to vote particularly for either the far
right or for the far left. However, I discover that recent economic deprivation during
the Great Recession was the driver only for left-wing populist voting (see also March and
Mudde (2005) and Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014)), and that recent cultural anxiety
induced support only for right-wing populism (see also Dinas et al. (2016), Kuziemko
and Washington (2018), Mutz (2018), and Sekeris and Vasilakis (2016)) in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election.
4.2 Institutional Background
In this section I briefly discuss the evolution of the Great Recession and the 2014 immi-
gration crisis in the U.S.
4.2.1 The Great Recession
The Great Recession has been regarded as the most influential economic recession world-
wide since the Great Depression in the 1930s. It originated in 2007 with a crisis in the
U.S. subprime mortgage market and spread to the banking system. Its impact was felt in
financial systems around the world, with the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers on September 15th, 2008 as a remarkable initial signal.
Despite a variety of monetary and fiscal policies adopted by governments around the
world to reduce the negative impact on the economy, the 2008 financial crisis nevertheless
developed into a severe worldwide economic recession. In addition to the collapse of
several banks and other financial institutions, the U.S. economy suffered a sharp drop
in its output and took a serious hit on its labor market. For instance, compared to
the respective previous years, U.S. real GDP decreased by around six percent at an
annual rate in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 (U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis). Unemployment change is usually lagged, following GDP decline.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rate in the U.S.
The unemployment rate soared to over ten percent in October 2009, the highest level
since 1983 and twice as high as before the Great Recession. Average working hours per
week decreased to 33, the lowest since 1964 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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Figure 4.1: Unemployment Rate in the U.S. (Seasonally Adjusted); 1995-2017
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
4.2.2 The 2014 Immigration Crisis
From October 2013 to late 2016, large numbers of unauthorized immigrants from the
Northern Triangle of Central America, i.e. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, trav-
eled to the U.S. southern border with Mexico, leading to an immigration crisis that peaked
in 2014.5 It turned out to be the biggest inflow of asylum seekers to the U.S. since the
1980 Mariel boatlift out of Cuba (Greenblatt, 2014). Many of them were women, unac-
companied children and juveniles. Almost all of these immigrants entered the West South
Central region of the U.S., in particular from the Rio Grande Valley area located on the
southern edge of Texas.6 Figure 4.2 provides an overview of U.S. border arrests from
2013 to the third quarter of 2016: the blue line represents monthly apprehensions at the
southwest central patrol sector. The inflow started to soar at the end of 2013 and reached
its peak in June 2014. It then dropped dramatically at first, but started to climb again
after the end of 2014. The red line denotes apprehensions at other patrol sectors in the
U.S. This line is relatively flat and limited. Though this figure does not directly provide
information on the number of unauthorized immigrants actually entering each month,
the monthly number of arrests implies a huge variation in the influx. 55% of Northern
Triangle immigrants in the U.S. were unauthorized by 2015. In 2014 the estimate of new
5Precise records of entries of these unauthorized immigrants are unavailable.
6Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B lists the numbers of family unit apprehensions by month in different
border patrol sectors in the U.S. from October 2012 to September 2016.
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Figure 4.2: Family Unit Apprehensions by Month; 2013-Sep.2016
Source: United States Border Patrol
(authorized) immigrant arrivals from these three Central American countries is around
115,000 (Pew Research Center). Thus, if the immigrant influx in 2014 followed the same
pattern as before — and in fact, during this crisis it is likely there were more unauthorized
entries than authorized ones — the number of Central American immigrants entering the
U.S. would be roughly doubled to 230,000 in 2014.
The principal reason that these people abandoned their family and country and took
this risky and dangerous journey to the U.S. border was the mass violence in these Central
American nations (U.S. Department of Homeland Security).7 Other important drivers of
this immigration crisis were the organized crime and drug trade as well as poverty and
food shortage.8
Given the above causes, the 2014 immigration crisis has been regarded both as a
7DHS concluded that “(These immigrants) come from extremely violent regions where they probably
perceive the risk of traveling alone to the United States preferable to remaining at home”. The murder
rates in these countries have skyrocketed. For example, recognized as the murder capital of the world,
Honduras had a homicide rate of 91.6 murders per 100,000 people in 2011; in 2014, this number declined
to 66 but was still the highest among non-war zone countries. Likewise, El Salvador also had a high rate
of 90 murders per 100,000 people in 2011. Moreover, this rate dramatically increased to 104 murders per
100,000 people in 2015 after the breakdown of a truce in 2013 between the country’s two most influential
gangs — MS-13 and Barrio 18 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime).
8Nowadays, 79% of all cocaine-smuggled flights pass through Honduras. Children and juveniles in
school are forced to smuggle drugs by criminal gangs (Nazario, 2014). Meanwhile, in the Northern
Triangle area — Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, most of the criminals will not be reported or
prosecuted due to the lack of police force. In Guatemala, half of the children are malnourished, stunted,
or even dead because of food shortage (Loewenberg, 2009).
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refugee crisis and a “humanitarian crisis” (President Obama). The U.S. government
took several measures in response: (1) a multimedia awareness campaign; (2) assistance
to the Mexican southern border; (3) expedition of the removal process; and (4) raids
in January 2016 on individuals that had exhausted their asylum claims (Hiskey et al.,
2016). However, these strategies did not prove effective.9 The Central American children
and juveniles attempting to illegally cross the border are treated differently in the U.S
from their Mexican counterparts. Mexican immigrants may be deported immediately,
but the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act requires that youth
from Central America must be given a court hearing before they are either deported or
allowed to stay. The extent of the crisis meant that in the overwhelming majority of
cases, these children and juveniles would wait years for a hearing, either staying with
their relatives or family friends who already lived in the U.S., or else placed in foster care
(Migration Policy Institute). In fact, by the spring of 2016 most of them have not been
deported (Hiskey et al., 2016). Instead, by then approximately 124,000 were immediately
entitled for work authorization and free from the threat of deportation under the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Around 79,000 unauthorized children
and juveniles from these countries had applied for the DACA program in 2016, and 65,000
of them were approved (Migration Policy Institute).
U.S. residents were aware of this immigration crisis and made their concerns known.
Figure 4.3 displays the Google Trends indicator on the frequency of the term “immigra-
tion” being searched for, relative to the total number of searches in the U.S. across time.
The high leap in late 2014 is remarkable, showing that U.S. citizens suddenly paid special
attention to this immigrant influx.
4.3 Data
The data I utilize to analyze the economic and cultural drivers of populism are the General
Social Survey (GSS) of the U.S. administered by NORC at the University of Chicago.
The GSS contains a core of demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal questions. It has
been conducted biennially since 1994 and has included in every wave a random sample
of around 3000 (until 2004) to 4500 (since 2006) adults that is representative of the U.S.
population. Hence the main body of GSS is a repeated cross-sectional dataset. However,
the GSS also includes three three-wave individual panels.
9As the U.S. District Court Judge James Boasberg noted in his February 2015 ruling, “Defendants
[DHS] have presented little empirical evidence ... that their detention policy even achieves its only desired
effect, i.e., that it actually deters potential immigrants from Central America.”
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Figure 4.3: U.S. Google Trends on Immigration
Source: Google Trends
To obtain the voting information on the 2016 U.S. Presidential Primary Elections, I
turn to the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2016 Time Series Study. This
complementary dataset contains 4,271 individuals, a representative random sample of the
U.S. eligible voter population. I combine it with the GSS to study populist voting.
4.3.1 Panel Data of Individuals
In addition to the repeated cross-sectional data, the GSS also includes three individual
panels: the 2006-sample panel, the 2008-sample panel, and the 2010-sample panel. For
example, the 2006 sample of 4,510 individuals was initially interviewed in 2006, 1,536
of them drawn randomly were re-interviewed in 2008, and then 1,276 of that 1,536 were
interviewed again in 2010. The 2008- and 2010-sample panels were designed in a similar
manner. There was no identifiable overlap among these three panels for me.
I exploit the 2006-sample panel to investigate the economic driver of populism and
the 2010-sample panel to study the cultural driver. The former spans the pre- and post-
Great Recession periods and the latter covers the pre- and post-immigration crisis phases.
Even though the recent financial crisis began in the U.S. in 2008, I regard only wave 2010
as the post-Great Recession phase with respect to unemployment since unemployment
rise is usually a lagged indicator of economic downturns. As shown in Figure 4.1, from
1995 to November 2008 the variation in unemployment rate displayed the same pattern
at roughly the same level. Moreover, all the subjects in the year 2008 were interviewed
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before October, while the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, signaling the beginning of
this financial crisis, happened in mid-September. Therefore, it is reasonable to see the
year 2008 as pre-Great Recession with respect to unemployment. The immigration crisis
erupted in 2014 and lasted till 2016. Thus, in the 2010-sample panel, it is clear to classify
the 2010 and 2012 waves as the pre-immigration crisis phase and the 2014 wave as post-
immigration crisis. In both cases, I preserve only respondents who appeared in all three
waves, resulting in two balanced panels with 1,276 individuals in the 2006-sample and
1,304 in the 2010-sample.
Based on the “ideational definition” of populism (Kaltwasser, 2018) which has been
widely used in the literature in political science and political economy (Aytaç and Öniş,
2014; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013, 2017; Rodrik,
2018a,b), left-wing or inclusionary populist attitudes refer to attitudes against wealthy
elites and the socioeconomic advantaged. In the GSS data, the variables that may most
accurately capture such attitudes are confidence in people who are running major compa-
nies in the US, demand for the government to equalize the income between rich and poor,
and request for the government to financially help the poor. The last two variables are
two dimensions of preferences for redistribution. An increase in attitudes against wealthy
elites will translate to a decrease in confidence in people running big companies, and an
increase in preferences for redistribution without necessarily benefiting the poor proba-
bly by merely imposing higher taxes on the rich. Likewise, right-wing or exclusionary
populist attitudes refer to attitudes against threatening outsiders such as immigrants or
foreigners. Thus I adopt the attitude to immigration to represent this right-wing populist
attitudes.10 All of them are transformed so that a larger score refers to a higher level
in each of these outcomes, respectively. These outcome variables can more specifically
capture left-wing and right-wing populist attitudes, respectively, than variables such as
trust in government or politicians in general do. Moreover, trust in government in the
US is constantly low (Kuziemko et al., 2015). Its small variations across time does not
help to identify the effects of economic insecurity and cultural anxiety.
The explanatory variable of interest is couple unemployment. This is constructed by
combining two variables — the respondent’s working status in the past week and that of
their spouse if they have one.11 Couple unemployment is a dummy that takes 1 if either
partner of the couple became unemployed and takes 0 otherwise. The set of covariates
10Details of specific questions about the outcome variables are in Appendix 4.C.
11Details of specific questions about couple unemployment are in Appendix 4.C too. Alternative
explanatory variables for economic insecurity, including self-unemployment of the respondent, are used
for sensitivity analyses in Section 4.7.
71
contains the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings,
number of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family in-
come, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification,
dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Note that time-invariant in-
dependent variables such as gender, racial dummies, immigration status categories are
canceled in the individual fixed effects model.12
In the DID framework, in relation to the Great Recession, the treatment group consists
of respondents who became unemployed or whose spouse became unemployed, i.e. couple
unemployment has a value of 1, only in wave 2010. The corresponding control group
contains respondents who were not unemployed and whose spouse (if they have one)
was not unemployed, that is, couple unemployment takes a value of 0, in all the three
waves. The treatment group contains 81 individuals and the control group 1,109, which
is comparable to the unemployment rate in the US population given that individuals
having unemployment experience before the Great Recession are not included. As for
the immigration crisis, the treatment group includes respondents who lived in the West
South Central region of the U.S. that the immigration crisis mostly impacted in wave
2014. The precise information on these undocumented immigrant entries in different
states is unavailable since they were not tracked. To be conservative, I rely on the original
classification of US regions in the data (also the conventional classification of US regions)
and apply the West South Central region including the states of Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas as the treated region. The corresponding control group covers
those that lived in the rest of the U.S. in the same wave. The treatment group contains
136 individuals and the control group 1,168. Later in Section 4.6 and 4.7 respectively,
I implement robustness checks in terms of the composition of the treated region and
conduct an IV analysis on the effect of the proportion of Central American immigrants
at the state level on the attitude to immigration drawing the same conclusion.
4.3.2 Pseudo Panel Data of Cohorts
To investigate the effects of the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration crisis on the
populist voting in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, I turn to the main body of the
GSS. However, with the original repeated cross-sectional data from the GSS, I am not
able to link the independent variables in previous waves to voting variables in later waves
or to other external voting data at the individual level. In order to address this problem,
12The definitions and descriptives of the relevant variables in the baseline models are provided in
Appendix 4.A.1.
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I construct a pseudo panel based on the repeated cross-sectional data (Deaton, 1985).
Specifically, I aggregate the original data into nine ten-year birth cohorts by gender
and by the nine U.S. regions where respondents resided. Hence in total there are 162
(= 9×2×9) cohorts in the sample of the pseudo panel. The average of individuals within
cohort represents the corresponding cohort in every wave for every variable.
Similarly, as in Section 4.3.1, with respect to the Great Recession, the treatment group
comprises cohorts whose couple unemployment averaged within cohort is greater than or
equal to 0.5 in wave 2010 or 2012, and the control group contains cohorts whose couple
unemployment average is less than 0.5 in both of these two waves.13 The reason that I do
not consider later waves is that the negative economic impact of the Great Recession was
already extinct by 2014 and thereafter. As for the immigration crisis, the treatment and
control groups are formed exactly as in the case of the individual level panel. However,
I exploit information about residence in wave 2014 and 2016. All the variables are the
same as in Section 4.3.1, but their values are now means within cohort in every wave.
Though there are questions about individual voting turnout and which candidate to
vote for in the U.S. Presidential General Election, there is no information about the
U.S. Presidential Primary Elections in the GSS survey. Since left-wing populist Bernie
Sanders was a candidate only in the primaries, I need data on individual voting in the
2016 U.S. Presidential Primary Elections. These relevant questions exist in the ANES
2016 Time Series Study. I aggregate the 4,271 individuals in that dataset into cohorts
in the same way as above and transform the data into a cross-section of 162 averaged
cohorts. Merging this ANES 2016 cross-section with the GSS pseudo panel of cohorts, I
am able to study the effects of the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration crisis on
the populist voting in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
In the main estimation with the two individual level panels, I employ the ordered logit
fixed effects model (Baetschmann et al., 2015) to account for time-invariant unobserved
confounders. I choose this model because of the nature of ordinal dependent variables.
In a sensitivity analysis, I estimate the linear fixed effects model and draw the same
conclusions. The ordered logit fixed effects model in the DID setting is specified as:
13In Table 4.A.4.5 of Appendix 4.A.4, I also directly apply the average of couple unemployment within
cohort, i.e. a continuous treatment, as the explanatory variable of interest. Though the estimates are
not significant, the sign and magnitude are still as expected.
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y∗it = βTreat.×PCTreatmenti × Post crisist + x′itβx + αi + γt + εit (11)
yit =

1, y∗it ≤ c1




J, y∗it > cJ−1
(12)
where i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) refer to individuals, and t (t = 1, 2, ..., T ) stand for survey waves.
y represents different observed outcome variables including confidence in major com-
panies, preferences for income redistribution, attitude to immigration, and couple unem-
ployment (in the last two cases it is a logit fixed effects model). y∗ denotes the latent
counterpart of y.
Treatment represents the dummy for the corresponding treatment group during
the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration crisis, respectively (see Section 4.3.1).
Post crisis is either the post-Great Recession period (wave 2010) or the post-immigration
crisis phase (wave 2014). Furthermore, x denotes the vector of demographic, socio-
economic, and political and ideological covariates as enumerated in the data section. In
another model specification I include state-specific linear time trends to capture smooth
changes in unobservables and obtain virtually identical results. Coefficients of only time-
varying independent variables can be estimated in the fixed effects model where all the
time-invariant variables are dropped. αi indicate individual fixed effects and γt represent
survey wave fixed effects. Finally, εit are the errors following a logistic distribution.
In order to apply the DID framework, the parallel trend assumption between the
treatment and control groups should hold. This assumption in the current context im-
plies that during the period of the last two waves, the outcome variables would follow the
same trajectory between the treated and the controlled in the absence of the correspond-
ing crisis. To assess this assumption and thus evaluate the validity of the DID setting, I
examine whether the pre-shock time trends in my outcome variables diverge between the
treatment and control groups. I estimate a slightly modified version of Eq.(11). Specif-
ically, Post crisis is replaced by the last two waves in the panels separately (with the
first wave omitted as reference for identification), namely wave 2008 and wave 2010 for
the Great Recession and wave 2012 and wave 2014 for the immigration crisis.14 If the co-
14It is called the “Auto” model following Autor (2003) and the leads and lags model by Atanasov and
Black (2016).
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efficient of the interaction term of Treatment and the penultimate wave is insignificantly
close to zero, it is evidence for the pre-treatment parallel trends. This is indeed the case
in my estimation for both the Great Recession and the immigration crisis.15
Moreover, in order to establish a causal link between the shocks and the outcome
variables, there must not have been other events responsible for the divergence between
the treatment and control groups occurring at a time close to the treatment. Placebo tests
by applying fake shocks at different times during the pre-treatment period will provide
such evidence if estimates are similar and statistically indistinguishable from zero before
and after the fake shock (Atanasov and Black, 2016). In the current context I use only
pre-treatment data. I change the onset of the fake shock to the second wave in both
the Great Recession and the immigration crisis and do not detect a significant treatment
effect.
To render individuals in the treatment and control groups even more comparable,
two additional approaches are exploited. First, in the design of the Great Recession, I
discard all the individuals who had once been unemployed in the ten years prior to 2008
in both groups. It is therefore less likely that the treated individuals and the untreated
ones had different employment status during the Great Recession merely because of their
divergent unobservables. Second, in designs for both the Great Recession and the 2014
immigration crisis, I adopt the method of nearest neighbors propensity score matching
based on pre-shock individual characteristics. This is to improve the covariate balance
between the treated and the controlled. Only the matched individuals then compose the
estimation sample in the DID framework. With these two methods as robustness checks,
I obtain virtually identical results.
When I study the effects of the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration crisis on
the populist voting in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, I apply the multivariate OLS
model:
yi = βTreat.Treatmenti + x
′
iβx + εi. (13)
where i denotes cohorts now. All the variables except Treatment in Eq.(13) are means
within cohort and thus cardinal.
y refers to expected dummy of voting for different candidates within cohort, either in
15Figure 4.A.3.1 illustrates the coefficient estimates of the leads and lags model for different outcome
variables. None of the estimates of the interactions of Treatment and the second wave is significantly
distinguishable from zero. Therefore, arguably, the trends measured pre-shock between the treatment
and control groups are parallel.
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the 2016 U.S. Presidential Primary Elections or General Election. Treatment again de-
notes the corresponding dummy of the treatment group during either the Great Recession
or the immigration crisis (see Section 4.3.2). x contains the set of means of covariates in
Eq.(11) and averaged voting turnout in the corresponding elections within cohort. Guiso
et al. (2017) argue that turnout incentive is vital for populist voting, so I add it to x
in Eq.(13). When the dependent variable is about the primaries, x includes the voting
turnout in the primaries; when the dependent variable is about the General Election, x
includes the turnout in that election. As for the Great Recession, the covariates take
values in wave 2010. With respect to the immigration crisis, they take values in wave
2014.
4.5 Economic Insecurity and Left-wing Populism
In this section I study the effects of economic insecurity represented by unemployment
on populist attitudes. Table 4.1 displays the results based on the individual panel from
2006 to 2010.16 The odd columns are estimates without covariates and the even columns
are with controls. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in parentheses. Only wave 2010 is the post-Great Recession period with respect to un-
employment.17
Recent unemployment during the Great Recession may exert different effects on pop-
ulism than unemployment persisting from before the Great Recession. So, I distinguish
between the two types of unemployment and estimate their effects in panel a and panel
b, respectively. In panel a of Table 4.1, with the DID framework, the treatment group
consists of respondents who became unemployed or whose spouse became unemployed,
i.e. couple unemployment has a value of 1, only in wave 2010. The corresponding con-
trol group therefore reflects a situation where neither respondent nor spouse (if they
have one) was laid off, that is, couple unemployment takes a value of 0, in all the three
waves.18 In panel b, the sample excludes respondents who became unemployed or whose
16Table 4.A.4.1 in Appendix 4.A.4 presents the parameter estimates of the full model.
17To facilitate the understanding of the effect magnitudes, I report results of the linear fixed effects
model in panel a of Table 4.2.
18In a sensitivity analysis displayed in panel a of Table 4.7, in order to make the two groups more
comparable, I discard all the individuals who had lost their jobs at any time during the ten years prior
to 2008. The estimates do not notably change. In another robustness check reported in Table 4.A.4.3,
I include state-specific linear trends in the model and obtain virtually identical results. In the even
columns of the same table, I also set wave 2008 as the onset of a placebo treatment and do not acquire
any significant estimates. This therefore provides evidence that there have not been other events taking
place close to the Great Recession that are responsible for the treatment effect.
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Table 4.1: Effects of Unemployment on Attitudes Related to Populism
Panel a. Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.23*** -1.32*** 0.67** 0.70** 0.28 -0.00 -0.37 -0.28
(0.47) (0.50) (0.34) (0.34) (0.41) (0.43) (0.45) (0.48)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 1,569 1,569 5,049 5,049 3,057 3,057 878 878
Panel b. Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Existing Unemp. Pre-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Couple Unemployment -0.61 -0.69 0.26 0.16 0.63 0.40 0.35 0.56
(0.44) (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.49)
Unemp.×Post-Rec. 1.96 2.02 0.35 0.48 -0.15 0.04 -1.37* -1.33
(1.38) (1.53) (0.67) (0.73) (0.76) (0.77) (0.80) (0.90)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 1,537 1,537 5,018 5,018 3,025 3,025 912 912
Note: In panel a, the sample excludes individuals who were unemployed or whose spouse was
unemployed in either wave 2006 or wave 2008. The treatment group consists of respondents who did
not become unemployed or whose spouse did not become unemployed until wave 2010 and the control
group contains respondents who were not laid off, and whose spouse was not laid off, at all in the three
waves. Wave 2010 is the only post-Great Recession period with respect to unemployment. In panel b,
the sample excludes individuals who were unemployed or whose spouse was unemployed only in wave
2010. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every column. Controls
contain extensive demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age,
marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree dummies, categories
of last year’s total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party
self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
spouse became unemployed only in wave 2010. The coefficients of the interaction term
Unemployment×post-Great Recession represent the additive effects of couple unemploy-
ment during the Great Recession for individuals who were already unemployed before the
recession.
4.5.1 Confidence in Major Companies
Lack of confidence in people managing big companies represents distrust in elites and the
wealthy. Such anti-elitist attitude is connected with left-wing populism in the literature.
Columns (1) and (2) of panel a show that after the Great Recession, the ordered log-
odds of having a higher level of confidence in people running big companies diminished
significantly by 1.3 for the recent unemployed relative to those not laid off in the data
period, holding other covariates fixed. In terms of the average marginal effect, after the
Great Recession the probability of having a great deal of confidence in people running
major companies, that is, trust in companies = 3, decreased for the newly unemployed
by 19 percentage points compared to the untreated individuals. The linear fixed effects
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estimate displayed in Table 4.2 is around minus 0.3, sizable when compared to the cor-
responding adjusted mean in the treated, 0.98, over a range of zero to two. Panel b of
Table 4.1 does not display significant effects on confidence in major companies among
people who had already become unemployed before the Great Recession.
4.5.2 Preferences for Redistribution
Preferences for income redistribution, especially with the aim of increasing financial bur-
den on the wealthy may be an indicator of left-wing populism. If people perceive that
elites set unfair rules for the economy and take advantage of these rules to gain unfair
benefits, they will ask for a higher level of redistribution. The relevant survey question
inquires about preferences for redistribution by means of “raising the taxes of wealthy
families or giving income assistance to the poor”.
Columns (3) and (4) of panel a in Table 4.1 show the estimates of requesting the
government to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor without and with
controls, respectively. Ceteris paribus, if the respondent or their spouse recently became
unemployed post-Great Recession, their ordered log-odds of requesting a higher level of
income redistribution increased by 0.7 significantly compared to those never laid off. In
other words, the probability that the newly unemployed would show the highest level of
demand for redistribution, that is government equalizes income = 7, increased by over
14 percentage points post-Great Recession relative to the untreated.
Income equalization can be realized by raising taxes from the wealthy or by offering
financial support to the poor. There is not a direct variable on taxing the rich in the
survey. However, one question asks about opinions of the government’s responsibility for
improving the living standard of poor Americans. The results are presented in columns
(5) and (6), both of which are statistically insignificant. In particular, when controlling
for available covariates, the coefficient of interest becomes almost zero. In panel b, one
does not observe significant estimates of preferences for redistribution.
Such an interesting discovery is noteworthy: unemployment soon after the Great
Recession significantly raised demand that the government brings about income equality
between rich and poor by “raising the taxes of wealthy families or giving income assistance
to the poor”. However, it did not increase the specific demand for the government to offer
economic assistance to the poor. These two points of view are not mutually exclusive.
Their preference was for the income gap between rich and poor to be reduced by imposing
higher taxes on the wealthy, rather than by helping the poor financially.
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Table 4.2: Linear Fixed Effects of Recent Unemployment and the Immigration Crisis on Populism
Panel a. Great Recession Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Adjusted Range (0–2) (0–6) (0–4) (0–1)
Recent Unemp. Post-Great Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -0.28*** -0.27*** 0.47* 0.48* 0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.25) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.06)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 1,569 1,569 5,049 5,049 3,057 3,057 878 878
Adjusted Mean of Treat. Group 0.98 3.45 2.29 0.50
Panel b. 2014 Immigration Crisis All Minorities Caucasians Placebo All Placebo Cauc. Couple Unemp. Anticipated Unemp.
Adjusted Range (0–1) (0–1) (0–1) (0–1) (0–3)
Attitude to Immigration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treat.×Post-Immig. Crisis. -0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.14** -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 1,070 1,070 349 690 899 635 633 633 2,848 2,848
Adjusted Mean of Treat. Group 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.08 0.68
Note: In panel a, the sample excludes individuals who were unemployed or whose spouse was unemployed in either wave 2006 or wave 2008. The
treatment group consists of respondents who did not become unemployed or whose spouse did not become unemployed until wave 2010 and the control
group contains respondents who were not laid off, and whose spouse was not laid off, at all in the three waves. Wave 2010 is the only post-Great
Recession period with respect to unemployment. In panel b, the treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central
region of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The
control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. Column (3) restricts the sample to include
Hispanic Whites and non-Whites and column (4) includes non-Hispanic Whites only. Column (5) is a placebo test by using the East South Central
region of the U.S. as the treated area and estimating the model excluding the West South Central region. Column (6) is the same type of placebo test for
non-Hispanic Whites only. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive demographic
and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree
dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal
ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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4.5.3 Attitude to Immigration
The last two columns in Table 4.1 examine the potential spillover of unemployment on
attitude to immigration. In both panels a and b, unemployment seems to lower the pos-
itive attitude to immigration, but the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Therefore,
the hypothesis that unemployment does not affect attitude to immigration cannot be for-
mally rejected. It is possible that when economic conditions worsen, employees in those
industries more intensively exposed to immigrants may present a more negative attitude
to immigration if they are laid off. In a sensitivity analysis in Section 4.7.5, I account
for this industry heterogeneity in the share of immigrant workers and construct an immi-
grant industry dummy for either top ten or top three industries in the U.S. by share of
immigrant workers. I interact it with post-Great Recession and with treatment×post-
Great Recession and then include these two additional terms in the model. Neither of
their coefficient estimates are significant. Thus, whether or not they became unemployed,
workers in industries with a high proportion of immigrants did not have a more negative
attitude to immigration after the Great Recession.
Nonetheless, it does not mean that economic insecurity and cultural anxiety went into
effect independently. In this subsection, I show only that unemployment did not signif-
icantly change attitude to immigration. However, it is still possible that the immigrant
influx caused economic insecurity in addition to cultural or identity anxiety. This may
be how the economic and cultural drivers of populism interacted.
4.5.4 Mechanism
Earlier, I showed that recent unemployment during the Great Recession increased pref-
erences for income redistribution through the imposition of higher taxes on the wealthy.
How is this manifest? In the literature on preferences for redistribution, Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) and Piketty (1995) allege that perceived economic unfairness gener-
ates stronger demand for income and wealth redistribution. Following their work, I use
the perceived importance of effort in one’s success to represent perceived economic fair-
ness. The more important personal effort seems to be in achieving success, the fairer the
economy is believed to be. And vice versa.
I explore whether perceived economic unfairness was a mechanism through which
recent unemployment during the Great Recession increased preferences for redistribution.
Specifically, I first examine whether new unemployment post-Great Recession created a
perception that the economy was unfair. Then, I explore the effect of perceived economic
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Table 4.3: Perceived Economic Unfairness: A Mechanism through which Recent Unem-
ployment Affected Preferences for Redistribution
Panel a. Perceived Economic Unfairness
Recent Unemp. Post-Great Recession (1) (2)
Treatment×Post-Great Recession 0.74** (0.36) 0.77** (0.36)
Controls No Yes
No. of Obs. 1,798 1,798
Panel b. Gov. Equalize Income Gov. Help Poor
Recent Unemp. Post-Great Recession (1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic Unfairness 0.22* (0.13) 0.22* (0.13) 0.06 (0.12) 0.10 (0.12)
Controls No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 2,743 2,743 1,671 1,671
Panel c. Perceived Economic Unfairness
Existing Unemp. Pre-Great Recession (1) (2)
Couple Unemployment 0.07 (0.44) 0.07 (0.49)
Unemployment×Post-Great Recession -0.25 (0.90) -0.31 (0.82)
Controls No Yes
No. of Obs. 1,743 1,743
Note: The samples in panels a and b exclude individuals who were unemployed in either wave 2006 or
wave 2008, or whose spouse was unemployed then. The treatment group consists of respondents who, or
whose spouse, did not become unemployed until wave 2010 and the control group contains respondents
who were not laid off, and whose spouse was not laid off, in all the three waves. Wave 2010 is the only
post-Great Recession period with respect to unemployment. In panel c, the sample excludes individuals
who, or whose spouse, were unemployed in wave 2010 only. Individual fixed effects and survey wave
fixed effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive demographic and socio-economic
variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number
of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the
population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy
of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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unfairness on preferences for redistribution. Panel a of Table 4.3 shows the results for
the first step. Recent unemployment during the Great Recession did indeed increase the
perception of economic unfairness, regardless of controls. In panel b, perceived economic
unfairness had a significant positive effect on the demand for the government to equalize
income between the wealthy and the disadvantaged. Nonetheless, this perception of
unfairness did not have a significant effect on the option of assisting the poor financially.
Panel c displays the first step results for those unemployed before the recession. This type
of unemployment did not significantly increase the perception of economic unfairness.
The results fit with the conclusion in previous subsections: the recently unemployed
during the Great Recession showed distrust in elites. They called for taxes on the wealthy
to be raised, rather than for compassionate measures for the deprived. They thought that
wealthy elites should be responsible for the recession and hence their economic hardship.
4.6 Cultural Anxiety and Right-wing Populism
In this section I analyze the effects of cultural anxiety on populist attitudes. An over-
whelming unauthorized immigrant influx, or even an immigration crisis, may be per-
ceived in the destination country either as an economic threat or as a cultural and iden-
tity threat. By excluding the economic channels, I argue that cultural concerns drove
the anti-immigration attitude related to right-wing populism. Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6
present results based on the individual panel from 2010 to 2014.19 I apply the logit fixed
effects model for attitude to immigration and actual couple unemployment, and the
ordered logit fixed effects model for left-wing populist attitudes and anticipated future
unemployment. The first column for every dependent variable does not include con-
trols but the remaining columns do. The treatment group is composed of respondents
who resided in the West South Central region of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states
of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas that the immigration crisis mostly im-
pacted.20 The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same wave. The post-
immigration crisis period is wave 2014.
19Again, Table 4.A.4.2 in Appendix 4.A.4 shows the parameter estimates of the full model.
20In Table 4.A.4.4 of Appendix 4.A.4, I change the compositions of the treated region as robustness
checks and find similar results though the estimates are less significant.
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4.6.1 Attitude to Immigration
In Table 4.4 the second column with covariates reports a significant negative estimate of
treatment×post-immigration crisis. In terms of the average marginal effect, for resi-
dents in the West South Central region the probability of their having a positive attitude
to immigration decreased by over 12 percentage points compared to those in untreated
regions. If cultural and identity concerns lowered positivity towards immigration, such
an effect would be milder or even reversed among groups with a cultural background and
identity that is closer to the immigrants. In columns (2I) and (2II), I estimate the same
model separately for Hispanic Whites and non-Whites, and non-Hispanic Whites, respec-
tively. Hispanic Americans are closer to these unauthorized immigrants from Central
America in culture and ethnicity. Non-Whites share the identity of racial minorities with
these Central American immigrants. As expected, the effect among the racial minori-
ties (column (2I)) is nonnegative while the negative effect among non-Hispanic Whites
(column (2II)) is considerably larger and significant. During the immigration crisis, for
non-Hispanic Whites in the treated region the probability of a positive attitude to immi-
gration was significantly decreased by 35 percentage points relative to those in the rest
of the U.S. The corresponding linear fixed effects estimate shown in panel b of Table
4.2 is minus 0.14, and also significant. It is substantial compared to the mean attitude
to immigration in the treated, 0.52. Columns (2III) and (2IV) show the estimates for
bachelor’s degree holders and individuals without a bachelor’s degree (measured in 2014),
respectively. Apparently, the lower educated group drove the anti-immigration attitude.
Column (2V) is a placebo test using the East South Central region of the U.S. (Ken-
tucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi) as the false treatment group. The East
South Central region is similar to the West South Central region in many aspects includ-
ing political inclinations. However, the 2014 immigration crisis did not notably impact
the East South Central region. Thus, the East South Central region is an appropriate
counterfactual. The estimate in column (2V) excludes individuals living in the West
South Central region, the real treatment group. Without the remarkable influence of the
2014 immigration crisis, people in the East South Central region did not significantly
change their attitude to immigration. Column (2VI) reports the estimate of the same
type of placebo test among non-Hispanic Whites only, which is also statistically insignifi-
cant. Column (2VII) shows the result of another falsification test with only pre-treatment
data (i.e. data of the first two waves) by using wave 2012 as a fake treatment. Column
(2VIII) is the same test for the version of non-Hispanic Whites. Again, neither of them
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is significant. Hence these placebo tests deliver evidence that the treatment effect is not
produced by other events occurring at a time close to the immigration crisis.
In column (3) I separate the pre-immigration crisis period into wave 2010 and wave
2012 and interact them with the treatment group respectively (treatment×wave 2010 is
omitted for reference). In 2012, before the immigration crisis, the difference in attitude
to immigration between the treated and controlled areas did not significantly change
relative to that in 2010. After Central American immigrants entered the West South
Central region, the local attitude to immigration deteriorated significantly compared to
the other areas.
4.6.2 Left-wing Populist Attitudes
Table 4.5 displays estimated effects of the immigration crisis on attitudes related to
left-wing populism. None of the coefficients of treatment×post-immigration crisis is
significant for confidence in big companies, the demand for the government to equalize the
income between rich and poor, or the request for the government to financially assist the
poor, regardless of controls inclusion. Thus I do not obtain evidence that the immigration
crisis affected these left-wing populist attitudes of anti-elites.
4.6.3 Labor Market Outcomes
Natives may also see immigrants as job competitors and social welfare diggers. Table 4.6
presents results for actual unemployment of either partner of the couple and individual
anticipated unemployment in the next 12 months. With or without controls, the immi-
gration crisis resulted in an insignificant rise in actual unemployment and insignificant
decline in anticipated future unemployment for people in the West South Central region.
The previous subsection concludes that lower-educated natives drove the increase in the
negative attitude to immigration. The reason may be the competition between immi-
grants and lower-educated natives in the labor market and for social welfare. Columns
(2I) and (4I) include only individuals without a bachelor’s degree, corresponding to col-
umn (2IV) in Table 4.4. Amazingly, the coefficient estimates are even smaller and remain
insignificant.21 Therefore, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the 2014 immigration crisis
did not impact the local labor market outcomes. A similar finding has been documented
by Card (2001) and Card (2005).
21I also investigate the effects of the immigrant influx on family income before taxes and on preferences
for redistribution, and do not obtain significant estimates either. So, worries on lower wage and social
security crowding out were not the reasons for the negative attitude to immigration.
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Table 4.4: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Attitude to Immigration
Attitude to Immigration Placebo Test 1 Placebo Test 2
(1) (2) (2I) (2II) (2III) (2IV) (2V) (2VI) (2VII) (2VIII) (3)
Treat.×Post-Immig. Crisis -0.44 -0.50* 0.15 -1.40** -0.26 -0.62* -0.30 -0.06 -0.31 -0.27





Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,070 1,070 349 690 289 781 899 635 498 318 1,070
Note: The treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central region of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same wave.
The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. Column (2I) restricts the sample to include Hispanic Whites and non-Whites and column (2II) includes
non-Hispanic Whites only. Column (2III) and (2IV) show the estimates for bachelor’s degree holders and individuals without a bachelor’s degree
(measured in 2014), respectively. Column (2V) is a placebo test by using the East South Central region of the U.S. as the treated region and estimating
the model excluding the West South Central region. Column (2VI) is the same type of placebo test for non-Hispanic Whites only. Column (2VII) is
another placebo test by using wave 2012 as a fake time of the shock and estimating with only pre-(real)treatment data. Column (2VIII) is the same test
among non-Hispanic Whites only. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive
demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children,
academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification,
dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5: Effects of Immigration Crisis on Left-wing Populist Attitudes
Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat.×Post-Immigration Crisis 0.13 0.18 -0.12 -0.11 0.09 0.01
(0.30) (0.32) (0.26) (0.28) (0.32) (0.34)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 1,547 1,547 8,345 8,345 3,251 3,251
Note: The treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central region
of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the
immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same
wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed
effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive demographic and socio-economic
variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number
of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the
population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy
of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.6: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Individual Labor Market Outcomes
Actual Couple Unemp. Anticipated Future Unemp.
(1) (2) (2I) (3) (4) (4I)
Treatment×Post-Immigration Crisis 0.47 0.71 0.38 -0.28 -0.23 -0.17
(0.44) (0.45) (0.53) (0.33) (0.34) (0.37)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of observations 633 633 492 2,848 2,848 1,986
Note: The treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central region
of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the
immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same
wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. Columns (2I) and (4I) show the estimates for
individuals without a bachelor’s degree (measured in 2014). Individual fixed effects and survey wave
fixed effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive demographic and socio-economic
variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings,
number of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories
of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and
dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in
parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Overall, I rule out the idea that economic insecurity in terms of labor market com-
petition and social security crowding out triggered the anti-immigration attitude. Such
negative attitudes prevailed much more substantially among non-Hispanic Whites, an
ethnic group with cultural background and identity remote from the Central American
immigrants. Thus, cultural or identity concerns are more likely to have driven the nega-
tive attitude to immigration. This result is consistent with the conclusions drawn by Card
et al. (2012), Sekeris and Vasilakis (2016), and Tabellini (2018). Moreover, I do not find
that the immigration crisis exerted significant influences on left-wing populist attitudes.
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Therefore, economic insecurity drove left-wing populism, while cultural anxiety triggered
right-wing populism.
4.7 Robustness Checks
In this section, I apply alternative methods and combine extra data to make various
sensitivity analyses. The aim is to address concerns on the selection of treatment groups,
the measure of individual economic insecurity, interactions of individuals’ economic inse-
curity with regional labor market conditions and exposure to immigration, as well as the
differential effects of immigration on the labor market outcomes at the regional level.
4.7.1 Propensity Score Matching
In order to improve the covariate balance between the treatment and control groups
and render individuals in these two groups more comparable, I apply nearest neighbors
propensity score matching.22 More specifically, in every wave before the shock, I match
the individuals in the treatment group with those in the control group based on the whole
set of covariates. The propensity score is estimated with a logit model. Then I take the
union of these matched individuals in different pre-shock waves to form the estimation
sample for DID. Different numbers of nearest neighbors are adopted and the results are
robust.
Table 4.7 displays this sensitivity analysis for the design of the Great Recession.
Panel b restricts the estimation sample to include only matched treated and controlled
individuals with the one-nearest neighbor matching. Panel c takes the same procedure
with five-nearest neighbors matching. The results for all the outcome variables are very
close to their counterparts in Table 4.1.
Likewise, panel b of Table 4.8 shows the effects of the immigration crisis on the
attitude to immigration of non-Hispanic Whites with the matching method. The first
two columns are for three-nearest neighbors matching and the remaining two are for five-
nearest neighbors matching. The results are also similar to that in column (2II) of Table
4.4, even though the number of observations is now halved.23 Several assumptions such as
the conditional independence assumption (CIA), that potential outcomes are independent
22Matching methods are more appropriate for my study than the synthetic control approach because
of the short pre-shock period.
23The estimated effects on labor market outcomes are insignificant and in similar magnitudes like
before as well.
87
Table 4.7: Effects of Recent Unemployment on Attitudes Related to Populism: Compa-
rability Improvement & Propensity Score Matching
Panel a. Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.53** -2.29** 1.30* 1.25* 0.78 0.40 -0.55 -0.28
(0.77) (1.10) (0.67) (0.65) (0.70) (0.74) (0.52) (0.58)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 899 899 2,717 2,717 1,638 1,638 692 692
Panel b. Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.68*** -1.94*** 1.04** 1.32*** 0.26 0.31 -0.20 -0.16
(0.54) (0.60) (0.41) (0.45) (0.48) (0.50) (0.55) (0.81)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 303 303 1,015 1,015 613 613 171 171
Panel c. Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.26*** -1.50*** 0.90** 0.92*** 0.27 0.11 -0.27 0.02
(0.48) (0.57) (0.36) (0.35) (0.42) (0.43) (0.47) (0.54)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 794 794 2,378 2,378 1,493 1,493 402 402
Note: In panel a, the sample excludes the individuals who were ever unemployed in the past ten years
before 2008. In panel b, the sample is restricted to contain matched treated and controlled individuals
only based on the one-nearest neighbor propensity score matching. In panel c, the sample is restricted
to contain matched treated and controlled individuals only based on five-nearest neighbors propensity
score matching. The treatment group consists of respondents who did not become unemployed or
whose spouse did not become unemployed until wave 2010 and the control group contains respondents
who were not laid off, and whose spouse was not laid off, at all in the three waves. Wave 2010 is the
only post-Great Recession period with respect to unemployment. Individual fixed effects and survey
wave fixed effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive demographic and
socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of
siblings, number of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family income,
categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal
ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are
reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.8: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Attitude to Immigration: Industry Het-
erogeneity in Immigration Exposure & Propensity Score Matching
Panel a. Attitude to Immigration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment×Post-Immigration Crisis -0.57* -0.65* -0.48* -0.55*
(0.31) (0.34) (0.29) (0.31)
Immig. Industry×Post-Immig. Crisis 0.24 0.18 -0.31 -0.15
(0.31) (0.34) (0.61) (0.64)
Treatment×Immig. Industry×Post-Immig. Crisis 0.58 0.67 1.01 0.93
(0.67) (0.71) (1.15) (1.18)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070
Panel b. Attitude to Immig. of Non-Hispanic Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment×Post-Immigration Crisis -1.09** -1.92** -1.08** -1.42**
(0.54) (0.84) (0.53) (0.67)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 309 309 387 387
Note: The treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central region
of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the
immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same
wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. In panel a, immigrant industry is a dummy for
individuals who worked before 2014 in one of the industries with highest proportion of immigrant
workers. In the first two columns, immigrant industry refers to the top ten industries ranked by
proportion of immigrant workers; in the last two columns, it means the top three industries. In panel b,
the sample is restricted to contain matched treated and controlled non-Hispanic Whites only based on
nearest neighbors propensity score matching. The first two columns of panel b apply three-nearest
neighbors propensity score matching and the remaining two columns apply five-nearest neighbors
propensity score matching. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every
column. Controls contain extensive demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of
respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree
dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s
place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
of treatment conditional on observables, are necessary for the matching method. Here I
show that with or without matching, the results are robust and thus the above conclusions
are convincing.
4.7.2 Different Measures of New Economic Insecurity
When regarding individuals rather than couples as economic units, I also show the effects
of self-unemployment of the respondents during the Great Recession on populist attitudes
in the odd columns of panel a in Table 4.9. The conclusions based on these results are
not changed.
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Table 4.9: Effects of Recent Unemployment on Attitudes Related to Populism: Different Measures of Economic Insecurity &
Interaction with Immigration Exposure
Panel a. Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.49** -0.98** 1.00*** 0.68** 0.07 -0.07 -0.61 0.16
(0.65) (0.42) (0.38) (0.33) (0.49) (0.38) (0.58) (0.40)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 1,575 1,478 5,049 4,740 3,063 2,876 878 779
Panel b. Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.26** -1.22** 0.65* 0.65* -0.02 0.02 -0.29 -0.40
(0.51) (0.51) (0.34) (0.34) (0.44) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48)
Immigrants Proportion -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10* -0.00 0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Immig. Prop.×Post-Rec. 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06
(0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08)
County Unemployment -0.03 0.05 -0.19 0.10
(0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18)
County Unemp.×Post-Rec. -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02
(0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16)
Immig. Prop.×County Unemp. -0.00 0.01 0.02** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Immig. Prop.×County Unemp.×Post-Rec. -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 1,538 1,534 4,955 4,949 3,000 2,995 864 858
Note: In the odd columns of panel a, the treatment group consists of respondents who did not become unemployed until wave 2010. The control group
contains respondents who were not laid off in any waves. In the even columns of panel a, the treatment group consists of respondents who, or whose
spouse, did not become unemployed, or who did not anticipate very likely or fairly likely to be laid off in the next 12 months until wave 2010. The
control group contains respondents who were not laid off, and whose spouse was not laid off, and who did not think they would very likely or fairly likely
lose their job in the next 12 months in any waves. Wave 2010 is the only post-Great Recession period. In panel b, the treatment and control groups are
constructed based on only actual individual (couple) unemployment. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every column.
Controls contain extensive demographic and socio-economic variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in
parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Economic insecurity may contain both real and perceived dimensions. The previous
treatment group in the case of the Great Recession is based on individual or couple actual
unemployment only. To account for the perceived dimension of economic insecurity, I use
another variable, individual anticipated unemployment in the next 12 months, in the
GSS survey. If an individual answered “very likely” or “fairly likely” to the question
“Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your
job or be laid off — very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?” in wave
2010 only, they are now added to the treatment group with those recently unemployed
during the Great Recession.
The corresponding results are reported in the even columns of panel a in Table 4.9.
The estimates for confidence in major companies are smaller in magnitude, indicating
that individual or couple actual unemployment had a stronger influence than anticipated
future unemployment. The estimates for the demand for the government to equalize
income are similar to those in Table 4.1. The estimates for the request for the government
to provide economic assistance to the poor, and for the attitude to immigration, are again
insignificant and smaller. These results fit with the previous conclusions.
4.7.3 Effects of Local Immigration Exposure and Labor Market
Conditions on Left-wing Populism
If left-wing populism prevails more intensely in areas with higher proportions of immi-
grants, cultural or identity concerns may also contribute to it. To investigate the possible
influences of cultural anxiety and its interaction with the economic shock, I include the
fraction of immigrants in the state population in every wave and its interaction term
with the post-Great Recession period in the model. The information on immigrants at
the state level is from the American Community Survey (ACS).24
In panel b of Table 4.9, the odd columns report relevant results. The estimates of
treatment×post-GreatRecession are still close to those in the baseline model. Moreover,
neither the immigration fraction in the state population nor its interaction with post-
Great Recession phase had significant effects on the outcome variables. Thus, residing in
areas with more exposure to immigration did not seem to boost left-wing populist surge.
Economic insecurity may originate from one’s own and one’s family’s economic dis-
tress, or from anxiety on the local adverse labor market conditions. Even if an individual
24The immigrant data at the county level are only available for part of the counties on the annual
basis and hence too limited for analysis.
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or their partner is not laid off, the high unemployment rate in their area may induce a
movement towards left-wing populism. Hence, in the even columns of the same panel,
I add the county unemployment rate and its interaction with post-Great Recession. I
acquire the annual county unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I
then include the interactions of the immigrant proportion with the county unemployment
rate and with the county unemployment rate×post-Great Recession to account for the
interacting effects of the economic shock and cultural concern. The estimates in the even
columns show that local labor market conditions did not exert significant influences on
left-wing populism, even after the Great Recession. I also do not find that immigration
exposure was an important multiplier of the effects of the Great Recession on either the
anti-elite attitude or the anti-immigrant attitude in regions suffering from adverse eco-
nomic conditions. The coefficients of treatment×post-GreatRecession hardly change.
Therefore, individual economic insecurity dominated regional economic concern in these
attitudinal variations.
4.7.4 Effects of the 2014 Immigration Crisis on Local Labor Mar-
ket Conditions
In Section 4.6.3, I investigate the effects of the 2014 immigration crisis on individual labor
market outcomes and do not find significant impact relative to the untreated areas. Nev-
ertheless, the effects of unauthorized immigration on the labor market may be different
at the individual level than at the regional level due to changes in inflows and outflows
of natives (Dustmann et al., 2017). If natives in the treated area become more negative
towards immigration at the same time as the local unemployment rate is increasing, the
change in attitude may be (partially) due to economic reasons. If the immigration crisis
were to affect neither individual labor market outcomes nor local labor market conditions,
we could be more confident that the more negative attitude to immigration was mainly
driven by cultural or identity concern.
Table 4.10 reports relevant estimates. State or county fixed effects and their spe-
cific time trends, and state real GDP per capita as well as survey waves fixed effects
are included. Columns (1) and (2) present the effects of the immigration crisis on the
state unemployment rate and county unemployment rate, respectively. Both of them are
statistically and economically insignificant (around 0.2 — 0.3 percentage points). When
combined with the results in Section 4.6.3, it is clear that the immigration crisis did not
impact significantly on either individual labor market outcomes or local labor market
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conditions in the treated region.
Table 4.10: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Local Labor Market Conditions and
Immigrants Proportions
Unemploy. Rate (%) Central American Immig. Prop. (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State County State County
Treatment×Post-Immigration Crisis 0.27 0.17 0.08* 0.08***
(0.43) (0.20) (0.05) (0.02)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 127 692 91 625
Note: The treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central region
of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the
immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same
wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. State or county fixed effects and survey wave
fixed effects are included in every column. Controls contain state real GDP per capital and state- or
county-specific time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the state or county level are reported
in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Columns (3) and (4) report the effects of the immigration crisis on the fraction of
(authorized) Central American immigrants in the state of residence.25 The covariates are
the same as in the first two columns. The immigration crisis increased the proportion
of (authorized) Central American immigrants in the state of residence by around 0.1
percentage points in the treated region compared to the rest of the U.S.26 In 2015, most
of the Central American immigrants living in the U.S. were unauthorized (Pew Research
Center). Thus, if the unauthorized immigration inflow followed the same pattern, the
effect would be roughly doubled to 0.2 percentage points. Compared to this proportion
in the median state in the sample, 0.85%, the effect of the immigration crisis would not
be seen as trivial.
4.7.5 Industry Heterogeneity in Immigration Exposure
Even though the immigration crisis did not negatively affect local labor market out-
comes in the treated region, it is still possible that workers in industries that were more
intensively exposed to immigrants would feel threatened and thus hold a more negative
attitude to immigration after the immigration crisis. If so, the deterioration in attitude to
immigration should be attributed to economic insecurity rather than to cultural concern.
In panel a of Table 4.8, the industry heterogeneity in the share of immigrant workers is
taken into account. The first two columns set out the top ten industries ranked by share
25Again, the available immigrant data at the county level from ACS are too limited on a yearly basis.
26The estimates of numbers of unauthorized Central American immigrants by state are imprecise and
not on an annual basis. Therefore, I can only use data about authorized immigrants.
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of immigrant workers, namely private households (45%), textile, apparel, leather manu-
facturing (36%), agriculture (33%), accommodation (32%), food manufacturing (29%),
computer and electronic products manufacturing (27%), personal and laundry services
(26%), administrative and support services (25%), construction (24%), and miscella-
neous and not specified manufacturing (23%) (Pew Research Center). The remaining
two columns define immigrant industry in terms of the top three industries. More specif-
ically, the immigrant industry is a time-invariant dummy of individuals who worked
in one of the immigrant industries before the immigration crisis. Additional interaction
terms of immigrant industry and post-immigration crisis, and of these and treatment
region are included. Neither of the coefficients of these interactions are significant, so
working in an industry with a high share of immigrant workers did not entail a more
negative attitude to immigration after the immigration crisis, whether the respondent
lived in the treated region or not. The estimate of treatment×post-immigration crisis
remains similar to that in Table 4.4. In this way, I rule out potential economic insecu-
rity as an explanation for the increased negative attitude to immigration in immigrant
industries after the immigration crisis.
4.7.6 Effects of Individual Labor Market Outcomes and Local
Labor Market Conditions on Right-wing Populism
I have not found that the 2014 Immigration Crisis exerted a significant influence on either
individual labor market outcomes or local labor market conditions in the treated region.
This rules out the idea that residents in the most impacted area became increasingly
negative towards immigration because of any realistic adverse labor market consequences
created by the unauthorized immigration. However, it does not exclude the possibility
that natives facing economic hardship or living in places with adverse economic conditions
scapegoat immigrants.
In Table 4.11 I add to the model a dummy for couple unemployment, the unem-
ployment rate in county of residence, and their interactions with the post-immigration
crisis. The first three columns show the attitude to immigration of the whole sample,
and the last three that of non-Hispanic Whites only. The estimates for treatment×post-
immigrationcrisis stay close to those in the baseline model in Table 4.4. Individual (cou-
ple) labor market outcomes represented by couple unemployment did not have significant
effects on the attitude to immigration in any specifications, and this is in line with the
conclusion in Section 4.5.3. While local labor market conditions captured by the county
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Table 4.11: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Attitude to Immigration: Individual
Labor Market Outcomes and Local Labor Market Conditions as Additional Explanatory
Variables
Attitude to Immigration All Non-Hispanic Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat.×Post-Immig. Crisis -0.50* -0.43 -0.43 -1.38** -1.32** -1.30**
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.61) (0.59) (0.61)
Couple Unemployment -0.51 -0.51 -0.67 -0.68
(0.39) (0.40) (0.56) (0.57)
Couple Unemp.×Post-Immig. Crisis 0.49 0.52 0.62 0.63
(0.57) (0.56) (0.88) (0.86)
County Unemployment -0.09 -0.09 -0.17* -0.16
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
County Unemp.×Post-Immig. Crisis -0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.18*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 1,070 690
Note: The treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central region
of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the
immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same
wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed
effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive demographic and socio-economic
variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number
of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the
population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy
of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
unemployment rate bear some marginally significant effects only among non-Hispanic
Whites, we should be cautious with these estimates: first, they are merely marginally
significant at the 10% level; second, in the alternative linear specification even this 10%
level of significance disappears; finally, without an exogenous shock to the county unem-
ployment rate, these estimates present correlation rather than causation. Actually, by
exploiting the Great Recession as a shock to the county unemployment, I use the same
model as column (8) of panel b in Table 4.9 to estimate among non-Hispanic Whites
only and do not find significant coefficients for county unemployment related variables.
Therefore, I do not regard either individual labor market outcomes or local labor market
conditions as important drivers of the attitude to immigration connected with right-wing
populism.27
27Based on columns (1) and (4) of Table 4.11, I further interact the treated region with couple unem-
ployment and with couple unemployment×post-immigration crisis simultaneously. Neither of them has
significant negative effects on attitude to immigration.
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4.7.7 A Different Design for the 2014 Immigration Crisis
Previously the treatment group with respect to the 2014 immigration crisis has been the
West South Central region. The unauthorized Central American immigrants entered the
U.S. through this region and hence impacted there mostly intensely in the short term.
However, if these immigrants moved to other areas of the U.S. within a few months, their
destinations might form an appropriate treatment group. According to the Migration
Policy Institute, around 90% of the children and juveniles among these immigrants later
stayed with relatives or family friends who were already living in the U.S. Central Amer-
ican immigrants are already distributed rather unevenly in the U.S., gathering in several
states and metropolitan areas (Migration Policy Institute). So the states and areas with
higher proportions of Central American immigrants were more likely to be destinations
for the unauthorized immigrants in 2014.
Nonetheless, the proportion of Central American immigrants by state is endogenous
to the attitude of natives to immigration. There may be a reverse causality in that im-
migrants move to and concentrate in areas where they are more welcome or tolerated
by natives. A potential empirical strategy for addressing this problem is to utilize the
distance from the destination to the Rio Grande Valley border patrol sector as an in-
strument variable (IV) for the proportion of Central American immigrants. Note that
a dominant proportion of these unauthorized immigrants (over 80% in the peak of the
2014 immigration crisis) entered the U.S. via this valley. This strategy relies on the ex-
clusion restriction that the distance to the border patrol sector affected natives’ attitude
to immigration only through the proportion of Central American immigrants.28 The use
of distance as an IV in a similar context can be seen in Dinas et al. (2016).
Table 4.12 displays the 2SLS estimates. The distance is measured as the shortest
driving distance from the county of residence to the Rio Grande Valley border patrol
sector.29 In the first stage, the natural logarithm of distance to the border sector is
negatively associated with the proportion of (authorized) Central American immigrants
in the state of residence, although this association is only statistically significant for the
sample of non-Hispanic Whites. In the second stage, the proportion of Central American
immigrants is positively correlated with natives’ attitude to immigration. I am reluctant
to interpret this effect as causal since the distance to the Rio Grande Valley sector is
probably effective as an IV only for the 2014 immigration crisis. After all, Central Amer-
ican immigrants could previously enter the U.S. using many routes scattered along its
28I also try using the proportion of Latin American immigrants and obtain similar results.
29Another measure — distance “as the crow flies”, the most direct path — yields similar results.
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Table 4.12: 2SLS Estimates Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Attitude to Immigration:
A Different Design of Treatment
Attitude to Immigration All Non-Hispanic Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
Ln Distance -0.34 -0.79***
(0.23) (0.17)
Instrumented Centr. Amer. Immig. Prop. 1.02 3.06*
(2.73) (1.65)
Instru. Centr. Amer. Immig. Prop.×Post-Crisis -0.56 -0.81*
(0.45) (0.44)
County Unemployment 0.02*** -0.12 0.02** -0.22**
(0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10)
County Unemp.×Post-Crisis -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.15
(0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.11)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 1,070 690
Note: The distance is measured as the shortest driving distance from the county of residence to the Rio
Grande Valley border patrol sector. This distance is the instrument variable for the proportion of
Central American immigrants in the state population. Wave 2014 is the only post-immigration crisis
period. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every column. Controls
contain extensive demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age,
marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree dummies, categories
of last year’s total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party
self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
southern border. However, with respect to the estimate of the interaction of the propor-
tion of Central American immigrants with post-immigration crisis, I am more confident.
During the 2014 immigration crisis, the increase in the proportion of Central American
immigrants diminished natives’ positive attitude to immigration. This is consistent with
the conclusion drawn in Section 4.6.1: the 2014 immigration crisis provoked a more nega-
tive attitude to immigration in the impacted areas, especially among non-Hispanic White
natives.
4.8 The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Populism expresses negative attitudes to wealthy elites as well as anti-immigrant senti-
ment. Both types of attitude may be transferred to voting behavior in elections. In this
section I focus on the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, including the primaries as well as
the General Election. More specifically, I examine whether the treated group relating
to the Great Recession was more inclined to vote for left-wing populist Bernie Sanders,
and whether the treated group relating to the immigration crisis was more likely to sup-
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port right-wing populist Donald Trump. It is well known and documented that Bernie
Sanders’ rhetoric focused on the division between common people and corrupt wealthy
elites and that he fostered a negative attitude towards those wealthy elites. At the same
time, Donald Trump appealed to xenophobia by using the rhetoric of anti-(unauthorized)
immigration to create a division between nationals and the immigrants who threatened
them (Kazin, 2016; Rodrik, 2018b).
4.8.1 Great Recession and Left-wing Populist Voting
Since there is no information in the GSS survey about voting behavior in the U.S. Pres-
idential Primary Elections, I utilize the information from the ANES 2016 Time Series
Study and combine it with the GSS data. Since it is impossible to link the two data
at the individual level, I aggregate the ANES data in the same way as I do to generate
the GSS pseudo panel, and then merge it with the GSS pseudo panel at the cohort level
(please refer to Section 4.3.2). The treatment group is composed of cohorts whose couple
unemployment averaged within cohort in wave 2010 or 2012 is greater than or equal to
0.5.30 In the estimation process, the controls take their values in 2010. Note that self-
party identification, ideological dummy, and voting turnout are included as covariates.
The first six columns in panel a of Table 4.13 display outcomes for the 2016 U.S. Pres-
idential Primary Elections. Regardless of controls, the treated cohorts were significantly
more prone to support left-wing populist Sanders and significantly less inclined to vote for
Trump, echoing the findings of Di Tella and MacCulloch (2009). These results are more
likely to be due to the popularity of Sanders among the cohorts that were unemployed
during the Great Recession, rather than being due merely to differences in party prefer-
ences between the treated and the controlled. Columns (7) to (10) show the estimates for
the General Election in the same year as the first placebo test. After including covariates,
the coefficients are insignificant and almost zero for both Clinton and Trump votes. In
panel a of Table 4.14 I present results for the 2012 U.S. Presidential General Election
between Obama and Romney as another placebo test. With controls, the estimates are
still insignificant. Hence the support for Sanders from the treated cohorts during the
Great Recession is not very likely to be explained by differences in party preference.
30In Table 4.A.4.5 of Appendix 4.A.4, I also directly apply the average of couple unemployment within
cohort, i.e. a continuous treatment, as the explanatory variable of interest. Though the estimates are
not significant, the sign and magnitude are still as expected.
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Table 4.13: Effects of the Great Recession and Immigration Crisis on Populist Voting
2016 U.S. Presid. Primary Elections 2016 U.S. Presid. General Election
Panel a. Sanders Clinton Trump Clinton Trump
Great Recession (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment 0.40** 0.42** -0.10 -0.11 -0.16*** -0.25*** 0.19* 0.03 -0.26*** 0.01
(0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.04) (0.13)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 135 135 135 135 135 135 136 136 136 136
Panel b. Sanders Clinton Trump Clinton Trump
Immigration Crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment -0.15*** -0.10* -0.08** -0.11** 0.07** 0.09** -0.13*** -0.12** 0.15*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 132 132 132 132 132 132 134 134 134 134
Panel c. Sanders Clinton Trump Clinton Trump
Unemp. Pre-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment 0.44** 0.19 -0.12 -0.03 -0.12* -0.19 0.22** 0.23* -0.21*** -0.18
(0.17) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 134 134 134 134 134 134 135 135 135 135
Note: In panel a for the Great Recession, the treatment group is composed of cohorts whose couple unemployment averaged within cohort is greater than
or equal to 0.5 in wave 2010 or 2012. Covariates take values in wave 2010. In panel b for the immigration crisis, the treatment group consists of cohorts
that resided in the West South Central region of the U.S. in wave 2014 or 2016. Covariates take values in wave 2014. In panel c for existing
unemployment pre-Great Recession, the treatment group is composed of cohorts whose couple unemployment averaged within cohort is greater than or
equal to 0.5 in wave 2006 or 2008. Covariates take values in wave 2008. All the dependent variables and controls are averages within cohort. Controls
contain the mean of voting turnout in the corresponding election, as well as extensive averaged demographic and socio-economic variables such as the
quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total
family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.14: A Placebo Test: Effects of Recent Unemployment and the Immigration Crisis
on the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election
2012 U.S. Presidential General Election
Panel a. Obama Romney
Great Recession (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.28*** 0.19 -0.31*** -0.19
(0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.17)
Controls No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 134 134 134 134
Panel b. Obama Romney
Immigration Crisis (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -0.09 -0.03 0.07 -0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Controls No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 134 134 134 134
Note: In panel a for the Great Recession, the treatment group is composed of cohorts whose couple
unemployment averaged within cohort is greater than or equal to 0.5 in wave 2010 or 2012. Covariates
take values in wave 2010. In panel b for the immigration crisis, the treatment group consists of cohorts
that resided in the West South Central region of the U.S. in wave 2014 or 2016. Covariates take values
in wave 2014. All the dependent variables and controls are averages within cohort. Controls contain
the mean of voting turnout in the corresponding election, as well as extensive averaged demographic
and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status dummies,
number of siblings, number of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family
income, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of
liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Panel c of Table 4.13 displays the estimates for the counterpart whose couple unem-
ployment averaged within cohort in wave 2006 or 2008 is greater than or equal to 0.5.
The controls take their values in 2008. Including covariates, these treated cohorts were
not significantly more likely to support either left-wing populist Bernie Sanders or right-
wing populist Donald Trump. They were significantly more prone to vote for Hillary
Clinton who is usually regarded as a left centrist. This result is consistent with the story
in Section 4.5: only recent unemployment during the Great Recession produced left-wing
populism while existing unemployment from before the Great Recession did not.
4.8.2 Immigration Crisis and Right-wing Populist Voting
Likewise, the data used in this subsection also consist of the GSS pseudo panel and the
ANES 2016 Time Series Study. Now the treatment group is formed by the cohorts that
were in the West South Central region in wave 2014 or 2016 during the immigration crisis.
Covariates take their values in wave 2014 for estimation.
Panel b of Table 4.13 reports the relevant results. During the Presidential Primary
Elections, the cohorts in the West South Central region were significantly more likely
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to vote for right-wing populist Trump and significantly less prone to support the two
Democratic candidates Sanders and Clinton. A similar situation appeared during the
Presidential General Election. These results are closely related to the conclusions of Dinas
et al. (2016) and Tabellini (2018). One may suspect that they are merely a divergence
between party preferences of the treatment and control groups. However, I conduct a
placebo test again in panel b of Table 4.14 for the 2012 U.S. Presidential General Election,
and no longer find such a divergence between the votes for Democratic candidate Obama
and the votes for Republican candidate Romney. Hence support for Trump among people
in the West South Central region cannot be explained, in the main, by differences in party
preference.
4.8.3 Potential Mechanism
I try to distinguish two potential mechanisms through which new economic insecurity and
cultural backlash led to the populist voting — accountability theory (Ferejohn, 1986) and
issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996). In the current context, the former mechanism states
that voters who are dissatisfied with the way the incumbent government is dealing with
the Great Recession and the immigration crisis will punish it by turning to an opposition.
The latter mechanism claims that dissatisfied voters will support the party or politician
they deem competent on the specific issues (Dinas et al., 2016).
As shown in panel a of Table 4.13, people losing their job after the Great Recession
did not decrease their support for the incumbent — the Democratic Party — or turn to
the opposition — the Republican Party — in either the primaries or the General Election.
Instead, these people were significantly more prone to vote for Bernie Sanders who used
anti-elitist rhetoric during his campaign. Thus, accountability theory is not valid in this
case, while issue ownership seems to be what appropriately explains the electoral reaction
against elites and establishment after the Great Recession.
The results are mixed in panel b. The Democrats, Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clin-
ton, both lost votes from people who were most impacted by the immigration crisis. This
is predicted by accountability theory. However, Donald Trump, who used considerable
anti-immigrant rhetoric and promised harsh reform of the U.S. immigration policy dur-
ing his campaign, obtained increasing support from residents of the West South Central
region. This is also predicted by issue ownership. In order to disentangle this puzzle,
in Table 4.15 I estimate the same model for another two Republican candidates, Ted
Cruz and John Kasich, during the 2016 Primary Elections. Ted Cruz held a similar anti-
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immigrant position to that of Donald Trump. He was opposed to providing DREAMers
(unauthorized immigrants brought to the U.S. as children) with a path to citizenship
(Kapur, 2018). Moreover, he also called for the repeal of that clause of the 14th amend-
ment granting citizenship to those born in the U.S. (Farley, 2016). However, from 2014
John Kasich changed his previous conservative opinion on immigration and called for
a path to legal status for unauthorized immigrants (Sussman, 2015). In October 2015,
he actually criticized Trump’s plan for “building a wall along the U.S.–Mexico border
and removing immigrants who entered the U.S. illegally” as “just crazy” (Rappeport,
2015). If accountability theory were true, the residents in the West South Central region
would increase (or at least not decrease) votes for any Republican candidates. If issue
ownership were true, these residents would more likely support candidates with a clear
anti-immigration opinion. It is clear from Table 4.15 that they were significantly more
prone to vote for Cruz, an anti-immigration candidate, and significantly less likely to
support Kasich with his softer attitude to immigration. Once more, this phenomenon fits
issue ownership rather than accountability theory.
Table 4.15: Extra Candidates in Primaries: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Populist
Voting
2016 U.S. Presidential Primary Elections
Cruz Kasich
Immigration Crisis (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.11*** 0.08** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Controls No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 132 132 132 132
Note: The treatment group consists of cohorts that resided in the West South Central region of the
U.S. in wave 2014 or 2016. Covariates take values in wave 2014. All the dependent variables and
controls are averages within cohort. Controls contain the mean of voting turnout in the corresponding
election, as well as extensive averaged demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic
of respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree
dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s
place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard
errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
In this section, I connect new economic insecurity to left-wing populist voting and
link cultural anxiety to right-wing populist voting, both delivered through the channel
of issue ownership. I find consistent conclusions with the literature (Rodrik, 2018b):
economic deprivation drives people to support left-wing populists, and cultural concern
urges them to vote for right-wing populists (Sekeris and Vasilakis, 2016; Lucassen and
Lubbers, 2012). The effect of recent unemployment during the Great Recession seemed
to persist in the long-term. Even five years or so after they had been made unemployed
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by the Great Recession, people were still significantly more prone to vote for a left-wing
populist. Such lasting negative effects on electoral support and trust are also recorded
by Ananyev and Guriev (2016) and Dustmann et al. (2017).
4.9 Conclusions
Brexit, the rise of numerous radical left and radical right parties in Europe, as well
as Donald Trump’s presidency and Bernie Sanders’s popularity during the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election, present a surge in populism. This study has investigated whether
it is economic insecurity or cultural anxiety that has been driving the growth in populism.
The most important and unique contribution of this study is to identify the cause of
this growth by using the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration crisis as two sepa-
rate quasi-natural experiments for economic insecurity and cultural backlash respectively.
This paper disentangles economic forces from cultural forces and distinguishes between
left-wing populism and right-wing populism empirically. Moreover, individual longitu-
dinal data are rarely available in attitudinal and political surveys, but they are helpful
in identifying the cause here by removing individual specific confounders. With two in-
dividual level panels, my study is one of the first in populism literature that accounts
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and time-varying observable characteristics.
Compared with earlier studies, a larger set of measures is employed to capture the eco-
nomic and political dimensions of populism.
I find that recent unemployment during the Great Recession, rather than existing
unemployment from before the recession, is what engendered attitudes against wealthy
elites, such as a decrease in trust in those people who manage big companies and a rise
in preferences for income redistribution by imposing higher taxes on wealthy families
rather than by providing financial assistance to poor people. These anti-elitist attitudes
are connected with left-wing populism in the literature. This result is original in that
it distinguishes between recent unemployment during the Great Recession and existing
unemployment from before the recession. Individuals who became unemployed during
the Great Recession perceived the economy as manipulated by elites and thus unjust to
them. However, those who had lost their job before the Great Recession did not express
that perception.
The current study also provides quasi-natural experimental evidence that unautho-
rized immigration generated a more negative attitude to immigration in the more in-
tensely affected region. Such anti-immigration attitude was driven by cultural and iden-
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tity concerns rather than labor market competition and social security crowding out.
This phenomenon is related to right-wing populism in the literature.
Furthermore, new unemployment amid the Great Recession and the 2014 immigration
crisis influenced the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Cohorts with a high average of
unemployment post-Great Recession preferred left-wing populist Bernie Sanders, while
cohorts in the most intensely impacted region during the immigration crisis supported
right-wing populist Donald Trump. Placebo tests verify that these voting consequences
could not be merely attributed to difference in party preferences.
In sum, this paper takes a step towards reconciling the economic insecurity perspective
with the cultural backlash thesis. Economic insecurity represented by recent unemploy-
ment during the Great Recession drove left-wing populism while cultural anxiety due to
unauthorized immigration triggered right-wing populism. These implications are helpful
for economists and policy makers who seek to prevent or direct the influence of populism
in economic and political institutions.
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Appendix 4.A
Appendix 4.A.1: Definitions and Descriptives of Variables
Table 4.A.1.1 provides an overview of the definitions of variables used in the analysis.
Table 4.A.1.2 presents the descriptives of these variables in the 2006 sample panel (wave
2006 to 2010) for the Great Recession. Table 4.A.1.3 shows the descriptives in the 2010
sample panel (wave 2010 to 2014) for the immigration crisis.
Table 4.A.1.1: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Trust companies Confidence in people running major companies (one to three)
Gov. equal. inc. U.S. gov. ought to reduce income difference between rich and poor (one to seven)
Gov. help poor U.S. gov. should improve living standard of poor (one to five)
Attitude to immig. Dummy variable if number of immigrants to U.S. should not decrease
Unemploy. couple Dummy variable if either partner of couple unemployed
Econ. unfairness Luck & network more important than hard work in one’s success (one to three)
Married Dummy variable if married
Widowed Dummy variable if widowed
Divorced Dummy variable if divorced
Separated Dummy variable if legally separated, i.e. legally living apart but still legally married
Never married Dummy variable if never married
Children number Number of children
Sibling number Number of siblings
Age Age of respondent
Age squared Age squared of respondent
Lower high school Dummy variable if highest degree is lower than high school
High school Dummy variable if highest degree is high school
College Dummy variable if highest degree is junior college or bachelor
Graduate Dummy variable if highest degree is graduate degree
Family income Categories of total family income before taxes last year
City size Categories of population size of respondent’s place
Democrat Dummy variable if party self-identification is democrat
Republican Dummy variable if party self-identification is republican
Liberal Dummy variable if political view is liberal
Home owner Dummy variable if home owner
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Table 4.A.1.2: Descriptives in the 2006 Sample Panel; Wave 2006 – 2010
Treatment Control
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Trust companies 1.98 1 3 1.94 1 3
Gov. equal. inc. 4.45 1 7 4.22 1 7
Gov. help poor 3.29 1 5 3.06 1 5
Econ. unfairness 1.51 1 3 1.47 1 3
Number of children 2.07 0 6 1.95 0 8
Number of siblings 3.96 0 25 3.51 0 32
Age 43.31 22 75 50.06 18 89
Percentages
Attitude to immig. 0.50 0 1 0.47 0 1
Married 0.54 0 1 0.51 0 1
Widowed 0.02 0 1 0.09 0 1
Divorced 0.16 0 1 0.17 0 1
Separated 0.08 0 1 0.03 0 1
Never married 0.20 0 1 0.20 0 1
Lower high school 0.11 0 1 0.11 0 1
High school 0.57 0 1 0.49 0 1
College 0.26 0 1 0.28 0 1
Graduate 0.06 0 1 0.12 0 1
Family income 10K minus 0.16 0 1 0.17 0 1
Family income 10-20K 0.13 0 1 0.09 0 1
Family income 20-30K 0.13 0 1 0.10 0 1
Family income 30-40K 0.11 0 1 0.11 0 1
Family income 40-50K 0.09 0 1 0.08 0 1
Family income 50-60K 0.07 0 1 0.09 0 1
Family income 60-75K 0.08 0 1 0.10 0 1
Family income 75-90K 0.07 0 1 0.07 0 1
Family income 90-110K 0.05 0 1 0.06 0 1
Family income 110-150K 0.07 0 1 0.07 0 1
Family income 150K plus 0.04 0 1 0.06 0 1
City size 10K minus 0.39 0 1 0.32 0 1
City size 10-100K 0.37 0 1 0.45 0 1
City size 100-1000K 0.16 0 1 0.16 0 1
City size 1000K plus 0.08 0 1 0.07 0 1
Democrat 0.38 0 1 0.34 0 1
Republican 0.19 0 1 0.27 0 1
Liberal 0.26 0 1 0.27 0 1
Home owner 0.38 0 1 0.47 0 1
Based on 81 individuals in the treatment group and 1,109 in the control group.
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Table 4.A.1.3: Descriptives in the 2010 Sample Panel; Wave 2010 – 2014
Treatment Control
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Number of children 2.19 0 8 1.84 0 8
Number of siblings 4.42 0 20 3.36 0 30
Age 46.78 19 89 49.77 18 89
Percentages
Attitude to immig. 0.52 0 1 0.49 0 1
Unemploy. couple 0.08 0 1 0.07 0 1
Married 0.43 0 1 0.46 0 1
Widowed 0.08 0 1 0.08 0 1
Divorced 0.16 0 1 0.19 0 1
Separated 0.05 0 1 0.03 0 1
High school 0.54 0 1 0.50 0 1
College 0.23 0 1 0.28 0 1
Graduate 0.04 0 1 0.13 0 1
Family income 10-20K 0.19 0 1 0.10 0 1
Family income 20-30K 0.18 0 1 0.10 0 1
Family income 30-40K 0.10 0 1 0.09 0 1
Family income 40-50K 0.07 0 1 0.08 0 1
Family income 50-60K 0.07 0 1 0.08 0 1
Family income 60-75K 0.08 0 1 0.09 0 1
Family income 75-90K 0.03 0 1 0.07 0 1
Family income 90-110K 0.03 0 1 0.07 0 1
Family income 110-150K 0.03 0 1 0.08 0 1
Family income 150K plus 0.06 0 1 0.08 0 1
City size 10-100K 0.24 0 1 0.46 0 1
City size 100-1000K 0.34 0 1 0.17 0 1
City size 1000K plus 0.10 0 1 0.07 0 1
Democrat 0.45 0 1 0.35 0 1
Republican 0.16 0 1 0.24 0 1
Liberal 0.25 0 1 0.29 0 1
Home owner 0.51 0 1 0.53 0 1
Based on 136 individuals in the treatment group and 1,168 in the control group.
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Appendix 4.A.2: Covariate Balance Pre-Shock
Table 4.A.2.1 compares covariates between the treatment group and the control group,
measured pre-Great Recession, in the 2006 sample panel. Table 4.A.2.2 compares covari-
ates between the treated and controlled, measured pre-immigration crisis, in the 2010
sample panel.
Table 4.A.2.1: Descriptives in the 2006 Sample Panel; Pre-Great Recession Wave 2006 –
2008
Treatment Control Diff. test p-value
Variables Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. based on matched sample
Number of children 2.00 0 6 1.92 0 8 0.30
Number of siblings 3.85 0 14 3.50 0 32 0.93
Age 42.24 22 73 49.04 18 89 0.22
Percentages
Married 0.56 0 1 0.52 0 1 0.11
Widowed 0.01 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.71
Divorced 0.17 0 1 0.17 0 1 0.42
Separated 0.07 0 1 0.02 0 1 0.88
Never married 0.19 0 1 0.21 0 1 0.18
High school 0.57 0 1 0.49 0 1 0.89
College 0.27 0 1 0.28 0 1 0.11
Graduate 0.05 0 1 0.12 0 1 0.79
Family income 10K minus 0.18 0 1 0.16 0 1 0.49
Family income 10-20K 0.15 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.21
Family income 20-30K 0.09 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.60
Family income 30-40K 0.09 0 1 0.11 0 1 0.96
Family income 40-50K 0.10 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.93
Family income 50-60K 0.08 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.69
Family income 60-75K 0.07 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.53
Family income 75-90K 0.08 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.62
Family income 90-110K 0.06 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.31
Family income 110-150K 0.07 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.79
Family income 150K plus 0.03 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.81
City size 10K minus 0.40 0 1 0.32 0 1 0.41
City size 10-100K 0.36 0 1 0.45 0 1 0.47
City size 100-1000K 0.17 0 1 0.16 0 1 0.25
City size 1000K plus 0.07 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.12
Democrat 0.37 0 1 0.35 0 1 0.20
Republican 0.20 0 1 0.27 0 1 0.38
Liberal 0.27 0 1 0.27 0 1 0.27
Home owner 0.37 0 1 0.47 0 1 0.46
Based on 81 individuals in the treatment group and 1,109 in the control group.
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Table 4.A.2.2: Descriptives in the 2010 Sample Panel; Pre-Immigration Crisis Wave 2010
– 2012
Treatment Control Diff. test p-value
Variables Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. based on matched sample
Number of children 2.17 0 8 1.81 0 8 0.99
Number of siblings 4.43 0 19 3.36 0 30 0.22
Age 45.80 19 88 48.77 18 89 0.77
Percentages
Married 0.43 0 1 0.46 0 1 0.89
Widowed 0.07 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.88
Divorced 0.16 0 1 0.19 0 1 0.97
Separated 0.04 0 1 0.03 0 1 0.68
High school 0.56 0 1 0.50 0 1 0.59
College 0.23 0 1 0.28 0 1 0.52
Graduate 0.04 0 1 0.13 0 1 0.30
Family income 10-20K 0.21 0 1 0.11 0 1 0.05
Family income 20-30K 0.18 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.38
Family income 30-40K 0.09 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.51
Family income 40-50K 0.08 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.52
Family income 50-60K 0.06 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.60
Family income 60-75K 0.08 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.26
Family income 75-90K 0.03 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.20
Family income 90-110K 0.02 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.38
Family income 110-150K 0.04 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.52
Family income 150K plus 0.05 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.48
City size 10-100K 0.23 0 1 0.46 0 1 0.17
City size 100-1000K 0.34 0 1 0.17 0 1 0.11
City size 1000K plus 0.10 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.83
Democrat 0.44 0 1 0.35 0 1 0.03
Republican 0.17 0 1 0.24 0 1 0.05
Liberal 0.23 0 1 0.29 0 1 0.47
Home owner 0.42 0 1 0.45 0 1 0.76
Based on 136 individuals in the treatment group and 1,168 in the control group.
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Appendix 4.A.3: Pre-Treatment Trends
Figure 4.A.3.1 illustrates the coefficient estimates of the leads and lags model for different
outcome variables. None of the estimates of the interactions of Treatment and the second
wave is significantly distinguishable from zero. Therefore, arguably, the trends measured
pre-shock between the treatment and control groups are parallel.
Figure 4.A.3.1: Pre-Treatment Trends: Estimates of Treatment×Every Wave
a. Trust Big Companies b. Gov. Equalize Income c. Gov. Help Poor
d. Att. to Immig.: All e. Att. to Immig.: Cauc.
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Appendix 4.A.4: Supplementary Estimation Tables
Table 4.A.4.1: Effects of Recent Unemployment during the Great Recession on Attitudes
Related to Populism; Full Baseline Model
Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.32*** (0.50) 0.70** (0.34) -0.00 (0.43) -0.28 (0.48)
Married -0.47 (0.50) -0.03 (0.39) -0.08 (0.35) -0.99 (0.69)
Widowed -1.24 (0.80) 0.64 (0.62) -0.16 (0.56) -0.11 (0.79)
Divorced -0.88 (0.61) 0.11 (0.54) -0.05 (0.51) -0.38 (0.80)
Separated -0.81 (0.67) -0.58 (0.54) 0.28 (0.52) -1.02 (0.81)
Number of Siblings 0.13** (0.06) -0.00 (0.06) 0.12** (0.06) 0.08 0.08
Number of Children -0.03 (0.14) -0.00 (0.13) 0.09 (0.12) -0.01 (0.18)
Age -0.12 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.01 (0.10) -0.48** (0.21)
Age Squared 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00* (0.00)
High School 0.53 (0.50) -0.12 (0.39) 0.64 (0.52) -0.85 (0.72)
College 1.12* (0.60) -0.06 (0.46) 0.42 (0.59) -0.54 (0.82)
Graduate 1.14 (0.69) 0.38 (0.63) 0.58 (0.72) -0.74 (1.04)
Family Income 10-20K 0.29 (0.30) 0.21 (0.28) -0.51* (0.28) -0.57 (0.35)
Family Income 20-30K 0.06 (0.30) 0.24 (0.25) -0.07 (0.28) 0.48 (0.37)
Family Income 30-40K -0.16 (0.29) 0.30 (0.24) -0.06 (0.28) 0.37 0.37
Family Income 40-50K 0.24 (0.31) 0.27 (0.29) -0.15 (0.29) -0.29 (0.40)
Family Income 50-60K 0.15 (0.31) -0.12 (0.27) -0.46 (0.28) 0.14 (0.37)
Family Income 60-75K 0.09 (0.31) -0.33 (0.27) -0.36 (0.28) 0.59 (0.42)
Family Income 75-90K -0.05 (0.35) -0.10 (0.32) -0.36 (0.32) 0.21 (0.45)
Family Income 90-110K 0.14 (0.34) -0.20 (0.33) 0.07 (0.37) -0.21 (0.53)
Family Income 110-150K -0.34 (0.38) -0.01 (0.32) 0.01 (0.37) 0.17 (0.54)
Family Income 150K Plus 0.35 (0.39) -0.56 (0.37) -0.18 (0.39) -0.19 (0.56)
City Size 10-100K -0.15 (0.31) 0.39 (0.28) 0.57* (0.33) 0.22 (0.35)
City Size 100-1000K -0.05 (0.56) 0.38 (0.55) 0.62 (0.51) 0.33 (0.59)
City Size 1000K Plus -1.75* (0.97) 1.57 (1.05) 2.01* (1.07) -0.36 (1.39)
Democrat 0.11 (0.25) 0.14 (0.22) 0.15 (0.24) -0.37 (0.33)
Republican 0.16 (0.26) 0.16 (0.24) 0.05 (0.21) 0.15 (0.33)
Liberal -0.16 (0.18) 0.07 (0.16) 0.05 (0.19) 0.36 (0.23)
Home Owner -0.24 (0.40) -0.01 (0.32) -0.19 (0.28) 0.15 (0.31)
Wave 2 0.03 (0.15) -0.04 (0.13) -0.03 (0.16) 0.74** (0.33)
Wave 3 -0.46** (0.20) -0.78*** (0.20) -0.37 (0.25) 1.47*** (0.56)
No. of Obs. 1,569 5,049 3,057 878
Note: The sample excludes individuals who were unemployed or whose spouse was unemployed in either wave 2006 or
wave 2008. The treatment group consists of respondents who did not become unemployed or whose spouse did not
become unemployed until wave 2010 and the control group contains respondents who were not laid off, and whose spouse
was not laid off, at all in the three waves. Wave 2010 is the only post-Great Recession period with respect to
unemployment. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every column. Robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.A.4.2: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Attitude to Immigration; Full Baseline
Model
Attitude to Immigration All Non-Hispanic Whites
(1) (2)
Treat.×Post-Immig. Crisis -0.50* (0.30) -1.40** (0.60)
Married -0.01 (0.42) -0.07 (0.73)
Widowed -0.18 (0.69) -0.11 (1.24)
Divorced -0.50 (0.53) -0.82 (0.95)
Separated -0.19 (0.56) -0.50 (1.13)
Number of Siblings -0.04 (0.06) 0.01 (0.11)
Number of Children 0.00 (0.15) -0.20 (0.19)
Age -0.01 (0.11) 0.09 (0.15)
Age Squared -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
High School 0.13 (0.39) 0.50 (0.76)
College -0.36 (0.52) 0.03 (0.82)
Graduate -1.01 (0.77) -2.00 (1.26)
Family Income 10-20K 0.21 (0.29) 0.11 (0.46)
Family Income 20-30K 0.09 (0.33) -0.31 (0.52)
Family Income 30-40K 0.11 (0.32) 0.07 (0.46)
Family Income 40-50K -0.20 (0.35) 0.13 (0.50)
Family Income 50-60K 0.11 (0.39) 0.02 (0.53)
Family Income 60-75K -0.01 (0.41) -0.11 (0.53)
Family Income 75-90K -0.16 (0.47) -0.50 (0.59)
Family Income 90-110K -0.11 (0.48) -0.51 (0.60)
Family Income 110-150K -1.15** (0.50) -1.38** (0.64)
Family Income 150K Plus -0.33 (0.47) -0.62 (0.53)
City Size 10-100K 0.05 (0.38) 0.64 (0.52)
City Size 100-1000K 0.47 (0.75) -0.13 (0.84)
City Size 1000K Plus 1.15 (0.93) 2.53** (1.16)
Democrat -0.06 (0.25) -0.10 (0.36)
Republican -0.26 (0.28) -0.34 (0.37)
Liberal 0.13 (0.21) 0.16 (0.32)
Home Owner 0.16 (0.30) 0.30 (0.45)
Wave 2 0.24 (0.19) 0.35 (0.25)
Wave 3 0.76*** (0.28) 1.02*** (0.39)
No. of Obs. 1,070 690
Note: The treatment group is composed of respondents who resided in the West South Central region
of the U.S. in wave 2014, i.e. the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, that the
immigration crisis most intensely impacted. The control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same
wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave 2014. The first two columns use the whole sample
and the last two restrict the sample to include non-Hispanic Whites only. Individual fixed effects and
survey wave fixed effects are included in every column. Robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.A.4.3: Effects of Recent Unemployment on Attitudes Related to Populism:
Location-Specific Trends & Placebo Treatment
Trust Companies Gov. Equ. Inc. Gov. Help Poor Atti. Immig.
Recent Unemp. Post-Rec. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat.×Post-Great Rec. -1.35** -0.41 0.77** -0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.81
(0.56) (0.49) (0.33) (0.43) (0.44) (0.51) (0.56) (0.58)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 1,569 682 5,049 2,148 3,057 1,298 878 398
Note: The odd columns report estimates of the specification including state-specific linear trends. The
even columns show estimates with wave 2008 as a fake treatment time by using only pre-(real)
treatment data, i.e. the first two waves. The treatment group consists of respondents who did not
become unemployed or whose spouse did not become unemployed until wave 2010 and the control
group contains respondents who were not laid off, and whose spouse was not laid off, at all in the three
waves. Wave 2010 is the only post-Great Recession period with respect to unemployment. Individual
fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every column. Controls contain extensive
demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age, marital status
dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s
total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification,
dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.A.4.4: Effects of the Immigration Crisis on Attitude to Immigration: Different
Coverage of Treated Region
Extended Treated Region Shrunk Treated Region
All Non-Hisp. Whites All Non-Hisp. Whites
Attitude to Immigration (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat.×Post-Immig. Crisis -0.40 -1.11* -0.45 -0.71
(0.30) (0.58) (0.37) (0.68)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,070 690 1,070 690
Note: In the first two columns, the treatment group is extended to contain respondents who resided in
wave 2014 in all states bordering with Mexico including Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and neighboring
states of Texas such as Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. In the last two columns, the treatment
group is shrunk to contain respondents who resided in wave 2014 in New Mexico and Texas only. The
control group covers the rest of the U.S. in the same wave. The post-immigration crisis period is wave
2014. Odd columns include the whole sample and even columns restricts the sample to include
non-Hispanic Whites only. Individual fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects are included in every
column. Controls contain extensive demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of
respondent’s age, marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree
dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the population size of respondent’s
place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.A.4.5: Effects of the Great Recession on Populist Voting: Cohort Mean of Couple Unemployment as Explanatory Variable
2016 U.S. Presid. Primary Elections 2016 U.S. Presid. General Election
Sanders Clinton Trump Clinton Trump
Great Recession (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Cohort mean of couple unemp. 0.32** 0.25 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16** -0.16 0.16 -0.02 -0.30*** -0.04
(0.15) (0.22) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.09) (0.14)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Obs. 135 135 135 135 135 135 136 136 136 136
Note: Covariates take values in wave 2010. All the dependent and explanatory variables are averages within cohort. Controls contain the mean of voting
turnout in the corresponding election, as well as extensive averaged demographic and socio-economic variables such as the quadratic of respondent’s age,
marital status dummies, number of siblings, number of children, academic degree dummies, categories of last year’s total family income, categories of the
population size of respondent’s place, party self-identification, dummy of liberal ideology, and dummy of home owner. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
114
Appendix 4.B: Numbers of Family Unit Apprehen-
sions by Month
Table 4.B.1 lists the numbers of family unit apprehensions by month in different border
patrol sectors in the U.S. from October 2012 to September 2016.
Table 4.B.1: Total Family Unit Apprehensions by Month; Oct.2012-Sep.2016
a. Fiscal Year 2013
b. Fiscal Year 2014
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c. Fiscal Year 2015
d. Fiscal Year 2016
Source: United States Border Patrol
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Appendix 4.C: Details of Survey Questions on Vari-
ables
The questions on the confidence in major companies read “I am going to name major
companies in this country. As far as the people running these major companies are
concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or
hardly any confidence at all in them?” and the responses contain “1. A great deal, 2. Only
some, 3. Hardly any, 8. Don’t know, 9. No answer, IAP. Not applicable”. Two questions
concern the government’s income redistribution policies. The first one asks “Some people
think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between
the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income
assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with
reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale
from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the
income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government
should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7
comes closest to the way you feel? (CIRCLE ONE):” and the answers range from 1 to 7 as
well as “8. Don’t know, 9. No answer, IAP. Not applicable”. The second relevant question
is “Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible
to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card.
Other people think it is not the government’s responsibility, and that each person should
take care of himself; they are at Point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or
haven’t you have up your mind on this?” and the responses range from 1 to 5 as well as “8.
Don’t know, 9. No answer, IAP. Not applicable”. The question regarding the perception
of economic unfairness is “Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard
work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which
do you think is most important?” and the answers are “1. Hard work most important,
2. Hard work, luck equally important, 3. Luck most important, 8. Don’t know, 9. No
answer, IAP. Not applicable”. The question on attitude to immigration reads “Do you
think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be” and the corresponding
answers provided are “1. increased a lot, 2. increased a little, 3. remain the same as
it is, 4. reduced a little, 5. reduced a lot, 8. can’t choose, 9. no answer, and IAP. not
applicable”. I see all the answers of “8. Don’t know, 9. No answer, IAP. Not applicable”
as missing values.
All these outcome variables are inverted so that a larger score in each outcome vari-
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able refers to a higher level of confidence in major corporations, preferences for income
redistribution, and the perception of economic unfairness, respectively. The dummy vari-
able of the attitude to immigration is coded in the way such that it values 1 if respondent
reported “1. increased a lot, 2. increased a little, 3. remain the same as it is”, and values
0 otherwise.
The questions concerning the working status ask “Last week were you (your wife/husband)
working full time, part time, going to school, keeping house, or what?” respectively. The
answers provided are “1. Working full time, 2. Working part time, 3. With a job, but not
at work because of temporary illness, vacation, strike, 4. Unemployed, laid off, looking
for work, 5. Retired, 6. In school, 7. Keeping house, 8. Other, 9. No answer, IAP.
Not applicable (for spousal working status only)”. The couple unemployment variable is
coded in the way such that it values 1 if the respondent reported “4. Unemployed, laid
off, looking for work” for him/herself or for his or her spouse, and values 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 4.D: Game Theoretical Framework
In this appendix I present a simple game theoretical model to explain the key findings in
the main body of the paper. This model is a modified version based on the one developed
by Ghatak and Verdier (2017).
4.D.1: Set-Up of Homogeneous Society
This set-up of homogeneous-player game is established by Ghatak and Verdier (2017).
Consider a one-stage game in which both players, a and b, have to divide a positive payoff
R. They both can take an action from the action set A = {F,NF} where F refers to
fight and NF indicates non-fight. In a homogenous society, every member is assumed
to be identical thus with the same probability of winning, namely 1
2
, if they choose to
fight. The payoff in the situation of mutual fighting will be divided evenly between the
two players with a cost of fighting, c such that c > 0, borne by both players. One may
see this cost as an opportunity cost such as time or energy that would have been spent
on profitable events, e.g., work. If one player fights while the other surrenders, then
the whole payoff will be taken by the fighter. If neither players decides to fight, then
the payoff will be evenly shared by the two players with an extra reward, r such that
r > 0, enjoyed by both players. This extra reward may be regarded as beneficial networks
or phycological benefits such as mutual trust and subjective well-being. The payoffs in
different situations are shown in Table 4.D.1.
Table 4.D.1: Game of Homogeneous Society
With different parameter values, this game may transform to divergent variants: if
R
2
−c > 0 and r < R
2
, it will become the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The only equilibrium will be
that both players decide to fight and obtain their payoff R
2
− c, respectively; if R
2
− c < 0
and r < R
2
, it will be the Game of Chicken or Hawk-Dove Game. The two pure equilibria
are that one player fights and obtains the whole payoff R while the other concedes and
gets nothing; if R
2
− c > 0 and r > R
2
, it will become a coordination game. The two pure
equilibria are that both players choose the same action, either fight or compromise, while
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in the former case both acquire R
2
− c and in the latter both get R
2
+ r; if R
2
− c < 0 and
r > R
2




4.D.2: Society of Heterogeneous Socio-Economic Classes
Now suppose that members of the society are divided to two groups: group A with low
socio-economic class, and group B with high socio-economic class. A is assumed to be
more advantageous in member quantity while B more powerful individually, so as a group
A and B are equally competitive. When two members within a group play a game to
divide the payoff R, it is the same case as shown in the previous subsection. However,
when the two players a and b are from different groups such that a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
they are backed by their own group, respectively. Because the power of the two groups




The cost of mutual fighting c is assumed to depend on the economic condition of the
society as in Ghatak and Verdier (2017). This makes sense in that c is the opportunity
cost. When the economy is booming, the time spent on fighting rather than on work
with higher wage is more costly. Vice Versa. c takes two values, c̄ and c such that
0 < c < R
2
< c̄, to represent good and bad economic performance, respectively.
Another difference from the basic set-up of Ghatak and Verdier (2017) is that the
cooperation reward r is contingent on whether the two players are from the same group.31
One may associate r to sympathy or trust in similar people. If they are from the same
group, the level of sympathy or mutual trust is higher, namely r = r̄. They gain more
happiness from cooperation and are more likely to develop beneficial network. Vice Versa.
r̄ and r are subject to 0 < r < R
2
< r̄.
In such a game, when the economy is in a good condition, namely c = c̄, mutual
fighting will never be a dominant pure strategy. If both players are from the same group
thus bear higher sympathy, cooperation will be the dominant pure strategy; if they are
from different groups thus have lower mutual trust, it will be the Game of Chicken.
Nonetheless, when the economy turns down as in the Great Recession, i.e. c = c, mutual
fighting will always be a pure equilibrium no matter whether the two players are from the
same group (a coordination game) or from different groups (The Prisoner’s Dilemma).
This game model of heterogeneous socio-economic classes well fits the empirical results
31Ghatak and Verdier (2017) assume that the cooperating benefits vary depending on economic con-
ditions rather than player heterogeneity.
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in Section 4.5. In a prosperous economy, when people are unemployed, they do not choose
to fight against elites who represent the high socio-economic class. Nevertheless, the Great
Recession rendered job hunting difficult and wage declined, so fighting became less costly.
Especially those lately losing their job during the Great Recession felt to be betrayed by
elites and did not trust in them. Hence they were more likely to take the dominant
strategy of fighting against elites by requesting the government to impose higher taxes
on the wealthy and voting for left-wing populist who expressed anti-elite rhetoric.
4.D.3: Society of Heterogeneous Cultures and Identities
Let us take a recent immigration influx into account then: group A consists of natives who
are the majority and group B is composed of recent immigrants who are the minority. The
majority group is assumed to be more powerful so its member has a higher probability
of winning, pa such that
1
2
< pa < 1, in a fight with a minority member. The sympathy
or mutual trust is assumed to be at the lower level, namely r = r, between a native
and a recent immigrant because of differential cultural backgrounds and identities. The
payoffs in this game of heterogeneous cultures and identities between a native and a
recent immigrant is displayed in Table 4.D.2.
Table 4.D.2: Game of Heterogeneous Cultures and Identities
When the economy is in a bad condition, i.e. c = c, the majority member will always
take the action of fighting since c < R
2
< paR. Moreover, if c > (1 − pa)R, the recent
minority member will surrender when the majority fights, which further improves the
incentive of fighting for the majority. In such a game, even when the economy is in a
good condition as the U.S. economy in 2014 recovered from the Great Recession, i.e.
c = c̄, the majority will still choose to fight so long as R
2
< c̄ < paR. The recent minority
will then correspond to concede since (1−pa)R < R2 < c̄. The notable difference from the
previous subsection is that without recent immigration, fight will never be a dominant
strategy in a booming economy. However, with recent immigration, fight will still be a
dominant strategy for the majority in a prosperous economy if the majority is influential
enough.
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This game model of heterogeneous cultures and identities is consistent with the em-
pirical results in Section 4.6. Amid and right after the 2014 immigration crisis, residents
that were mostly affected became more negative to immigration even though the local
labor market was not significantly impacted and the U.S. economy already largely recov-
ered from the Great Recession. Furthermore, they were more prone to politically support
right-wing populist who exploited anti-immigration rhetoric in his campaign.
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